Vaalijärjestelmä on yksi keskeisimmistä demokraattisen järjestelmän instituutioista, joka vaikuttaa merkittävästi siihen, kuka vaalit voittaa ja kuka häviää. Eerik Lagerspetz analysoi kirjassaan Social Choice and Democratic Values laajasti äänestyssääntöjen vaikutusta demokraattisiin päätöksiin. Lagerspetzin teos on tärkeä monestakin syystä, mutta erityisesti siksi, että se yhdistää harvoin keskenään keskustelevia normatiivisen demokratiateorian ja sosiaalisen valinnan teorian perinteitä. Pohdin artikkelissani äänestysmenettelyjen valintaa. Keskityn siihen, millä säännöillä äänestysmenettely valitaan, en niinkään sitä, ketkä valinnan tekevät. Tarkastelen aluksi sitä, miten äänestyssäännön valinta poikkeaa muista poliittisista valinnoista. Tämän jälkeen (...) pohdin, millä menettelyillä valinta voidaan tehdä ja lopuksi tarkastelen kahta empiiristä tutkimusta siitä, miten äänestysmenettelyjä valitaan. (shrink)

Theories of deliberative democracy maintain that outcomes of democratic deliberation are fairer than outcomes of mere aggregation of preferences. Theorists of impartial justice, especially Rawls and Sen, emphasize the role of deliberative processes for making just decisions. Democratic deliberation seems therefore to provide a model of impartial decision-making applicable in the real world. However, various types of cognitive and affective biases limit individual capacity to see things from others’ perspectives. In this paper, two strategies of enhancing impartiality in real world (...) decision-making are discussed. The first involves decision-making processes which detach decision-makers from their particular interests, whereas the second aims to enhance the quality of democratic deliberation and empathetic reasoning. We conclude that new forms of democratic deliberation may be necessary if we hold on to the aspiration of making decisions which are both democratic and impartial. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality (...) assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice 'pathologies' - inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions - are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules. (shrink)

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We distinguish between two institutional mechanisms of accountability, i.e., opportunity to punish and requirement of a justification, and examine the separate and combined effects of these mechanisms on individual behavior. For this purpose, we designed a decision-making experiment where subjects engage in a three-player trust game with two senders and one responder. We ask whether holding (...) the responder accountable increases senders’ and responders’ contributions in a trust game. When restricting the analysis to the first round, the requirement of justification seems to have a positive impact on senders’ contributions. When the game is played repeatedly, the experience of previous rounds dominates the results and significant treatment effects are no longer seen. We also find that responders tend to justify their choices in terms of reciprocity, which is in line with observed behavior. Moreover, the treatment combining punishment and justification hinders justifications that appeal to pure self-interest. (shrink)