Wittgenstein's conception of logical and conceptual truth is often thought to rival that of the logical positivists. This paper argues that there are important respects in which these conceptions complement each other. Analyticity, in the positivists' sense, coincides, not with Wittgenstein's notion of a grammatical proposition, but rather with his notion of a tautology. Grammatical propositions can usually be construed as analyticity postulates in Carnap's sense of the term. This account of grammatical and analytic propositions will be illustrated by appeal (...) to logical, conceptual and arithmetic truths. Its consequences for an analysis of corresponding modal notions will be indicated. (shrink)

The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth an...

Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not (...) explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper. (shrink)

Fine bases his influential conception of essence on a particular account of definitions. And he complements it with a specific account of analyticity. I will argue that Fine's conception of relative analyticity confuses the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's definition with the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's meaning. His idea that correct definitions specify essential properties of meanings is mistaken. The correctness of definitions can only be assessed by (...) reference to the actual usage of the terms involved. The resulting conception of definitions leads to a deflationary interpretation of claims about essences. (shrink)

According to Hume’s principle, a sentence of the form ⌜The number of Fs = the number of Gs⌝ is true if and only if the Fs are bijectively correlatable to the Gs. Neo-Fregeans maintain that this principle provides an implicit definition of the notion of cardinal number that vindicates a platonist construal of such numerical equations. Based on a clarification of the explanatory status of Hume’s principle, I will provide an argument in favour of a nominalist construal of numerical equations. (...) The neo-Fregean objections to such a construal will be examined and rejected. And the implications of the nominalist construal for the use of numerals and for the understanding of ontological questions for the existence of numbers will be spelled out. (shrink)

In a notorious passage from his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that one can state of the standard metre neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long. While many commentators have rejected this claim, it has been commonly assumed that Wittgenstein himself endorsed it. In a recently published article, Thomas Müller not only provides a novel argument against Wittgenstein's claim about the standard metre but also claims that Wittgenstein did not actually endorse that claim. (...) In this paper, I argue that Müller's exegetical thesis is false and that his novel argument against Wittgenstein's claim about the standard metre is unsound. (shrink)

Luca Barlassina and Fabio del Prete argue that the past has changed by appealing to a sentence whose truth value changes after the time to which it refers. We consider various interpretations of the sentence at issue and show that there is no interpretation under which their argument goes through. We suggest a possible source of the confusion and consider what implications the discussion may have for the analysis of tense.

Ludwig Wittgenstein acknowledges that the Augustinian picture also informed his earlier conception of language. The Augustinian identification of the meaning of a word with the word's referent is accepted only with a further restriction. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between simple objects and the thereof composed complex objects. This chapter provides a systematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein's sometimes opaque remarks on ostensive definitions and his critique of the Augustinian picture of language. It then addresses the doctrines about names and naming endorsed (...) in the Tractatus. According to the later Wittgenstein the simple ostensive definition of a word, consisting in the utterance of the word accompanied by a pointing gesture, does not unambiguously determine the use of the word. Wittgenstein's arguments can be complemented by the observation that having the same sample is not necessary for two terms to be equivalent either. (shrink)

By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by (...) Tooley and Guleserian, against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being. (shrink)

Inhalt des Aufsatzes ist eine kritische Untersuchung der von Künne in seinem Buch Abstrakte Gegenstände vorgeschlagenen Definition der Unterscheidung zwischen singulären und generellen Termen. Zunächst wird aufgezeigt, dass Künnes Formulierung seiner Definition dahingehend unklar ist, dass sie sowohl eine satzrelative als auch eine kategorische Deutung der fraglichen Unterscheidung zulässt. Im Hauptteil des Aufsatzes soll dann gezeigt werden, dass Künnes Definition in beiden Deutungen inadäquat ist. Schließlich wird eine alternative Definition der Unterscheidung zwischen singulären und generellen Termen vorgeschlagen, welche zwar mit (...) Künnes intuitiven Beispielen entsprechender Terme in Einklang steht, sich jedoch nur schwerlich in Künnes begriffliche Gesamtarchitektur integrieren ließe. (shrink)

The paper provides an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s claim that a mathematical proof must be surveyable. It will be argued that this claim specifies a precondition for the applicability of the word ‘proof’. Accordingly, the latter is applicable to a proof-pattern only if we can come to agree by mere observation whether or not the pattern possesses the relevant structural features. The claim is problematic. It does not imply any questionable finitist doctrine. But it cannot be said to articulate a feature (...) of our actual usage of the word ‘proof’. The claim can be dissociated, however, from two tenable doctrines of Wittgenstein, namely that proofs can be used as paradigms for corresponding proof concepts and that a proof is not an experiment. (shrink)

Quine tries to combine truth conditional semantics with linguistic behaviourism. To this end, he identifies the truth conditions of a sentence with the conditions that prompt speakers to assign truth or falsity to the sentence. The first problem with this conception is that truth conditions determine not when truth-value assignments are made, but when they are correct. This fact vitiates Quine’s account of observation sentences (section 2). A second difficulty pertains only to theoretical sentences. The correctness of truth-value assignments to (...) such sentences depends not on current experiences, but on what can be experienced on other occasions. This observation militates against Quine’s general verification holism and against his account of predications (section 3 and 4). Combining truth conditional semantics and linguistic behaviourism is possible, though, if both these lessons are taken into account (section 5). (shrink)

Ratio, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 151-154, June 2022.

Ratio, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 151-154, June 2022.