Die neue diplomatische Ausgabe der Chronik von Leontios Machairas setzt zwar die Publikationen von K. Sathas und Dawkins voraus, Methode und Zielsetzungen der neuen Bearbeitung und Veröffentlichung der Chronik – der 2. Band mit der Kritischen Ausgabe wird noch geliefert – weichen jedoch davon ab und nähern sich den zeitgenössischen textphilologischen Forderungen. Die Herausgeber des hier zu präsentierenden 1. Bandes haben schon seit langem in zahlreichen Abhandlungen an dem Dialog über die Chronik von Machairas selbst und ihre Interpretationsmöglichkeiten wie auch (...) über andere Textausgaben früher neugriechischer Werke teilgenommen, wobei sie immer den starken oralen Charakter beider Versionen, die die Handschriften uns überliefern , betonen. (shrink)

This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins ‘the imaginary texture of the real’. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it (...) will be suggested, following both Kant and Strawson, that there is a more fundamental working of the imagination, present in both perception and the constructions of fictions. What Kant and Strawson failed to make clear, however, was that the workings of the imagination within the perceived world, gives that world, an affective logic. The domain of affect is that of emotions, feelings and desire, and to claim such an affective logic in the world we experience, is to point out that it has salience and significance for us. Such salience suggests and demands the desiring and sometimes fearful responses we make to it; the shape of the perceived world echoed in the shapes our bodies take within it. (shrink)

I expect every reader knows the hackneyed old joke: ‘What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter.’ Antique as this joke is, it none the less points to an interesting question. For the so-called mind–body dichotomy, which has been raised to almost canonical status in post-Cartesian philosophy, is not in fact at all easy to draw or to defend. This of course means that ‘the mind–body problem’ is difficult both to describe and to solve—or rather, as I would (...) prefer, to dissolve. (shrink)

The word ‘freedom’ leads a double life. As a rallying cry in the mouths of politicians and publicists, it features in speech acts which inspire men to brave endeavours. Freedom or death are the proffered alternatives, and they are generally linked with fatiguing dispositions such as vigilance. As a philosophical concept , on the other hand, freedom is a territory in which battles are fought about such issues as positivity and negativity, virtue, determinism and the character of the will. There (...) is remarkably little connection between these two lives. Philosophers do not seem to take much interest in courage, and politicians do not tarry to specify whether it is negative or positive liberty they are talking about. (shrink)