Contemporary social policy toward low-income women in the United States, as evidenced both by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and by the AFDC programme that preceded it, is in part an artefact of long-standing conceptions of the nature of citizenship. This view sees citizenship as resting primarily on civil and political rights, not on rights with respect to economic, social, and cultural matters. Drawing on scholarly literature on the development of international human rights regimes, the feminist literature (...) that analyses social policy both comparatively and in terms of US domestic policy, and literature regarding contemporary movements among low-income persons, this paper analyses the efforts of one organization, the Kensington Welfare Rights Union (KWRU), to challenge US policy via international human rights law and international enforcement mechanisms. We will suggest that, despite some of the flaws of the KWRU, their approach is a promising one for low-income women. In particular, we wish to suggest that a broader conception of citizenship that takes into account economic, cultural, and social rights is necessary to create a more equitable and democratic polity for women. (shrink)

Activists in feminist, queer, and trans movements share in common a critique of the existing gender order. Yet activists may have different understandings of what is wrong with existing gender arrangements, and different understandings of what might be required to establish greater social equality. Using data from interviews with activists in the feminist, queer, and trans movements in Iceland, this article looks at the ways that gender equality and the gender binary are understood by individuals who identify with feminist, queer, (...) and/or trans activism, and some of their shared and conflicting critiques of the existing gender order. (shrink)

For decades, scholars have been calling into question the universality of disciplinary objects and categories. The decay of master narratives showcases a distrust of universals, while deepening particularity seems to promise nothing but further dissolution. For Jason Josephson-Storm, these are dead ends. He wants to offer a path forward, which he terms metamodernism. This is the first full-length work to line up the various critiques of disciplinary master-categories (religion, science, art, etc.) and trace their affinities and shared conceptual roots. (...) It suggests that if these critiques are granted, they tell us something fundamental about the mechanisms through which concepts and social categories are produced and maintained. They suggest that the social world should be seen in terms of a "process social ontology" with temporary zones of stability called "social kinds." This amounts to a new theory of society and a new methodology for research in the human sciences. The work also broadens to fundamental issues of the relationship between knowledge and value, promoting not skepticism but zeteticism--a stance directed toward humble, emancipatory knowledge. Valuing this form of knowledge allows postmodernism to be channeled into a critical virtue ethics directed toward multi-species. (shrink)

Research Ethics in Applied Economics Emphasizing the new challenges posed by the data science revolution, digital media, and changing standards, Research Ethics in Applied Economics examines the ethical issues faced by the applied economics researcher at each stage of the research process. The first section of the book considers project development, including issues of project management, selection bias in asking research questions, and political incentives in the development and funding of research ideas. The second section addresses data collection and analysis, (...) discussing concerns about participant rights, data falsification, data management, specification search, p-hacking, and replicability. The final section focuses on sharing results with academic audiences and beyond, with an emphasis on self-plagiarism, self-promotion, and the importance of achieving policy impact. The discussion and related recommendations highlight emergent issues in research ethics. Featuring case studies from experienced researchers on how they address ethical issues, this book provides practical guidance to both students and experienced practitioners seeking to navigate ethical issues in their applied economics research. (shrink)

In The Humboldtian Tradition, eleven scholars analyse Wilhelm von Humboldt as a historical phenomenon and a contemporary symbol. They put Humboldt's basic academic principles into context and discuss their significance for the current debate about the university.

For decades, scholars have been calling into question the universality of disciplinary objects and categories. The coherence of defined autonomous categories—such as religion, science, and art—has collapsed under the weight of postmodern critiques, calling into question the possibility of progress and even the value of knowledge. Jason Ānanda Josephson Storm aims to radicalize and move beyond these deconstructive projects to offer a path forward for the humanities and social sciences using a new model for theory he calls metamodernism. Metamodernism (...) works through the postmodern critiques and uncovers the mechanisms that produce and maintain concepts and social categories. In so doing, Storm provides a new, radical account of society’s ever-changing nature—what he calls a “Process Social Ontology”—and its materialization in temporary zones of stability or “social kinds.” Storm then formulates a fresh approach to philosophy of language by looking beyond the typical theorizing that focuses solely on human language production, showing us instead how our own sign-making is actually on a continuum with animal and plant communication. Storm also considers fundamental issues of the relationship between knowledge and value, promoting a turn toward humble, emancipatory knowledge that recognizes the existence of multiple modes of the real. Metamodernism is a revolutionary manifesto for research in the human sciences that offers a new way through postmodern skepticism to envision a more inclusive future of theory in which new forms of both progress and knowledge can be realized. (shrink)

Proponents of the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to our supposed right to "die with dignity" to defend their case. I examine and assess different notions of "dignity" that are operating in many arguments for the legalization of assisted suicide, and I find them all to be deficient. I then consider an alternative conception of dignity that is based on Aristotle's conception of the conditions on the best life. I conclude that, while such a conception of dignity fits best (...) with our intuitions about the conditions under which a life has dignity, it supports the legalization of assisted suicide only under very limited circumstances. (shrink)

It has often been noted that Socratic cross-examination is problematic as a method of inquiry, i.e., as a method for 'acquiring' knowledge. Rarely has it been noticed that there are problems with cross-examination when used for the purposes of 'testing' for knowledge. In the 'Charmides', Socrates commits himself to the following principle: In order to discriminate between the person who knows and the person who does not know the subject matter covered by a particular discipline (technê), one must have mastered (...) that discipline. But if Socrates' disavowals of moral knowledge are sincere, it would seem to follow from this principle that, contrary to what Socrates says in many early dialogues, he cannot successfully test claims to moral expertise through cross-examination. Through an examination of the conditions that Socrates places on knowledge and on mastering a 'technê', I show how this problem can be resolved. (shrink)

We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a good explanation for his procedure. When one is attempting (...) to gain true belief and knowledge, it is important to consider the cases that can be made for hypotheses that one has never before considered, much less believed to be true. (shrink)

John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...) detector, we equally have no reason to accept moral objectivism (1977, 23–24, 38–41). Recently, Julia Annas has observed that Mackie has offered us “a coarse and imperceptive interpretation of Plato,” in addition to a mistaken account of the epistemic requirements of moral objectivism (2001, 238). But one might worry that the case Annas makes for the homely nature of Platonic moral knowledge—it’s just like plumbing, only non-optional (2001, 246)—rests, as she admits, on her focus on dialogues like the Laches, in which the analogy between the moral virtues and crafts like flute-playing, shoe-making, and navigating is emphasized (2001, 244). Annas explicitly leaves open the question whether Mackie’s interpretation might capture Plato’s conception of moral knowledge in dialogues like the Republic, in which the analogy between moral and mathematical knowledge is emphasized (2001, 243). Yet it is clear from Mackie’s brief remarks about Plato that he has the Republic primarily in mind (Mackie 1977, 23–24). (shrink)

Socrates' cross-examination of Callicles in the 'Gorgias' has traditionally been viewed as a paradigm of the Socratic method. I argue that, when he cross examines Callicles, Socrates behaves out of character. In fact, he acts like a Sophist and violates the very principles of persuasion that he advocates in the 'Gorgias'. I offer an explanation of Socrates' temporary transformation into a Sophist, and suggest that his role-reversal reinforces Plato's representation of Socrates as the model of the virtuous philosopher.

What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we should reconsider Plato's (...) objectivist theory of goodness as unity, or the One. This view is both consistent with and explains our most basic views both about goodness in general and human well-being in particular. (shrink)

In informal terms, abductive reasoning involves inferring the best or most plausible explanation from a given set of facts or data. It is a common occurrence in everyday life and crops up in such diverse places as medical diagnosis, scientific theory formation, accident investigation, language understanding, and jury deliberation. In recent years, it has become a popular and fruitful topic in artificial intelligence research. This volume breaks new ground in the scientific, philosophical, and technological study of abduction. It presents new (...) ideas about inferential and information-processing foundations for knowledge and certainty. The authors argue that knowledge arises from experience by processes of abductive inference, in contrast to the view that it arises non-inferentially, or that deduction and inductive generalization are enough to account for knowledge. Much AI research is hypothetical, so the importance of this book is that it reports key discoveries about abduction that have been made as a result of designing, building, testing, and analyzing actual working knowledge-based systems for medical diagnosis and other abductive tasks. The book tells the story of six generations of increasingly sophisticated generic abduction machines, RED-1, RED-2, PEIRCE, MDX2, TIPS, QUAWDS, and the discovery of reasoning strategies that make it computationally feasible to form well-justified composite explanatory hypotheses, despite the threat of combinatorial explosion. The final chapter argues that perception is logically abductive and presents a layered-abduction computational model of perceptual information processing. This book will be of great interest to researchers in AI, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Method in Ancient Philosophy brings together fifteen new, specially written essays by leading scholars on a broad subject of central importance. The ancient Greeks recognized that different forms of human activity are guided by different methods of reasoning; examination of how they reasoned, and how they thought about their own reasoning, helps us to see how they came to hold the views they did, and how our own methods of enquiry have developed under their influence. Contributors include Terence Irwin, Patricia (...) Curd, Ian Mueller, Robert Bolton, A.A. Long, Gail Fine, Constance C. Meinwald, Lesley Brown, Gisela Striker, C.D.C. Reeve, Charlotte Witt, Richard Kraut, Sarah Broadie, James Allen, and G.E.R. Lloyd. (shrink)

In Socrates' account of his earlier investigations into the nature of causation in the "Phaedo", he describes a method that uses hypotheses. He posited as true those propositions that appeared to harmonize ("sumphonein") with his hypothesis and as false those propositions that failed to harmonize with his hypothesis. Earlier commentators on this passage have maintained that it is impossible to give a univocal reading of the occurrences of "sumphonein"' such that the method that Socrates describes is at all reasonable. It (...) is argued in this paper that such a reading is possible. (shrink)

We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a good explanation for his procedure. When one is attempting (...) to gain true belief and knowledge, it is important to consider the cases that can be made for hypotheses that one has never before considered, much less believed to be true. (shrink)

Socratic cross-examination is used for a number of purposes in Plato's early dialogues; among the most important is inquiry. However, it is difficult to see how a method for rendering one's belief-set coherent is likely to move one closer to knowledge of a mind-independent reality. The Theory of Recollection is introduced in the 'Meno' to explain why successful moral inquiry by means of Socratic cross-examination is probable at least in the long run.

[First paragraph of article] Among historians of science in the U.S.S.R., discussion of the nature of scientific revolutions has been deeply influenced by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. First published in 1962 and translated into Russian in 1975, Kuhn's book has been the subject of many articles in Soviet journals, and many of his arguments have found concurrence among Soviet writers. Kuhn's postulated sequence of "normal science-anomalies-crisis/revolution-normal science," for example, fits the dialectical explanation of revolutions. While some Soviet (...) scholars have found fault with Kuhn's perceived historical relativism, his apparent simplification of the mechanisms of scientific revolutions, and his belief in the "incommensurability" of research paradigms, many others believe that he has captured the essence of the struggle between competing scientific theories. These scholars call for the improvement or emendation of Kuhn's theory, not its wholesale rejection. (shrink)

In Socrates' account of his earlier investigations into the nature of causation in the "Phaedo", he describes a method that uses hypotheses. He posited as true those propositions that appeared to harmonize ("sumphonein") with his hypothesis and as false those propositions that failed to harmonize with his hypothesis. Earlier commentators on this passage have maintained that it is impossible to give a univocal reading of the occurrences of "sumphonein"' such that the method that Socrates describes is at all reasonable. It (...) is argued in this paper that such a reading is possible. (shrink)

Bobonich argues that, in the Laws, Plato is committed to the view that the goodness of all goods entirely distinct from virtue is dependent on the virtue of their possessor. He suggests further that Plato's commitment to this dependency thesis is best explained by Plato's commitment to two other theses: (1) that knowledge is sufficient for all virtue, and (2) that the goodness of goods entirely distinct from virtue depends on their possessor's knowledge of the nature of their goodness. While (...) I agree with Bobonich that Plato maintains his commitment to a strong relationship between virtue, knowledge, and happiness in the Laws, I disagree with the details of Bobonich's account of this relationship. (shrink)

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...) nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism. (shrink)

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...) nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism. (shrink)

A review of John Beversluis' "Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues".

The perception of reality by biosystems is based on different, and in certain respects more effective, principles than those utilized by the more formal procedures of science. As a result, what appears as random pattern to the scientific method can be meaningful pattern to a living organism. The existence of this complementary perception of reality makes possible in principle effective use by organisms of the direct interconnections between spatially separated objects shown to exist in the work of J. S. Bell.

Edited proceedings of an interdisciplinary symposium on consciousness held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Includes a foreword by Freeman Dyson. Chapter authors: G. Vesey, R.L. Gregory, H.C. Longuet-Higgins, N.K. Humphrey, H.B. Barlow, D.M. MacKay, B.D. Josephson, M. Roth, V.S. Ramachandran, S. Padfield, and (editorial summary only) E. Noakes. A scanned pdf is available from this web site (philpapers.org), while alternative versions more suitable for copying text are available from https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/245189. -/- Page numbering convention for the pdf (...) version viewed in a pdf viewer is as follows: 'go to page n' accesses the pair of scanned pages 2n and 2n+1. Applicable licence: CC Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0. (shrink)

The following progress report views language acquisition as primarily the attempt to create processes that connect together in a fruitful way linguistic input and other activity. The representations made of linguistic input are thus those that are optimally effective in mediating such interconnections. An effective Language Acquisition Device should contain mechanisms specific to the task of creating the desired interconnection processes in the linguistic environment in which the language learner finds himself or herself. Analysis of this requirement gives clear indications (...) as to what these mechanisms may be. (shrink)

Niels Bohr's arguments indicating the non-applicability of quantum methodology to the study of the ultimate details of life, given in his bookAtomic Physics and Human Knowledge, conflict with the commonly held opposite view. The bases for the usual beliefs are examined and shown to have little validity; significant differences do exist between the living organism and the type of system studied successfully in the physics laboratory. Dealing with living organisms in quantum-mechanical terms with the same degree of rigor as is (...) normal for non-living systems would seem not to be possible without considering also questions of the origins of life and of the universe. (shrink)

This paper examines the processes involved in attempting to capture the subtlest aspects of nature by the scientific method and argues on this basis that nature is fundamentally elusive and may resist grasping by the methods of science. If we wish to come to terms with this resistance, then a shift in the direction of taking direct experience into account may be necessary for science’s future complete development.

We describe a general problem solving mechanism that is especially suited for performing a particular form of abductive inference, or best-explanation finding. A problem solver embodying this mechanism synthesizes composite hypotheses. It does so by by combining hypothesis parts as a means to the satisfaction of explanatory goals. In this way it is able to arrive at complex, integrated conclusions which are not pre-stored.The intent is to present a computationally-feasible, task-specific problem solver for a particular information processing task which is (...) nevertheless of very great generality. The task is that of synthesizing coherent composite explanatory hypotheses based upon a prestored, and possibly vast collection of hypothesis-generating “concepts”. The authors’ claim is nothing less than to have shown, in a new sense, and surpassing all other work in this area, how it is computationally possible for an agent to come to “know”, based upon the evidence of the case. (shrink)

What makes conscious experience a difficult or confusing subject for science to deal with is its personal or individualistic character (that is to say the fact that a given experience is an experience apparently tied to a particular individual). It is in this respect very different from the other phenomena studied by science, where while the phenomena may be observed by a particular individual they are considered to be in principle independent of that individual. To say that an individual’s experience (...) is merely the functioning ofthat individual’s brain does not fully resolve the problem, since experiences are so very different in nature from brain processes. (shrink)

The second-order radial differential equations for the relativistic Dirac hydrogen atom are derived from the Dirac equation treated as a system of partial differential equations. The quantum operators which arise in the development are defined and interpreted as they appear. The splitting in the energy levels is computed by applying the theory of singularities for second-order differential equations to the Klein-Gordon and Dirac relativistic equations. In the Dirac radial equation additional terms appear containing a constant, which is shown to be (...) the “radius of the electron.” It is concluded that the minute perturbation of the radial eigenfunction in the vicinity of the proton brought about by the extension of the elementary particles, which appears naturally out of the Dirac equations, results in the prediction of the observed splitting of the hydrogen atom energy levels by the Dirac theory. The extension of the particles arises even though the Dirac hydrogen atom is originally formulated for point charges. (shrink)

Red-2 is a computer program for red-cell antibody identification, a piece of "normal science". Abstracting from Red-2, a general problem solving mechanism is described that is especially suited for performing a form of abductive inference or best explanation finding. A problem solver embodying this mechanism synthesizes composite hypotheses by combining hypothesis parts. This is a common task of intelligence, and a component of scientific reasoning. The work addresses the question, 'How is science possible?' by showing how a simple but powerful (...) form of hypothesis synthesis is computationally feasible. (shrink)

This paper describes in some detail a pattern of justification which seems to be part of common sense logic and also part of the logic of scientific investigations. Calling this pattern “abduction,” the paper lays out an “abduction-prediction” model of scientific inference as an update to the traditional hypothetico-deductive model. According to this newer model, scientific theories receive their claims for acceptance and belief from the abductive arguments that support them, and the processes of scientific discovery aim to develop theories (...) with strong abductive support. It is suggested that the study of diagnosis presents a good opportunity for studying abduction under somewhat simpler and more reproducible conditions than occur in scientific discovery. A computer-based diagnostic system is described which provides a small-scale validation of the abduc-tion-prediction model by showing that a version of it can be made precise enough to be implemented and to perform correctly for diagnosis. (shrink)

Traces the cultural evolution of the visual arts, looking at the ways in which culture shapes art, the role of institutional structures, and debates over censorship, public art, and popular art. Overviews the evolution of fine art from the Renaissance to the present, and discusses the histories of design and advertising, and the interaction of art and technology, especially in the marriage of the television and computer. For students in art and cultural studies. Paper edition (unseen), $19.95. Annotation copyrighted by (...) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)