Order:
See also
Justin J. Bartlett
Srinakharinwirot University
  1.  17
    An Expected Error: An Essay in Defence of Moral Emotionism.Justin J. Bartlett - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (2):271-289.
    This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz. I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  14
    Motivating Emotions: Emotionism and the Internalist Connection.Justin J. Bartlett - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):711-731.
    I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz and supported by myself which construes moral concepts and properties as a subset of emotion-dispositional properties. Given these claims, it follows that sincere moral judgements are necessarily motivating in virtue of their emotional constitution. I defend an indefeasible version of judgement motivational internalism which takes into consideration both positively and negatively valenced affective states and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  10
    A War of Words: Dissecting the Foundational Claims of CMT.Justin J. Bartlett & Sugunya Ruangjaroon - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-17.
    This work presents two theoretical challenges to Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The first argument shows CMT’s foundational Conceptual Claim—that abstract concepts are necessarily structured by concrete concepts—entails the blurring of the literal–figurative distinction, which calls into question the legitimacy of standard methods of metaphor identification used in CMT. The second argument aims at the Linguistic Claim—that conceptual metaphors are necessary for metaphorical language—by showing that conceptual metaphors are neither necessary nor sufficient for linguistic metaphors and that, therefore, the existence of conceptual (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark