Tremendous development in recent medical science and the consequent discoveries resulting in successful prevention and also cure of different diseases are shared by clinical research involving the human volunteers. Preceding the trials in the human subjects, and to ensure safety, the proposed drug and other interventions are either tested in animals (vivo) or in laboratory (vitro) to evaluate initial safe starting dose for the human beings and to key out the benchmarks for the clinical monitoring for the potential unfavorable effects. (...) These pre human trials might not necessarily protect against the untoward effects in the human beings as happened in the case of thalidomide tragedy, which caused disability and killed thousands of babies born to the mothers, those who took this medicine. Use of healthy human volunteers in the preliminary experiments or phase I clinical trials either reduces or excludes risks of subsequent undesirable effects in the future trails (1). Phase-1 trials are conducted in order to test the safety, reactions and immunogenicity of vaccines in volunteers. Novel treatments for the cancer are first tested in phase 1 trials enrolling the patients with advanced disease, who have exhausted the standard treatment options. Phase-1 oncology trials are the pivot point in the translation of new cancer therapies from bench to bedside. Nevertheless, these trials remain ethically controversial. The controversy stems from the fact that, classically, phase-1 oncology clinical trials involve first-in-human testing of experimental treatment candidates in patients with a terminal diagnosis, who typically have exhausted standard treatment options. Commentators on the ethics of phase-1 clinical trials make diametrically opposed claims about the prospect of direct medical benefit from participation in these trials-benefits that can be attributed to receiving the experimental treatment intervention. One camp of benefit skeptics, inhabited mainly by bioethicists, characterizes this form of research as lacking any reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit. They see an ethical cloud hovering over phase-1 trials, because the vast majority of patients volunteer for phase-1 trials out of a motivation to receive medical benefit. In the view of these skeptics, such patients therefore harbor a ‘therapeutic misconception’ about research participation. This misconception calls into question the validity of informed consent and thereby undercuts the ethical basis of these trials (2). In this paper, I will discuss the ethical justification of the participation of human volunteers in phase-1 trials. (shrink)

Asia is the most diverse continent in the world in terms of culture, religion, population size, finance, education, health care, academic research, general population skills, and governmental drug regulations. Each Asian country has its own unique qualities when it comes to attracting industry sponsored clinical trials. Factors that influence selecting location of a study site for a sponsored trial are mainly population size, infrastructure, education levels, and quality of health care, cost and drug regulatory platform. Conducting research in traditional countries (...) like Pakistan adds another dimension to the problems in assuring that research conducted in an ethical manner. The indigenous layer of the cultural values makes it even more difficult task, but this is the task that we are morally and ethically bound to shoulder. (shrink)

The case (Dawson et al. 2024) describes an Institutional Review Board (IRB) chair who seeks consultation about waiving the requirement that investigators obtain prospective, informed consent for co...

Many health care systems include programs that allow patients in exceptional circumstances to access medical interventions of as yet unproven benefit. In this article we consider the ethical justifications for—and demands on—these special access programs (SAPs). SAPs have a compassionate basis: They give patients with limited options the opportunity to try interventions that are not yet approved by standard regulatory processes. But while they signal that health care systems can and will respond to individual suffering, SAPs have several disadvantages, including (...) the potential to undermine regulatory and knowledge-generation structures that constitute significant public goods. The “balance” between these considerations depends in part on how broadly SAPs are used, but also on whether SAPs can be made to contribute to the generation of knowledge about the effects of health interventions. We argue that patients should usually be required to contribute outcome data while using SAPs. (shrink)

Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the 'equiprobability model'. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made precise, and that generally, it even contradicts individual rational agency. (...) Without the impersonality constraint, Harsanyi's two justifications of utilitarianism on the grounds of Bayesian rationality fail. As an alternative, I develop a contractarian framework that is compatible with individual rational agency and Harsanyi's central assumptions, and that allows the derivation of moral conclusions on the grounds of Bayesian rationality. The developed framework offers a novel justification of contractarian ethics and may best be described as a combined version of Harsanyi's equiprobability model and Rawls's original position. (shrink)

Tom Regan has made a very important contribution to the debate on environmental ethics in his “On the Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic.” The debate can be brought out yet more clearly by contrasting Regan’s views with those of an eminent critic of environmental ethics in Regan’s sense, William K. Frankena. I argue that Regan’s position has much to recommend it, but has a fatal flaw whichwould render environmental ethics unjustifiable. I suggest this flaw can (...) be remedied by divorcing an environmental ethic from a dubious ontological commitment. Reflection on metaethics, ontological commitments, and the nature of ethical justification leads to a conclusion favorable to an environmental ethic. (shrink)

This book focuses on the normative questions raised by the postulation and declaration of a global ethic. Its scope covers the questions “why do we need a global ethic?”, “what kind of global ethic do we need and what sort of normative justification does it imply?” The book considers the imperative of global ethic to be plausible because it demands consistency in the application of the rule or standard of moral behavior.

Tom Regan has made a very important contribution to the debate on environmental ethics in his “On the Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic.” The debate can be brought out yet more clearly by contrasting Regan’s views with those of an eminent critic of environmental ethics in Regan’s sense, William K. Frankena. I argue that Regan’s position has much to recommend it, but has a fatal flaw whichwould render environmental ethics unjustifiable. I suggest this flaw can (...) be remedied by divorcing an environmental ethic from a dubious ontological commitment. Reflection on metaethics, ontological commitments, and the nature of ethical justification leads to a conclusion favorable to an environmental ethic. (shrink)

The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a (...) particular interpretation of how “objective moral obligation” is to be understood within constructivism. (shrink)

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, (...) coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice. (shrink)

Philippe Van Parijs’s ethical justification of basic income is based on the argument that job resources must be shared equally. Underlying this idea are two important claims: (1) all individuals in society hold an ex. ante entitlement in job resources and (2) job resources are tradable: First, I present the real-libertarian argument for sharing job resources. Next, I identify and critically review three different objections against this view: the liability objection, the cooperation objection and the parasitism objection. I believe (...) the parasitism objection poses a serious challenge to basic income, and argue that Van Parijs’s most plausible response-based on the idea that job resources are socially owned-is flawed. I provide the outline of an alternative normative basis for grounding a person's ex ante entitlement to job resources using an institutionalist approach. (shrink)

The Weatherall report on the use of non-human primates in research was published in 2006. Its main conclusion was that there is a strong scientific case for the use of non-human primates in some cases, but the report stressed the importance of evaluating each case in the light of the availability of alternatives. In addition to arguing for the scientific necessity of using non-human primates in research, the report also provided an ethical justification. As could be expected, the report (...) was harshly criticised by animal rights groups, but in the academic literature, only two critical replies appeared. In what follows, I will describe the ethical justification for non-human primate research as it is laid out in the Weatherall report and then consider the criticism in the academic literature. I conclude that the report’s ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research, in particular in basic neuroscientific research, has not been convincingly challenged by its critics. Since the criticism of the report is limited and represents only a small part of the academic discussion about the use of non-human primates in research, and a still smaller part of the ethical discussion about animal research, it is important that the discussion continue both at the academic and social level. (shrink)

The implementation of education programmes in different cultures invites the question whether we are justified in doing so in cultures that may reject the programmes’ underlying principles. Are there indeed ethical principles and educational ideals that can be justified as applicable to all cultures? After a consideration of Zygmunt Bauman's postmodern rejection of the possibility of universal ethics, Ι cite and extend Harvey Siegel's defence of multiculturalism as a transcultural ethical ideal. I conclude the paper with a justification (...) of the transcultural normative reach of moral principles that I have elsewhere defended as the ethics of integrity. The paper's significance lies in its justification of educational interventions founded in these principles across different cultures. (shrink)

The feminist in academe, says Paula Bennett, is like Procne married to Tereus, "inextricably wedded to the sources of her harm." An ethical justification of academic feminism can be found, not in cooperation and affiliation, but in the strategies currently necessary to ensure curricular and cultural diversity. Historically contextualized and strategically politicized, this ethic is founded on the claim that universities are places where we may all learn to know what is other than ourselves.

Recent defenders of Philippa Foot, such as Michael Thompson and John Hacker-Wright, have argued that it is a mistake to think that Ft aims to justify a substantive conception of human soundness and defect. instead, she relies on the acceptance of certain groundless moral norms to underwrite her views about what is characteristically human. I maintain that this is a weakness and that the Footian-style proponent of natural normativity needs to provide a story about how we might achieve justified self-confidence (...) regarding moral norms. In this paper, I offer a coherentist model for doing so, thereby addressing the justification gap. (shrink)

레비 (David Levy)는 2007년 그의 저서 Love and Sex with Robot 에서 인간이 로봇과 성관계를 갖는 것이 일상화 될 날이 멀지 않았고, 매춘과 같은 부분에 있어 로봇이 인간을 대체하게 될 것이라고 주장한다. 실제로 2010년 기존의 섹스돌(sex doll)에 인공지능을 탑재한 트루컴퍼니언(Truecompanion)사의 ‘록시(Roxxxy)’로부터 성적 교감뿐만 아니라 철학, 과학, 음악에 이르는 다양한 분야의 대화와 일상적인 농담 역시 가능한 2015년 리얼보틱스(Realbotix) 사의 ‘하모니(Harmony)’에 이르기까지 섹스로봇산업의 규모와 기술력은 나날이 발전하고 있다. 이에 섹스로봇이 인간의 모든 성생활에 있어 중요한 역할을 담당하게 될 것이라는 예측 역시 가능할 수 (...) 있다. 하지만 이에 대한 우려도 적지 않다. 대표적으로 리차드슨(Kathleen Richardoson)은 레비의 주장에 내재된 심각한 윤리적 문제에 주목하며 섹스로봇의 개발과 상용화를 반대한다. 특히, 레비가 예를 들고 있는 매춘 산업에 있어 섹스로봇이 사람을 대신할 수 있다는 주장에 대하여, “여러 관계 속에서 마주하게 되는 사람을 권리를 가진 인격체(person)가 아닌 사물(things)로 간주하게 되는 문제가 발생할 수 있다”며 섹스로봇의 개발과 사용은 윤리적으로 정당하지도 안전하지도 않다고 주장한다. 본 논문은 이들 중 하나의 입장을 견지하거나 옹호하지 않는다. 본 논문의 목적은 섹스로봇의 개발과 사용이 갖는 이점과 리차드슨이 제시한 윤리적 문제점 등을 검토하고, 이에 대해 취할 수 있는 윤리적 관점을 제시하는 것이다. 본 논문의 말미에는 피터 싱어의 ‘이익평등고려의 원칙 (The principle of equal consideration of interests)’에 근거하여 섹스로봇의 개발과 사용은 윤리적으로 정당화 될 가능성이 있음을 조심스럽게 검토해 볼 것이다. (shrink)

This collection of four essays and an interview contains Habermas's most recent contributions to ethical theory. It expands and clarifies the work on discourse ethics presented in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Here, largely in response to criticisms from contemporary neo-Aristotelians, Habermas underscores the claim of discourse ethics to a preeminent position in contemporary moral philosophy with incisive analyses and refinements of the central concepts of his theory that include important developments in his treatment of practical reason and (...) of the problems of application and motivation.The first essay offers a comprehensive analysis of practical rationality, which establishes a clear demarcation between pragmatic, ethical, and moral questions and a corresponding differentiation between forms of volition and spheres of practical discourse. The centerpiece of the book is a multifaceted defense of the central claims of discourse ethics incorporating masterly critiques of the major competing positions, including those of John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Karl-Otto Apel, and Albrecht WellmerThe middle essays defend the basic intention of universalist moral theory in the face of the claims of the neo-Aristotelian ethics of the good and Horkheimer's skepticism toward reason that led him to embrace a religiously inspired ethic of compassion. An interview with Habermas covering such topics as the genesis of discourse ethics, the precise import of some of its more controversial elements, and its interconnections with the theory of communicative actions concludes this important collection.Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. (shrink)

Recently, shifting societal attitudes towards animals have resulted in an increasing challenge to the ‘social license’ to use animals in competitive sport. Against that background, this paper explores whether the use of animals in competitive sport is ever justifiable from the perspective of three commonly used ethical theories: deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. In so doing, it recognises the importance of human understanding of animals as sentient beings. The author argues that when deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics are (...) each used to consider the question ‘Is the use of animals in sport ethically justifiable?’, only absolutist rights theory leads to a negative conclusion. Specified rights theory, utilitarianism and virtue ethics all allow for the human use of animals in sport. However, the author then goes onto argue that even if one does not accept an absolutist rights point of view and does believe that the use of animals in sport is generally ethically justifiable, that use should be limited by fulfilment of certain ‘qualifying constraints’: (a) minimisation of negative welfare effects and maximisation of positive welfare effects, to enable ‘good lives’ for animals (b) identification of and mitigation against avoidable, unnecessary risk and (c) compliance with governing body regulations and the law. (shrink)

During the 1970s, prenatal screening technologies were in their infancy, but were being swiftly harnessed to uncover and prevent spina bifida. The historical rise of this screening process and prevention programme is analysed in this paper, and the role of ethical debates in key studies, editorials and letters reported in the Lancet, and other related texts and governmental documents between 1972 and 1983, is considered. The silence that surrounded rigorous ethical debate served to highlight where discussion lay—namely, within the justifications (...) offered for the prevention of spina bifida, and the efficacy and benefits of screening. In other words, the ethical justification for screening and prevention of spina bifida, when the authors are not explicitly interested in ethics, is considered. These justifications held certain notions of disability as costly to society, with an imperative to screen and prevent spina bifida for the good of the society. (shrink)

The use of placebo controls in clinical trials remains controversial. Ethical analysis and international ethical guidance permit the use of placebo controls in randomized trials when scientifically indicated in four cases: (1) when there is no proven effective treatment for the condition under study; (2) when withholding treatment poses negligible risks to participants; (3) when there are compelling methodological reasons for using placebo, and withholding treatment does not pose a risk of serious harm to participants; and, more controversially, (4) when (...) there are compelling methodological reasons for using placebo, and the research is intended to develop interventions that can be implemented in the population from which trial participants are drawn, and the trial does not require participants to forgo treatment they would otherwise receive. The concept of methodological reasons is essential to assessing the ethics of placebo controls in these controversial last two cases. This article sets out key considerations relevant to considering whether methodological reasons for a placebo control are compelling. (shrink)

This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same op-position. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in (...) the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby render-ing the procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of champi-oning a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress. (shrink)

Decisions must be justified. In medical ethics various grounds are given to justify decisions, but ultimate justification seems illusory and little considered. The philosopher Wittgenstein discusses the problem of ultimate justification in the context of general philosophy. His comments, nevertheless, are pertinent to ethics. From a discussion of Wittgensteinian notions, such as 'bedrock', the idea that 'ultimate' justification is grounded in human nature as such is derived. This discussion is relevant to medical ethics in (...) at least five ways: it shows generally what type of certainty there is in practical ethics; it seems to imply some objective foundation to our ethical judgements; it squares with our experience of making ethical decisions; it shows something of the nature of moral arguments; and, finally, it has implications for teaching medicine and ethics. (shrink)

The relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice and Quine’s philosophy constitute an almost entirely new topic of discussion. The analysis undertaken in this article aims to show that some fundamental epistemological traits of Rawls’s theory of justice may be causally explained by referring to Quine’s influence on him. Rawls’s assumptions, methods of theory-building and evaluation criteria are addressed and a close nexus between the methods of ethics and natural science is made explicit. In the light of the historical and (...) epistemological analysis presented in this article it may be argued that Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness satisfies scientific requirements of evidence and objectivity within the sphere of ethics to the extent it is constructed and justified in accordance to Quine’s epistemology. (shrink)

The paper deals with the correlation between the justification of morality and the justifi­cation of utilitarian normative ethics in the two treatises of Jeremy Bentham: An Intro­duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. In the Introduction, the general requirement of morality (‘promote the good of others’) is considered justified because a) it is integrated into the structure of the principle of utility and only contingent to the concurring principles (the principle of asceticism and the principle (...) of sympathy and antipathy), b) the two concurring principles cannot withstand rational criticism, c) the list of principles is closed. There are two additional strategies to justify morality in the treatise. Bentham claims that the advantages of having a reputation of a trustworthy person are a sufficient reason to hold burdensome obligations. At the same time, he in­sists that an agent cannot persuade other people that her moral judgments are right unless these jugments are grounded in her recognition of the equal non-instrumental value of ev­ery person. In the Deontology, Bentham expands on the second strategy – the identifica­tion of moral virtue (duty) with the correctly understood personal interest of an agent. First, he proposes such a conception of moral virtue (duty) where sacrifices and efforts made by a person of prudence, probity, and beneficence are interpreted as the result of a clash among her own interests. Then, he demonstrates that the system of sanctions (sympathetic, religious, physical, moral, political) peculiar to human societies makes ad­vantages brought by breaches of prudence, probity, and beneficence illusory. (shrink)

This thesis is a contribution to the ethical justification for clinical research with children. A research subject’s participation in a trial is usually justified, in part, by informed consent. Informed consent helps to uphold the moral principle of respect for persons. But children’s limited ability to make informed choices gives rise to a problem. It is unclear what, if anything, justifies their participation in research. Some research ethicists propose to resolve this problem by appealing to social utility, proxy consent, (...) arguments explaining why it is permissible to expose children to some harm, and an argument concerning the appropriate balance between research harms and benefits. I argue that each of these is a necessary part of the justification for research with children, but that the argument concerning harms and benefits is under-developed. It relies on the concept of minimal risk, but minimal risk is inadequately justified. I propose an interpretation of minimal risk. I defend the idea that minimal risk should be interpreted according to the risks of daily life. I reject the most prominent defense of daily life, which claims that daily risks are morally relevant because they replace, rather than add to, the risks a child would ordinarily face. Instead, I propose that these risks are part of a reasonable trade-off between personal safety and our ability to pursue meaningful lives. I then examine whose daily life should be captured in the concept of minimal risk. I reject arguments that minimal risk should refer to healthy children or the subjects of the research and propose instead that the referent should be children who are not unduly burdened by their lives. I argue that children are not unduly burdened when they fare well and defend the idea that children fare well when they possess sufficiently high degrees of the substantive goods of childhood. I conclude by analyzing a controversial case study using my interpretation of minimal risk. I draw on this case to argue that my interpretation offers clear guidance for research ethics review and contributes to a determination that is more plausible than its rivals. (shrink)

John Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. He has developed and polished both in conjunction over the course of half a century. Yet the moral principles he advocates have always been more doctrinaire than the corresponding justification model should have ever allowed with design details explicitly promising objectivity. This article goes to the beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it, in the “Outline of a (...) Decision Procedure for Ethics,” with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that an ethical justification for political resistance can be found in Spinoza’s writings. It establishes that important elements of his ethical analysis of politics entail an ethical imperative to actively resist any attempt on the part of the sovereign to abolish or unduly curtail freedom of thought and expression. It shows that, under such circumstances, active resistance will be in accord with reason: (1) the less it is motivated by any species of hatred; and (2) the (...) more it serves to empower people. Since freedom of thought and expression necessarily involves the freedom to engage in the philosophical critique of prejudices, and the latter can itself function as a form of political resistance, the ethical imperative to preserve libertas philosophandi amounts to an enjoinder to preserve a form of perpetual resistance within the normal functioning of the rationally-ordered state. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that an ethical justification for political resistance can be found in Spinoza’s writings. It establishes that important elements of his ethical analysis of politics entail an ethical imperative to actively resist any attempt on the part of the sovereign to abolish or unduly curtail freedom of thought and expression. It shows that, under such circumstances, active resistance will be in accord with reason: (1) the less it is motivated by any species of hatred; and (2) the (...) more it serves to empower people. Since freedom of thought and expression necessarily involves the freedom to engage in the philosophical critique of prejudices, and the latter can itself function as a form of political resistance, the ethical imperative to preserve libertas philosophandi amounts to an enjoinder to preserve a form of perpetual resistance within the normal functioning of the rationally-ordered state. (shrink)

The following paper considers the extent to which discourse ethics can adequately respond to Habermas' own call for normative justification for the expectation of tolerance. It concludes that discourse ethics is able to lend its services to the flagging fortunes of the idea of toleration, not by seeking to underscore this idea with rationally compelling argumentation,but by offering insights into the possibilities opened up to a life which accepts this principle.

The most popular defense of altruism has come from ethicists, mostly Western ethicists, who argue that for an action to hold any justification as it pertains to altruistic commitments, such an altruistic action must stem from the agent’s internal states such as beliefs, practical reasoning, desires, or deliberative attitudes. I refer to this as the internalist justification for altruism. On this internalist approach, the mere recognition of others—which I shall refer to as an externalist justification—albeit necessary for (...) an agent who wants to perform an altruistic act, is insufficient in accounting for the agent’s altruism. This paper offers an African model of communitarian ethics (ACE) under which the externalist justification for altruism is satisfied. I argue that at its core, ACE holds a normative conception of community and personhood that accounts for a sufficient externalist justification for altruism, which proponents of internal altruism have argued is insufficient. (shrink)

Liberal societies are characterized by respect for a fundamental value pluralism; i.e., respect for individuals’ rights to live by their own conception of the good. Still, the state must make decisions that privilege some values at the cost of others. When public ethics committees give substantial ethical advice on policy related issues, it is therefore important that this advice is well justified. The use of explicit tools for ethical assessment can contribute to justifying advice. In this article, I will (...) discuss one approach to ethical assessment, the ethical matrix method. This method is a variant of intuitionist balancing. Intuitionism is characterized by stressing the existence of several (at least two) fundamental prima facie moral principles, between which there is no given rank order. For some intuitionist approaches, coherentism has been proposed as a model of justification. This article will discuss justification of ethical advice and evaluate the appropriateness of coherentism as a justificatory approach to intuitionist tools. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a critique of Kantian ethics, and more precisely a critique of a particular conception of moral reasoning. The fundamental assumption that underlies the conception that I am targeting is that to justify (morally or otherwise) an action is (perhaps with an ‘all things being equal’ clause) to settle its value, in such a way that all rational participants would have to acknowledge that value. As an alternative to the Kantian conception, I propose a conception (...) in which the basic unit of moral reasoning is not an action but rather what I call an ‘ethical position’—where an ethical position is where, at any given moment and with respect to the matter at hand, you stand, and where moral reasoning consists in the articulation of ethical positions. (shrink)

In 2015, the FDA revised its indefinite deferral policy towards MSM blood donors. I develop an empirical case for the revised policy and show why rights-based objections fail. I introduce and defend a distinction between “ordinary” and “exact” justification that accounts for the worries in the empirical case. I conclude that the FDA is committed to further revising the policy to let MSM donors with exact justification donate.

The resolution of ethical dilemmas often requires individuals to search for reasonable justifications to support their choices. Occasionally, such justifications must be made explicit to stakeholders inside or outside the organization. Other times, the justification for a decision will be known only by the decision-maker. In either case, the organizational code of conduct that governs the individual can play a vital role in providing guidelines about appropriate and inappropriate justifications. The present paper discusses the connections between organizational codes and (...) employee justifications. (shrink)

Se analizan las bases hermenéuticas de toda decisión ética. La normatividad moral exige una comprensión de las circunstancias, porque solo desde su intelección se puede realizar un buen juicio ético. Si, para Peter Singer, las herramientas para tal aprehensión son de tipo racional, Mauricio Beuchot las amplía por medio de la intuición y la sutileza. Se discute si las pretensiones argumentales de Singer se actualizan en sus obras. The article analyzes the hermeneutical bases of all ethical decisions. Moral norms require (...) an understanding of the circumstances, since good ethical judgments can only be made on that basis. While for Peter Singer, the tools for that understanding are rational, Mauricio Beuchot expands them through intuition and subtlety. The paper discusses whether Singer's claims are substantiated in his works. Neste artigo, analisam-se as bases hermenêuticas de toda decisão ética. A normatividade moral exige uma compreensão das circunstâncias, porque só a partir de seu entendimento se pode realizar um bom juízo ético. Se, para Peter Singer, as ferramentas para a apreensão são de tipo racional, Mauricio Beuchot as amplia por meio da intuição e da sutileza. Discute-se se as pretensões argumentais de Singer se atualizam em suas obras. (shrink)

This article reports the results of research aimed at developing and validating a multi-item scale to measure consumers' agreement with three main justifications for not engaging in socially responsible consumption behaviours, namely the 'economic rationalist argument' founded on the idea that the costs of SRC are greater than its benefits, the 'economic development reality argument' based on the idea that ethical and moral aspirations are less important than the economic development of countries, and the 'government dependency argument' grounded in the (...) premise that government inaction demonstrates the legal character and the banality of unethical consumption behaviours. The scale items were generated on the basis of a multi-country qualitative study of consumers. The content validity of the scale was assessed in the first study. The second study was a survey of 157 Canadian adult consumers in which the threedimensional scale and other scales measuring relevant concepts were administered. The survey results showed that the 28-item resulting scale is reliable and generally behaves as one would theoretically expect. Implications for consumption ethics researchers and policy makers are proposed. (shrink)

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ and the _Critique of Practical Reason_, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to (...) conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today. (shrink)

A view widely held by epistemologists is that there is a distinction between subjective and objective epistemic justification, analogous to the commonly drawn distinction between subjective and objective justification in ethics. Richard Brandt offers a clear statement of this line of thought.

The Preface to my book, Kant's Justification of Ethics.