Jury theorems are mathematical theorems about the ability of collectives to make correct decisions. Several jury theorems carry the optimistic message that, in suitable circumstances, ‘crowds are wise’: many individuals together (using, for instance, majority voting) tend to make good decisions, outperforming fewer or just one individual. Jury theorems form the technical core of epistemic arguments for democracy, and provide probabilistic tools for reasoning about the epistemic quality of collective decisions. The popularity of jury theorems spans across various disciplines such (...) as economics, political science, philosophy, and computer science. This entry reviews and critically assesses a variety of jury theorems. It first discusses Condorcet's initial jury theorem, and then progressively introduces jury theorems with more appropriate premises and conclusions. It explains the philosophical foundations, and relates jury theorems to diversity, deliberation, shared evidence, shared perspectives, and other phenomena. It finally connects jury theorems to their historical background and to democratic theory, social epistemology, and social choice theory. (shrink)

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) (...) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. (shrink)

We show that under the assumption of the existence of the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal$M_1$, there is a model of$\mathsf {ZFC}$in which$\mbox {NS}_{\omega _{1}}$is$\aleph _2$-saturated and${\Delta }_{1}$-definable with$\omega _1$as a parameter which answers a question of S. D. Friedman and L. Wu. We also show that starting from an arbitrary universe with a Woodin cardinal, there is a model with$\mbox {NS}_{\omega _{1}}$saturated and${\Delta }_{1}$-definable with a ladder system$\vec {C}$and a full Suslin treeTas parameters. Both results rely on (...) a new coding technique whose presentation is the main goal of this article. (shrink)

Sistemas jurídicos -- Enunciados jurídicos preinterpretivos -- Enunciados jurídicos interpretivos.

In a homogeneous jury, in which each vote is correct with the same probability, and each pair of votes correlates with the same correlation coefficient, there exists a correlation-robust voting quota, such that the probability of a correct verdict is independent of the correlation coefficient. For positive correlation, an increase in the correlation coefficient decreases the probability of a correct verdict for any voting rule below the correlation-robust quota, and increases that probability for any above the correlation-robust quota. The jury (...) may be less competent under the correlation-robust rule than under simple majority rule and less competent under simple majority rule than a single juror alone. The jury is always less competent than a single juror under unanimity rule. (shrink)

Proceeding from the insights of Petrażycki, Polish-Russian legal realists distinguished legal theory, legal dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal (...) laws and on the subject's goals. PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way : We have a custom on the threefold condition that Rc is believed true by a given X, Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience in X, and X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence. (shrink)

Proceeding from the insights of Petrażycki, Polish-Russian legal realists distinguished legal theory, legal dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal (...) laws and on the subject's goals. PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way : We have a custom on the threefold condition that Rc is believed true by a given X, Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience in X, and X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 90-131.

Suppose that a majority of jurors decide that a defendant is guilty (or not), and we want to know the likelihood that they reached the correct verdict. The French philosopher Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) showed that we can get a mathematically precise answer, a result known as the “Condorcet Jury Theorem.” Condorcet’s theorem isn’t just about juries, though; it’s about collective decision-making in general. As a result, some philosophers have used his theorem to argue for democratic forms of government. This (...) essay explains Condorcet’s theorem and how philosophers have used it as an argument for democracy. (shrink)

Trial by jury is a fundamental feature of democratic governance. But what form should jury decision-making take? I argue against the status quo system in which juries are encouraged and even required to engage in group deliberation as a means to reaching a decision. Jury deliberation is problematic for both theoretical and empirical reasons. On the theoretical front, deliberation destroys the independence of jurors’ judgments that is needed for certain attractive theoretical results. On the empirical front, we have evidence from (...) both legal and non-legal contexts that group deliberation often leads to group judgments that are worse in a number of respects than judgments generated by non-interactional methods of judgment aggregation. Finally, I examine some possible alternatives to free-wheeling jury deliberation, including the constrained and structured deliberation embodied in the DELPHI method, voting, and averaging of probabilistic judgments. (shrink)

Nakba is ignored in Western philosophy encyclopedias, and the notion of genocide is rarely explained. In turn, there is much talk about the Holocaust.

In 1963 the American journalist Betty Friedan published her book The Feminine Mystique, in which she identified, on the basis of an analysis of women's magazines and surveys of women, a paradox in the self- awareness of American women: in striving to achieve the ideal of femininity, they devote themselves zealously to serving the family, and at the same time they feel they are "different" human beings from men, who have access to the world at large. Friedan compared the situation (...) of the housewife with the situation of a prisoner in a concentration camp. In both, a person is deprived of self-identity, of self-respect, and of manifesting one's individuality and is isolated from the large world of ideas and events. Friedan's general conclusion was that the ideal of "femininity" that guides women is not a natural bent of their natures but an inhumane stereotype that is imposed by advertising, business, and government because it is useful to society. (shrink)

El legado enciclopedista de Diderot sobre el poder político y el derecho en vísperas de Revolución -- Un célebre profesor de jurisprudencia de siglo XVIII, después marginado durante siglos: el caso de Jean Jacques Burlamaqui y sus Elementos de derecho natural -- Lardizábal, jurista "ilustrado" en los albores de la Independencia de México -- Los ilustrados, infatigables inventores de derechos vitales. Escolio a una obra de Lynn Hunt -- Lichtenberg, un ilustrado minimalista. A manera de epílogo.