Alvin Plantinga, in some essays recently published and presented, defends the rationality of a belief in the existence of God on the grounds that it is foundationally justified. Though this belief does not appear to be justified were we to adopt what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, there are other, less restrictive versions of foundationalism. Plantinga urges that we recognize that a belief in the existence of God can be warranted within one of these frameworks.

The major religions are committed to incompatible world-views. Are there criteria available on the basis of which we can rationally decide among these sets of religious beliefs? Ninian Smart in Reasons and Faiths assumes that there is no a priori reason to suppose that such criteria are not possible or unavailable, and sets out a procedure for the justification of religious beliefs which primarily, though not exclusively, depends upon an appeal to religious experience. In this paper I wish to appraise (...) the results of applying his criteria to different sets of religious beliefs and, in addition, I wish to appraise these criteria. (shrink)