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Judith Martens [4]Judith H. Martens [3]
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  1.  65
    Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):245-266.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
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  2.  9
    Doing Things Together: A Theory of Skillful Joint Action.Judith Martens - 2020 - De Gruyter.
    In everyday contexts we do numerous things together. Philosophers of collective intentionality have wondered how we can distinguish parallel cases from cases where we act together. Often their theories argue in favor of one characteristic, feature, or function, that differentiates the two. This feature then distinguishes parallel actions from joint action. The approach in this book is different. Three claims are developed: (1) There are several functions that help human agents coordinate and act together. (2) This entails that joint action (...)
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  3.  17
    Exploring the Relation Between the Sense of Other and the Sense of Us: Core Agency Cognition, Emergent Coordination, and the Sense of Agency.Judith Martens - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):38-60.
    It has been claimed that a sense of us is presupposed for shared intentions to be possible. Searle introduced this notion together with the notion of the sense of the other. in joint action. It argues that the sense of the other is a necessary condition for a sense of us. Whereas thisarticle distinguishes between the “sense of the other” and the “sense of us” and elaborates on their role the sense of the other is immediate and automatic, the sense (...)
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  4.  7
    Habit and Skill in the Domain of Joint Action.Judith H. Martens - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):663-675.
    Dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena is abundant in philosophy. One particularly tenacious dichotomy is between “automatic” and “controlled” processes. In this characterization automatic and unintelligent go hand in hand, as do non-automatic and intelligent. Accounts of skillful action have problematized this dichotomous conceptualization and moved towards a more nuanced understanding of human agency. This binary thinking is, however, still abundant in the philosophy of joint action. Habits and skills allow us agentic ways of guiding complex action routines that would otherwise (...)
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  5.  28
    Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions.Luke Roelofs & Judith Martens - 2018 - Journal of Social Ontology 4 (2):93-120.
    We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon – implicit coordination – is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by “explicit” intentions differ from individual actions driven by “implicit” intentions. More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly implicit (...)
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  6. Soziale Wahrnehmung.Tobias Schlicht & Judith H. Martens - 2017 - In Bedeutung und Gefährdung der Sinne im Digitalen Zeitalter. Wittener Kolloquium für Humanismus, Philosophie und Medizin. Witten:
    Dieser Beitrag nimmt als Ausganspunkt die gegenwärtige kontroverse Debatte um den adäquaten Erklärungsansatz in der Kognitionswissenschaft, und zwar zwischen Enaktivisten einerseits und Repräsentationalisten andererseits. Beispielhaft wurde aufgezeigt, dass in Bezug auf die soziale Kognition der enaktivistische Ansatz eine Voraussetzung machen muss, die er mit seinen eigenen Mitteln nicht einzufangen in der Lage ist. Denn der Versuch, das Verstehen des Anderen durch gemeinsame Sinnstiftung der Akteure innerhalb ihrer sozialen Interaktion zu erklären, gerät in einen Zirkel, da nicht erklärt wird, wie die (...)
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  7.  15
    Habits and Skills in the Domain of Joint Action.Judith H. Martens - 2020 - Topoi (3):1-13.
    Dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena is abundant in philosophy. One particularly tenacious dichotomy is between “automatic” and “controlled” processes. In this characterization automatic and unintelligent go hand in hand, as do non-automatic and intelligent. Accounts of skillful action have problematized this dichotomous conceptualization and moved towards a more nuanced understanding of human agency. This binary thinking is, however, still abundant in the philosophy of joint action. Habits and skills allow us agentic ways of guiding complex action routines that would otherwise (...)
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