Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and (...) Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges. (shrink)

7. The rights of immigrants: Joseph H. Carens.

This paper challenges the assumption that reasons are intrinsic to rational action. A great many actions are not best understood as ones in which the agent acted for reasons--and yet they can be understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism. The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving, practical arguments in daily life presents a general philosophical problem. It reflects the existence of a class of ways in which reason can regulate action, which goes far beyond producing reasons or applying (...) principles. Much practical reasoning takes the form of what H. P. Grice called 'thought-transitions'. These are neither in the form of standard practical arguments, nor can they be so reconstructed without distorting the ways in which an agent thinks. Some actions to which one is led by a thought transition are rational, namely when what Grice called a 'propension' towards a given class of actions--a standing inclination to act in certain ways--would itself stand up to rational evaluation. The paper examines two bases for such endorsement, one local and limited, and one much more speculative, due to Grice himself. (shrink)

In this book Richard Foley formulates the problem of the authority of others’ testimony, and of the rationality of one’s own beliefs, in terms of trust. Part 1 discusses the appropriateness of trust in one’s own cognitive faculties and beliefs, while part 2 argues that those assessments provide a basis for trust in others’ beliefs as well as those of one’s earlier and later selves. He does not offer us an analysis of trust or what it is to speak of (...) trust as rational or reasonable. He simply uses the notion to discuss what is surely one form of the problem of the rationality of belief. Rationality, in this book as in his earlier works, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality and Working Without a Net, is understood from a strict internalist and first-person perspective. Assessments of the rationality of opinions, like assessments of decisions, are claims, from a particular perspective, about how effectively the belief or decision promotes a goal or set of goals. With respect to belief and rational belief, the goal is what Foley calls the traditional “epistemic goal” of accurate and comprehensive beliefs. On his view, the perspective from which the assessment is made is the individual’s, taken on reflection. From the start, Foley’s understanding of rationality involves the first-person perspective. Rational belief is belief that will stand up to an individual’s own self-criticism. (shrink)