This essay examines the terms of the Judicial Oath sworn by the judges in the Athenian courts during the classical period. There is general agreement that the oath contained four basic clauses: to vote in accordance to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people, to vote about matters pertaining to the charge, to listen to both the accuser and defendant equally, and to vote or judge with one’s most fair judgment . Some scholars believe that the (...) fourth clause gave judges the right to vote according to their conscience and to ignore the law if they found it unjust. The first part of the essay shows that this clause gave judges the right to make decisions solely on the basis of their most just judgment only where the laws gave no clear guidance. It was a default clause invoked only twice in the extant orations; it was never used as justification to ignore the written laws. The second part addresses the view that the courts took political factors into account during trials. Although some trials involved leading politicians, the courts were bound by their oath to decide whether the defendant was guilty of the charge brought by the accuser. The only part of a trial where a defendant might mention his political achievements or his public largesse was at during the assessment of the penalty in a trial on a public charge. (shrink)

In a great variety of cultures oaths, ordeals, or lie detectors are used to adjudicate in trials, even though they do not reliably discern liars from truth tellers. I suggest that these practices owe their cultural success to the triggering of cognitive mechanisms that make them more culturally attractive. Informal oaths would trigger mechanisms related to commitment in communication. Oaths used in judicial contexts, by invoking supernatural punishments, would trigger intuitions of immanent justice, linking misfortunes following an oath (...) with perjury. These intuitions would justify the infliction of costs on oath takers in a way that appears morally justified. Ordeals reflect the same logic. Intuitions about immanent justice link a worse outcome following the ordeal with a guilty verdict. This link justifies the application of the ordeal, and the fixed costs involved. Lie detectors also rely on the creation of a link between a specified outcome and a guilty verdict. However, they do not rely on intuitions about immanent justice, but on a variety of intuitions ranging from the plausibly universal to the culturally idiosyncratic. As a result, lie detectors involve lower fixed costs than ordeals, and are less cross-culturally successful than oaths or ordeals. (shrink)

Introduction -- Practical reasons and judicial use of force -- Deviating from legal standards -- The legal duties of judges -- The normative classification of legal results -- Reasons to deviate -- Adherence rules -- Obeying adherence rules -- The judicial oath -- Legal duty and political obligation -- Systemic effects -- Agent-relative principles -- Optimal adherence rules -- Guidance rules -- Treating like cases alike -- Implementation -- Theoretical implications -- Conclusion.

On the art of perjury: the “ambiguous oaths” in the first French Novels. Every language possesses the elements intended to assert that what one says the truth, and specifically, formulas to take an oath. But the solemn oath is an act: perjury is punished as a crime. In medieval French, the linguistic formula of the oath is now well described: it is si m'aït Dieux (/se Dieus m'aït), always linked to a second utterance: in this binary structure, (...) the first utterance asserts the truth of the second one. Besides the linguistic constraints, the solemn oath requires a very precise gestural and social ritual: formula uttered aloud, hand laid on relics or on a manuscript of the Gospel, presence of witnesses and guarantors. This ceremonial is known by some juridical treatises (the Coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, principally), but above all by some texts of fiction in French, novels or “chansons de geste”, which present juridical oaths.These fictional “solemn oaths” are caracterised by the fact that all of them are “ambiguous oaths”, and that the reader perceives them all, in some respects, as perjuries. Among the oldest texts of French literature, four texts, all written at the end of the XIIth century, show a process with an oath taken by the defendant or his champion: the Roman de Tristan of Béroul, the Chevalier de la charrette of Chrétien de Troyes, the “Branche I” of the Roman de Renart, and Ami et Amile. In the four instances, the process is about a woman's virtue: the oath is necessary to clear of suspicion a woman charged with adultery (queen Yseut, queen Guenièvre, Hersent the wolf) or impurity (Emperor Charlemagne's daughter); in the four instances, the question of truth is linked to the essential question of the purity of the lineage. But above all, in all the instances the oath can take place, with sometimes an ordeal or a judicial fight following it, and the woman charged is declared innocent, therefore chaste: but it is never the case. And yet these oaths are never really false oaths: “ambiguous oaths” rather. The logical and linguistic means by which the ambiguity is built up will be described: it plays, in all the instances, on a double reference.Literary texts do not show real perjuries: the oath scenes appear rather as presentations of the art of lying innocently, or to tell the truth while transfering one of the elements of the proposition. It is the awareness that truth is a linguistic matter, a purely linguistic matter, which is represented. (shrink)

While readers of Euripides' Hippolytus have long regarded Phaedra's deltos as a mechanism of punitive revenge, I argue here that the tablet models itself on a judicial curse (defixio) and that its main function is to ensure victory for Phaedra in the upcoming “trial” over her reputation. In support of my thesis I examine three interrelated phenomena: first, Hippolytus' infamous assertion that his tongue swore an oath while his mind remains unsworn (612); second, Phaedra's status as a biaiothanatos; (...) and third, Phaedra's claim that Hippolytus “will learn sophrosune” (731), a speech act that, I conclude, anticipates the silencing effect on Hippolytus of Phaedra's death and her writing. (shrink)

The article describes the problematic spots of the court system ordained by the temporary law during the inter-war period in Lithuania and the prolonged attempts of the authority to transform it into the permanent one. It demonstrates that there has been a constant involvement in this situation among the authority representatives and the institutions until the issue of the Judiciary Act in 1933. The new legislation has been prepared, even though not all of it has been implemented. The first legislation (...) on judiciary of an independent Lithuania was enacted in 1918 as the Temporary Act on Lithuanian Courts and their Operation. It acknowledged the weak spots such as the procedure for assigning peace judges, no provision for cassation, elimination of jury as well as no limitations of guarantees during assignment and dismissal of judges, etc. Current imperfections resulted from lack of knowledge and no possibility to have an election as well as the limited financial potential of the state. It has been intended to solve these problems in the near future. The legal regulation of the fundamental points on court organization and operation, that lacked in the Temporary Judiciary Act, has been supported by the provisions incorporated into the Constitution of Lithuania of 1922. The distinct laws have let the colegially operating courts to temporary incorporate the advocate under oath as a member of the judicial board. Also, considerably transcendent salaries of the court official workers as compared to other civil servants has been established. The bill ascertaining the court system and their operation has finally been drawn and hereafter for several years it has been refined by various legal institutions and experts. This situation ended with enactment of the new Judiciary Act in 1933. Although it retained the assignment of judges and finally eliminated the institution of the jury, it solved the majority of questions related to the court organization and operation that had not been regulated by law before. (shrink)

The Russian conquest of Central Asia marked the beginning of record-keeping for Qazaq arbitrators and customary law. It remains obscure how bīs complied with the colonial regulations obliging them to record their court proceedings. I approach this issue first by questioning the utility of extra-judicial sources crafted in Russian at the instigation of colonial bureaucrats; hence, I argue that the comparison alone of ’ādat-related judicial records written in Turki with šarī’a court certificates allows situating the legal terminology applied (...) by Qazaq arbitrators within the discursive tradition of Islamic law. By way of illustrating my approach, I offer a close reading of a report of a murder case adjudicated according to Qazaq customary law in the vicinity of Khiva in 1895. My commentary on the summary of the trial sheds light on the interplay of customary and Islamic law in the region. In addition, it challenges earlier interpretations of the use of the exculpatory oath among the Qazaqs. (shrink)

The basic contention of this article is that, contrary to a widely held and influential view, the Chalkis Decree does not constitute evidence that Athens tried to impose democracies on rebellious allies after their subjugation. It contains an exchange of oaths between Athens and Chalkis, confirming an 'agreement' (homologia), the contents of which are lost. The oaths show Athenian concern for the protection of the Athenian democracy and its friends at Chalkis, and impose some judicial but no political restrictions (...) on Chalkis to secure Athenian domination and assure the priority of Athenian interests. In fact, the Athenians acknowledge the right of the Chalkidians to insist on the performance of civic duties in Chalkis on the part of aliens (xenoi) resident there. The Athenians among these resident xenoi, who are exempted from these obligations, are neither colonists nor kleruchs, as is sometimes alleged, but most probably individual settlers who had been given land in Chalkidian territory by Tolmides in the 450s. (shrink)

T. A. Cavanaugh's Hippocrates' Oath and Asclepius' Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession articulates the Oath as establishing the medical profession's unique internal medical ethic - in its most basic and least controvertible form, this ethic mandates that physicians help and not harm the sick. Relying on Greek myth, drama, and medical experience (e.g., homeopathy), the book shows how this medical ethic arose from reflection on the most vexing medical-ethical problem -- injury caused by a physician -- (...) and argues that deliberate iatrogenic harm, especially the harm of a doctor choosing to kill (physician assisted suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and involvement in capital punishment), amounts to an abandonment of medicine as an exclusively therapeutic profession. The book argues that medicine as a profession necessarily involves stating before others what one stands for: the good one seeks and the bad one seeks to avoid on behalf of the sick, and rejects the view that medicine is purely a technique lacking its own unique internal ethic. It concludes noting that medical promising (as found in the White Coat Ceremony through which U. S. medical students matriculate) implicates medical autonomy which in turn merits respect, including honoring professional conscientious objections. (shrink)

Soldiers sign contracts to obey lawful orders; they also swear oaths to this end. The enlistment contract for the Armed Forces of the United States combines both elements: -/- '9a. My enlistment is more than an employment agreement. As a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, I will be: (1) Required to obey all lawful orders and perform all assigned duties … (4) Required upon order to serve in combat or other hazardous situations.' -/- We standardly think (...) that these oaths and contracts give soldiers new moral reasons to fight. Many also think that soldiers who are ordered to fight by legitimate states have moral reasons to obey those orders, just in virtue of their provenance. -/- We generate these reasons through our voluntary decisions—to sign the contract or swear the oath; to form the institutions and give the orders. They are therefore additional moral reasons, on top of the reasons that we have prior to those voluntary decisions. Simply because they are additional, these reasons seem limited in force and scope. In particular, they arguably cannot override pre-existing commitments. For example, if I already have a duty not to kill an innocent person, my promising to breach that duty seems irrelevant to whether doing so is permissible. Similarly for orders issued by legitimate states: the citizens of a legitimate state have pre-existing moral reasons not to kill the innocent; by what alchemy could their state's orders allow combatants to override those reasons? If additional reasons could make prohibited acts permissible, as Sidgwick observed, ‘we could evade any moral obligation by promising not to fulfil it, which is clearly absurd’ (Sidgwick 1981). -/- We might conclude that the contracts soldiers sign, the oaths they take and the orders they receive have weight only when they pertain to acts that soldiers are already allowed to do. Perhaps these additional reasons can require actions that would otherwise be merely permissible, but they cannot license otherwise prohibited actions. If this is right, then it radically limits the relevance of contracts, oaths and authority to the ethics of war, since almost all conflicts involve soldiers breaching some pre-existing moral duties. -/- This is obviously true for soldiers fighting on the unjust side in a war, since almost all the killing they do is unjust. But in all actual wars soldiers on the just side also kill at least some innocent victims, whether as part of an unjust subordinate aim, as ‘collateral damage’, or simply because their adversaries are not sufficiently responsible for unjustified threats to be liable to be killed. If additional reasons cannot make otherwise prohibited acts permissible, then they are practically irrelevant to the ethics of killing in war, at least in this sense: if fighting is impermissible without regard to the contract, oath and authority of their state, then fighting is simply impermissible. -/- This is a tempting conclusion. In this paper, however, I argue that even if it is true at the level of objective permissibility, it is false for subjective permissibility. And since subjective permissibility is where (at least some of) the action is in the ethics of war, this is a significant result. I explain first why additional reasons can make otherwise subjectively prohibited acts permissible, then why just war theorists should care more than they seem to about subjective permissibility. Although I focus throughout on the ethics of war, my arguments generalise to all kinds of additional reasons. (shrink)

In Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession, Thomas Cavanaugh focuses on performative aspects of the taking of the oath which bear upon the formation of that community we identify as the medical profession. In this paper, I suggest that we can go further than Cavanaugh does in identifying what the Hippocratic oath makes possible. Given its particular content and what it communicates, the oath makes possible, to a degree few other oaths (...) could, and in a way which might be significantly impaired by the absence of an oath, the form of community we have come to call the physician-patient relationship. In Section I, I will discuss Cavanaugh’s treatment of the oath’s relationship to the community of medical professionals. In Section II, I discuss at a relatively abstract level the relationship between communication and community. In Section III I show how the oath can additionally constitute the primordial moment in the existence of the physician-patient relationship. (shrink)

This article argues that Kant's essay on enlightenment responds to Moses Mendelssohn's defense of the freedom of conscience in Jerusalem. While Mendelssohn holds that the freedom of conscience as an inalienable right, Kant argues that the use of one's reason may be constrained by oaths. Kant calls such a constrained use of reason the private use of reason. While he also defends the unconditional freedom of the public use of reason, Kant believes that one makes oneself a part of the (...) machinery of the church or state by swearing an oath to and assuming a position within those institutions. -/- The appendix to this article includes a translation of Mendelssohn's comments on Kant's enlightenment essay, "Public and Private Use of Reason.". (shrink)

The Declaration of Geneva is one of the core documents of medical ethics. A revision process was started by the World Medical Association in 2016. The WMA has also used this occasion to examine how the Declaration of Geneva is used in countries throughout the world by conducting a survey of all WMA constituent members. The findings are highly important and raise urgent questions for the World Medical Association and its National Medical Associations : The Declaration of Geneva is only (...) rarely used as an oath text despite the fact that physicians’ oaths are generally widespread. This is not consistent with the intention and claim of the Declaration of Geneva. The article then discusses three questions. Should there be one single binding oath? Which organization should be responsible for such an oath? Which oath is the most obvious candidate? In a globalized world and despite all cultural diversity, the medical profession should have one core moral basis which is binding for physicians all over the world. The most obvious candidate for an oath incorporating this moral basis is the Declaration of Geneva. (shrink)

Medicine was until recently a greatly respected profession supported by trust and faith on one side and compassion and care on the other. However, over the years, the relationship between doctors and patients has suffered. Doctors now find themselves in the news for all the wrong reasons. Labelled as 'murderers', 'knife happy', 'organ stealing thieves' or touts of pharmaceutical giants, they have now lost respect in the eyes of society. When and how did this happen? When did doctors go from (...) being 'Next to God' to maut ke saudagar, as the media is so fond of labelling them? Hippocratic Oath or Hypocrisy?: Doctors at Crossroads is the author's journey as a doctor over three decades, from a young medical student to an experienced paediatrician. She has used her experience to highlight serious issues--demanding patients, prescribing of unnecessary investigations, hospitals run like business houses, the role of big pharmaceutical industries and so on from the point of view of both doctors and patients. (shrink)

While there has been much discussion about the role of oaths in medical ethics, this discussion has previously centered on the content of various oaths. Little conceptual work has been done to clarify what an oath is, or to show how an oath differs from a promise or a code of ethics, or to explore what general role oath-taking by physicians might play in medical ethics. Oaths, like promises, are performative utterances. But oaths are generally characterized by (...) their greater moral weight compared with promises, their public character, their validation by transcendent appeal, the involvement of the personhood of the swearer, the prescription of consequences for failure to uphold their contents, the generality of the scope of their contents, the prolonged time frame of the commitment, the fact that their moral force remains binding in spite of failures on the part of those to whom the swearer makes the commitment, and the fact that interpersonal fidelity is the moral hallmark of the commitment of the swearer. Oaths are also distinct from codes. Codes are collections of specific moral rules. Codes are not performative utterances. They do not commit future intentions and do not involve the personhood of the one enjoined by the code. Recent attacks on oath-taking by physicians are discussed. Two arguments in favor of oath-taking are presented: one on the basis of the nature of medicine as a profession and the other on the basis of rule-utilitarian considerations. No attempt is made to define which oath a physician should swear. (shrink)

Considering that getting along in civil society is based on the expectation that people will do what they say they will do, i.e., essentially live up to their explicit or implicit promises, it is amazing that so little scientific attention has been given to the act of promising. A great deal of research has been done on the moral development of children, for example, but not on the child’s ability to make and keep a promise, one of the highest moral (...) achievements. What makes it possible developmentally, cognitively, and emotionally to make a promise in the first place? And on the other hand, what compels one to keep a promise when there seems to be no personal advantage in doing so, and even when harm can be predicted? How do we know when a promise is offered seriously to be taken at face value, and how do we understand that another is only a polite gesture, not to be taken seriously? In _Promises, Oaths, and Vows: On the Psychology of Promising_, Herbert Schlesinger addresses these questions, drawing on the literature of moral development in children; the psychotherapy of a patient who regularly broke promises that were unnecessary in the first place; those who were regarded as "promising youngsters" who did not fulfill their "promise"; and those who feared making a promise, a commitment, or a threat out of fear that, once made, the utterance would take on a life of its own and could never be taken back. Furthermore, he illustrates his conclusions by examining the widespread use of promising in classical literature, such as Greek drama and the plays of Shakespeare, as well as the motivating and reifying power of the promise in Western religious traditions. With a style honed over the penning of two previous books, Schlesinger once again produces a work grounded in a firm analytic sensibility, but which also retains the wit and candor of the seasoned analyst. His seminal investigation of this all but neglected topic in the clinical literature is as timely as it is scholarly, and – with the title firmly in mind – _Promises, Oaths, and Vows_ is assured to be a worthy addition to any clinician’s library and a provoking investigation into Nietzsche’s notion of man as "the animal who makes promises.". (shrink)

The trouble with business schools -- The great, but delicate experiment -- A hippocratic oath for business -- Six more arguments for the MBA oath -- The purpose of a manager -- Ethics and integrity -- No man is an island : stakeholders -- Ambition and good faith -- The letter and the spirit : law -- The sunlight of responsibility : transparency -- Personal and professional growth -- Sustainable prosperity : a partnership for living well -- Accountability.

Promises of a customary, interpersonal kind have received no small amount of philosophical attention. Of particular interest has been their capac- ity to generate moral obligations. This capacity is arguably what distinguishes promises from other, similar phenomena, like communicating a firm intention. But this capacity is common to still other nearby phenomena, such as oaths and vows. These latter phenomena belong to the same family of concepts as promises, but they are structurally and functionally distinct. Taken in their turn, they (...) fill out what I call the ‘breadth criterion’: Theories of promising should cover not only customary, interpersonal promises but also sibling phe- nomena, including oaths and vows. Accommodating the breadth criterion is not something all theories of promising are positioned to accomplish. I focus on the challenge that the breadth criterion poses for Scanlon’s influential ex- pectation view of promising and suggest a normative powers account will fare better. (shrink)

What makes a good teacher? In 1991 Hartmut von Hentig attempted to answer this when he first formulated a "Socratic oath" for the profession and it is a question which remains relevant today. In The Socratic Oath for Teachers Klaus Zierer revisits and reframes the concept of a teacher's oath while also addressing challenges currently facing our society developments in recent didactic-methodological research, and fresh perspectives on the goals of the teaching profession. Referencing Socrates throughout, this short (...) think piece proposes a professional oath for teachers that at its core is fully committed to the successful education and well-being of students. Drawing upon key research and his own experiences within education, Zierer answers the following questions, establishing how a professional oath may support teachers. For example, What is a professional oath, and what can it do? What characterises teacher professionalism? What can be understood by teacher attitudes? Why are they crucial for a successful professional oath? Why is Socrates suitable as a guarantor for a professional oath of teachers? Why is a renewal of the Socratic Oath necessary? For whom is an oath necessary, and what must it contain? In this fascinating work, Klaus Zierer explores the principles and goals of the teaching profession and formulates theoretically sound and empirically validated principles of successful teaching. This is an essential read for any teacher, senior leader, policy maker, educationalist or researcher who wants to learn more about what makes a good teacher. (shrink)

In this paper I ask whether mathematicians should swear an oath similar to the Hippocratic oath sworn by some medical professionals as a means to foster morally praiseworthy engagement with the ethical dimensions of mathematics. I individuate four dimensions in which mathematics is ethically charged: (1) applying mathematical knowledge to the world can cause harm, (2) participation of mathematicians in morally contentious practices is an ethical issue, (3) mathematics as a social activity faces relevant ethical concerns, (4) mathematical (...) knowledge itself may be ethically charged. I present a conceptual framework for oaths and discuss some empirical results on the effectiveness of oath-taking to foster morally praiseworthy behaviour. My findings suggest that enforcing oath-taking practices in mathematics is not currently a suitable means to foster ethically praiseworthy behaviour amongst mathematicians. Oaths can, however, provide needed edifying narratives about how to act ethically when acting as a mathematician. (shrink)

Oaths and Curses: A Study in Neo- and Late Babylonian Legal Formulary. By Malgorzata Sandowicz. Alter Orient und Altes Testament, vol. 398. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2012. Pp. xiii + 542. 41 plts. €92.

While the consequences of mathematically-based software, algorithms and strategies have become ever wider and better appreciated, ethical reflection on mathematics has remained primitive. We review the somewhat disconnected suggestions of commentators in recent decades with a view to piecing together a coherent approach to ethics in mathematics. Calls for a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians are examined and it is concluded that while lessons can be learned from the medical profession, the relation of mathematicians to those affected by their work (...) is significantly different. There is something to be learned also from the codes of conduct of cognate but professionalised quantitative disciplines such as engineering and accountancy, as well as from legal principles bearing on professional work. We conclude with recommendations that professional societies in mathematics should sponsor an (international) code of ethics, institutional mission statements for mathematicians and syllabuses of ethics courses for incorporation into mathematics degrees. (shrink)

This short work examines what the Hippocratic Oath said to Greek physicians 2400 years ago and reflects on its relevance to medical ethics today. Drawing on the writings of ancient physicians, Greek playwrights, and modern scholars, each chapter explores one passage of the Oath and concludes with a modern case discussion. This book is for anyone who loves medicine and is concerned about the ethics and history of the profession.

As an example of Aristotle's genre of epideictic, or ceremonial rhetoric, the Hippocratic Oath has the capacity to persuade its self-addressing audience to appreciate the value of the medical profession by lending an element of stability to the shifting ethos of health care. However, the values it celebrates do not accurately capture communally shared norms about contemporary medical practice. Its multiple and sometimes conflicting versions, anachronistic references, and injunctions that resist translation into specific conduct diminish its longer-term persuasive force. (...) Only when expunged of these elements and reconstructed using values over which there is widespread agreement can the Oath succeed in moving its audience from core values located in past discussions to principled action in the future. (shrink)

"I do solemnly swear" -- Economics in practice : what do economists do? -- Ethical challenges confronting the applied economist -- Historical perspective : "don't predict the interest rate!" -- Interpreting the silence : the economic case against professional economic ethics -- The economic case against professional economic ethics : a rebuttal -- The positive case for professional economic ethics -- Learning from others : ethical thought across the professions -- Economists as social engineers : an ethical evaluation of market (...) liberalization in the south and transition economies -- Global economic crisis and the crisis in economics -- On sleeping too well : in search of professional economic ethics -- Training the "ethical economist" -- The economist's oath. (shrink)

Veterinary oaths are public declarations sworn by veterinarians, usually when they enter the profession. As such, they may reflect professional and social concerns. Analysis of contemporary veterinary oaths may therefore reveal their ethical foundations. The objective of this article is to contextualize the ethical content of contemporary oaths, in terms of the origin and development of veterinary medicine and wider societal changes such as the intensification of farming and the rise of animal welfare. This informs a comparison of oaths from (...) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Brazil. This analysis suggests some ways in which the oaths might be developed to better reflect contemporary societal values. (shrink)

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) to judicial decision-making has already begun in many jurisdictions around the world. While AI seems to promise greater fairness, access to justice, and legal certainty, issues of discrimination and transparency have emerged and put liberal democratic principles under pressure, most notably in the context of bail decisions. Despite this, there has been no systematic analysis of the risks to liberal democratic values from implementing AI into judicial decision-making. This article sets out to (...) fill this void by identifying and engaging with challenges arising from artificial judicial decision-making, focusing on three pillars of liberal democracy, namely equal treatment of citizens, transparency, and judicial independence. Methodologically, the work takes a comparative perspective between human and artificial decision-making, using the former as a normative benchmark to evaluate the latter. -/- The chapter first argues that AI that would improve on equal treatment of citizens has already been developed, but not yet adopted. Second, while the lack of transparency in AI decision-making poses severe risks which ought to be addressed, AI can also increase the transparency of options and trade-offs that policy makers face when considering the consequences of artificial judicial decision-making. Such transparency of options offers tremendous benefits from a democratic perspective. Third, the overall shift of power from human intuition to advanced AI may threaten judicial independence, and with it the separation of powers. While improvements regarding discrimination and transparency are available or on the horizon, it remains unclear how judicial independence can be protected, especially with the potential development of advanced artificial judicial intelligence (AAJI). Working out the political and legal infrastructure to reap the fruits of artificial judicial intelligence in a safe and stable manner should become a priority of future research in this area. (shrink)

This short work examines what the Hippocratic Oath said to Greek physicians 2400 years ago and reflects on its relevance to medical ethics today. Drawing on the writings of ancient physicians, Greek playwrights, and modern scholars, each chapter explores one passage of the Oath and concludes with a modern case discussion. This book is for anyone who loves medicine and is concerned about the ethics and history of the profession.

This chapter presents the text of a lecture on oaths and vows in the works William Shakespeare given at the British Academy's 2009 Shakespeare Lecture. This text aims to rectify scholarly neglect of the Shakespeare's excessive use of oaths and vows in his plays. Using philosophical and stage-related arguments, it highlights Shakespeare's awareness of the paradoxes of oath-taking and vowing and their potency in performance.

In the 23rd book of the Iliad, Menelaus loses second place in the chariot race because of a manoeuvre by Antilochus. So, after Antilochus claims the second prize as his and dares others to fight him for it with their fists, Menelaus rises before the assembled heroes, sceptre in hand, to initiate a formal proceeding against him . First he makes the charge: Antilochus has insulted his aretē and endangered his horses. He then calls upon the leaders of the Argives (...) to judge fairly between them. But at this point he states that he will judge the case himself – in both instances the verb for ‘to judge’ is δικάζειν. He then calls on Antilochus to follow an involved procedure and finally to swear an oath that in running the race he did not purposefully use a trick. But despite the fact that Menelaus said during the race that Antilochus would not take the prize without swearing an oath , we do not know later what the result might be if Antilochus were to accept Menelaus' challenge and to swear the oath. Homer has him sidestep the challenge and concede the prize. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts (...) do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)