Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were philosophers and theologians associated with Port-Royal Abbey, a centre of the Catholic Jansenist movement in seventeenth-century France. Their enormously influential Logic or the Art of Thinking, which went through five editions in their lifetimes, treats topics in logic, language, theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and also articulates the response of 'heretical' Jansenist Catholicism to orthodox Catholic and Protestant views on grace, free will and the sacraments. In attempting to combine the categorical theory (...) of the proposition with a Cartesian account of knowledge, their Logic represents the classical view of judgment which inspired the modern transformation in logic and semantic theory by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and recent philosophers. This edition presents a new translation of the text, together with a historical introduction and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only (...) depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration. (shrink)

This work contributes to the theory of judgement aggregation by discussing a number of significant non-classical logics. After adapting the standard framework of judgement aggregation to cope with non-classical logics, we discuss in particular results for the case of Intuitionistic Logic, the Lambek calculus, Linear Logic and Relevant Logics. The motivation for studying judgement aggregation in non-classical logics is that they offer a number of modelling choices to represent agents’ reasoning in aggregation problems. By studying judgement aggregation in (...) logics that are weaker than classical logic, we investigate whether some well-known impossibility results, that were tailored for classical logic, still apply to those weak systems. (shrink)

This volume provides an articulate restatement of many of the themes of Husserlian phenomenology.

Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only (...) depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosopher F. H. Bradley, the most influential member of the nineteenth-century school of British Idealists. It offers a sustained interpretation of Bradley's Principles of Logic, explaining the problem of how it is possible for inferences to be both valid and yet have conclusions that contain new information. The author then describes how this solution provides a basis for Bradley's metaphysical view that reality is one interconnected experience and how (...) this gives rise to a new problem of truth. (shrink)

In Kant’s logical texts the reference of the form S is P to an “unknown = x” is well known, but its understanding still remains controversial. Due to the universality of all concepts, the subject as much as the predicate is regarded as predicate of the x, which, in turn, is regarded as the subject of the judgment. In the CPR, this Kantian interpretation of the S-P relationship leads to the question about the relations between intuition and concept in (...) judgment. In contrast to intuition, if no concept, due to its universality, refers immediately to an object, how should one understand the relations of S and P to one another, as well as their relations to intuition, which corresponds to the possible individuality of the object in general = x? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand Kant’s notion of extension, and to prove its irreducibility to the Port-Royal notion of extension as well as to the Fregean one. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, (...) social choice theory, and computer science. The aim of this paper is to provide a concise survey of the discipline and to outline some of the most pressing questions and future lines of research. (shrink)

The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pragmatic operator; in Frege's (...) first system, '⊦ Δ' expresses that the circumstance Δ is a fact, and in his second system that the truth-value - Δ is the True; in both systems, the judgement-stroke is construed as a sign sui generis, not as a genuine predicate; its counterpart in natural language is the syntactic "form of assertoric sentences", not the truth-predicate; neither in Frege's first nor in his second system sentences are treated as singular terms. (shrink)

이 논문은 후설의 판단 이론의 토대인 『논리연구』의 이론을 『수동적 종합』, C 원고들 등 후기의 작업들의 관점에서 비판하고 대안을 제시한다. 『논리연구』에서 후설은 범주적 직관(kategoriale Anschauung)에 대한 연구를 통해 현상학적 판단 이론에 토대를 놓았다. 그러나 『논리연구』의 판단 이론에는 불충분한 점과 문제가 있었는데, 그것은 바로 파악(Auffassung)에 대한 구체적인 분석이 없었다는 점, 그리고 파악이 마치 제2의 체험(Erlebnis)처럼 취급되었다는 점이었다. 이러한 점들은 우리가 『수동적 종합』, C 원고들 등 후기의 작업들을 살펴봄으로써 분명해진다. 이를 통해 우리는 후설이 나중에 범주적 파악에 대한 『논리연구』의 이론을 포기한다고 말한 이유도 알 (...) 수 있다. 나아가 나는 『논리연구』의 이론을 수정하기 위해 어떤 종류의 감정(Gefühl)이 판단의 핵심적인 부분이라는 가설을 제안한다. 하지만 이에 관한 자세한 서술은 이후의 논문에서 이루어질 것이다. (shrink)

In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers’ theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists’ uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. (...) Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms. (shrink)

The infinite judgement has long been forgotten and yet, as I am about to demonstrate, it may be urgent to revive it for its critical and productive potential. An infinite judgement is neither analytic nor synthetic; it does not produce logical truths, nor true representations, but it establishes the genetic conditions of real objects and the concepts appropriate to them. It is through infinite judgements that we reach the principle of transcendental logic, in the depths of which all reality (...) can emerge in its material and sensible singularity, making possible all generalization and formal abstraction. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the role of moral principles, specifically the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, in the judgements of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on matters of performance enhancement. The article begins with two pairs of distinctions, that between moral judgements and morally-laden judgements, and that between the moral judgement of cases and the ethical environment of a society. The article is concerned with working through the implications of those distinctions in the context of the IOC's judgements on performance (...) enhancement. The article favours a particularist account of the moral judgement of cases, while preserving a place for meaningful general moral statements as contributions to the ethical environment of a society, but not as general action-guiding statements or principles that can be applied to judgements in specific cases. The article illustrates the implications of this conclusion in the context of the decision-making of the IOC on performance enhancement (the case of Alain Baxter is considered). It is argued that there is a danger of the decision-making of the IOC suffering deep confusion over the difference between general and particular statements, the nature of reasons and the logic of what it is to apply a general action-guiding statement. (shrink)

This paper addresses Frege's discussion of illogical thought in the introduction to Basic Laws of Arithmetic. After a brief introduction, I discuss Frege's claims that logic is normative vis-à-vis thought, and not descriptive, and his opposition to the idea that logical laws express psychological necessities. I argue that these two strands of Frege's polemic against psychologism constitute two motivating factors behind his allowing for the possibility of illogical thought. I then explore a line of thought—originally advanced by Joan Weiner—according (...) to which Frege should have rejected illogical thought as not constituting a genuine possibility. I argue that, once developed, this line of thought constitutes an important correction (moreover, one that is consistent with his two aforementioned anti-psychologistic strands) to Frege's own response to the possibility of illogical thought. -/- . (shrink)

This study clarifies the confusion concerning the purpose of Husserl's last major phenomenological treatise, Experience and Judgment, and presents his theory of categorical judgment.

Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens (...) the theoretical boundaries of judgment aggregation by proving that, even if these nonmonotonic logics are employed, certain typical impossibility results still hold. (shrink)

One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role (...) of the judgement stroke in a way that renders it readily comprehensible why Frege insisted that this symbol was an essential part of his logical system. The key point here is that Frege viewed logic as the study of inference relations amongst acts of judgement , rather than – as in the typical contemporary view – of consequence relations amongst certain objects (propositions or well-formed formulae). The paper also explains why Frege's use of the judgement stroke is not in conflict with his avowed anti-psychologism, and why Wittgenstein's criticism of the judgement stroke as 'logically quite meaningless' is unfounded. The key point here is that while the judgement stroke has no content , its use in logic and mathematics is subject to a very stringent norm of assertion. (shrink)

The exercise of judgement is an aspect of human endeavour from our most mundane acts to our most momentous decisions. In this book Wayne Martin develops a historical survey of theoretical approaches to judgement, focusing on treatments of judgement in psychology, logic, phenomenology and painting. He traces attempts to develop theories of judgement in British Empiricism, the logical tradition stemming from Kant, nineteenth-century psychologism, experimental neuropsychology and the phenomenological tradition associated with Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger. His reconstruction of vibrant (...) but largely forgotten nineteenth-century debates links Kantian approaches to judgement with twentieth-century phenomenological accounts. He also shows that the psychological, logical and phenomenological dimensions of judgement are not only equally important but fundamentally interlinked in any complete understanding of judgement. His book will interest a wide range of readers in history of philosophy, philosophy of the mind and psychology. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

We investigate under what conditions a given set of collective judgments can arise from a specific voting procedure. In order to answer this question, we introduce a language similar to modal logic for reasoning about judgment aggregation procedures. In this language, the formula expresses that is collectively accepted, or that is a group judgment based on voting. Different judgment aggregation procedures may be underlying the group decision making. Here we investigate majority voting, where holds if a (...) majority of individuals accepts, consensus voting, where holds if all individuals accept, and dictatorship. We provide complete axiomatizations for judgment sets arising from all three aggregation procedures. (shrink)

The reism adopted by Brentano in the later stages of his philosophy led him to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. George Bealer, in his book Quality and Concept, charges that Brentano's theory, and indeed all non-propositional theories of judgment are not adequate to certain "intuitively valid" arguments in the realm of intensional logic. I show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments, and I (...) challenge the intuitive validity of the third. I conclude, therefore, that Bealer's arguments against Brentano do not succeed. (shrink)

The reism adopted by Brentano in the later stages of his philosophy led him to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. George Bealer, in his book Quality and Concept, charges that Brentano's theory, and indeed all non-propositional theories of judgment are not adequate to certain "intuitively valid" arguments in the realm of intensional logic. I show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments, and I (...) challenge the intuitive validity of the third. I conclude, therefore, that Bealer's arguments against Brentano do not succeed. (shrink)

This compelling reevaluation of the relationship between logic and knowledge affirms the key role that the notion of judgement must play in such a review. The commentary repatriates the concept of judgement in the discussion, banished in recent times by the logical positivism of Wittgenstein, Hilbert and Schlick, and the Platonism of Bolzano. The volume commences with the insights of Swedish philosopher Per Martin-Löf, the father of constructive type theory, for whom logic is a demonstrative science in which (...) judgement is a settled feature of the landscape. His paper opens the first of four sections that examine, in turn, historical philosophical assessments of judgement and reason; their place in early modern philosophy; the notion of judgement and logical theory in Wolff, Kant and Neo-Kantians like Windelband; their development in the Husserlian phenomenological paradigm; and the work of Bolzano, Russell and Frege. The papers, whose authors include Per Martin-Löf, Göran Sundholm, Michael Della Rocca and Robin Rollinger, represent a finely judged editorial selection highlighting work on philosophers exercised by the question of whether or not an epistemic notion of judgement has a role to play in logic. The volume will be of profound interest to students and academicians for its application of historical developments in philosophy to the solution of vexatious contemporary issues in the foundation of logic. ​. (shrink)

As the subtitle suggests, the book is organized around the themes of judgment, inference and truth. Material for the first two topics is largely taken from the second edition of Bradley's Principles of Logic. The discussion of his conception of truth relies on essays written in reply to various authors. In general, the book is to be welcomed by students of Bradley for its remarkably clear and unpretentious exposition of central themes in these difficult topics.Much of the book (...) is taken up with discussion of the views of Bradley's precursors and contemporaries in British and German idealism, material that is important for understanding Bradley's own views. Hegel scholars may cringe, however, at the oft-repeated claim, stated without qualification, that Hegel regarded thought and reality as identical. Allard argues that Hegel must maintain this because his view of deductive inference required that objects be self-determining, and self-determining objects require the identity of thought and being. The argument is particularly puzzling in the light of the fact that Bradley's view of inference also requires the self-development of its objects, although he denied that thought and reality are identical. (shrink)

The question of the extent to which one can rationally reconstruct the process of medical diagnosis and reduce it to an algorithm is explored. The act of diagnostic insight is such that a computational program cannot ‘catch on’ in the way that a competent diagnostician can. Clinical diagnostic reasoning in a particular case requires as a necessary condition an extraordinarily complex and rich structure of background knowledge as well as an intuitive element, such as is manifest when one ‘catches on’ (...) to a joke. Computers cannot ‘catch on’ due to their limitations in the computational mode. As a consequence, there can be no computer simulation of an essential element in diagnostic procedures. Keywords: clinical judgment, computer diagnosis, intuition, medical decision-making CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Papers presented at a workshop held during 17th-18th, January, 2008 at Technische Universit'at Berlin.

The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of (...) this paper is to demonstrate that ordinary English properly used has the resources for intricate and philosophically sound investigation of rather deep issues in logic and philosophy of language. No mathematical, logical, or linguistic symbols are used. Meanings need to be identified and clarified before being expressed in symbols. We hope to establish that clarity is served by deferring the extensive use of formalized or logically perfect languages until a solid “informal” foundation has been established. Questions of “ontological status”—e.g., whether propositions or sentences, or for that matter characters, numbers, truth-values, or instants, are “real entities”, are “idealizations”, or are “theoretical constructs”—plays no role in this paper. As is suggested by the title, this paper is written to be read aloud. -/- I hope that reading this aloud in groups will unite people in the enjoyment of the humanistic spirit of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Frege believes that the real power to determine the sentence to show the logic of interest to "true." And with the word "truth" of redundancy on the same, he believes the lack of everyday language and the ability to determine the appropriate symbol. However, Frege, it seems that he invented the concept of text assigned to a special force to determine the sign: determine the bar. This paper attempts to demonstrate, although Frege until the final stage of his academic (...) career to determine the bar still insist to retain its logic into the language system, but the concepts and words in this design does not meet him on the relationship between logic and fuzzy real insight. A key step in the argument, we will by means of Husserl on the "faith of variation" to clarify the doctrine of "judge" and "determined" by Frege between the neglected difference. On this basis, we finally prompted a brief on the logic of Frege and true insight into the relationship between the interpretation of ambiguous direction. (shrink)

ABSTRACTProbability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies. A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 uses data (...) where BL makes dominant predictions; Experiment 2's predictions were less clear, and we additionally investigated judgements about the second-most probable hypotheses. The results corroborated a pattern-probability account and cannot be easily explained by other theories of CFs. IFs were not limited to conjunctions, but rather occurred systematically for several logical connectives. Thus, pattern-based prob... (shrink)

This paper aims to show that moral judgments do not need to be objective in order to be logically respectable. Absence of 'objectivity' does not preclude us from putting moral judgments through standard logical hoops, And, Although derived moral judgments have a descriptive direction of fit, It does not follow that fundamental moral judgments are 'objectively true'. Without invoking objectivity the impersonal form of moral judgments can be justified on the analogy of kant's account of aesthetic judgments. Their impersonal form (...) is essential to both the logic and rhetoric of moral discourse and communication. (edited). (shrink)

We can formalize judgments as logical formulas. Judgment aggregation deals with judgments of several agents, which need to be aggregated to a collective judgment. There are several logical formalizations of judgment aggregation. This paper focuses on a modal formalization which nicely expresses classical properties of judgment aggregation rules and famous results of social choice theory, like Arrow’s impossibility theorem. A natural deduction system for modal logic of judgment aggregation is presented in this paper. The (...) system is sound and complete. As an example of derivation, a formal proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is given. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

This chapter tells how, within a century, the notions of judgment and inference were driven out of logical theory and replaced by propositions and consequence. Systematic considerations guide the treatment. The history is unashamedly Whiggish: the current position is shown as the outcome, or even culmination, of a historical development.