Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...) and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know-how in the literature, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know-how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections.

A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge (...) of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected. (shrink)

Review of Tamar Schapiro, 'Feeling Like It'.

I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (δεινότης), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of (...) this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects. (shrink)

Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI because they do not give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The (...) upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles. (shrink)

aristotle closes the second common book of his ethical treatises by considering a number of puzzles about wisdom and φρόνησις,1 devoting the bulk of his attention to a puzzle about the usefulness of the latter. Briefly, the puzzle is that if φρόνησις is useful insofar as it enables us to act virtuously, it will be useless both to the virtuous person, who naturally acts well without possessing it, and to the non-virtuous person, so long as someone else tells her how (...) to act. Either way, it would seem, possessing φρόνησις is useless. There is agreement among scholars that Aristotle’s reply depends on the following biconditional claim: Virtue-Φρόνησις... (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Extending Aanderaa’s classical result that $\pi ^{1}_{1} < \sigma ^{1}_{1}$, we determine the order between any two patterns of iterated $\Sigma ^{1}_{1}$ - and $\Pi ^{1}_{1}$ -reflection on ordinals. We show that this order of linear reflection is a prewellordering of length $\omega ^{\omega }$. This requires considering the relationship between linear and some non-linear reflection patterns, such as $\sigma \wedge \pi $, the pattern of simultaneous $\Sigma ^{1}_{1}$ - and $\Pi ^{1}_{1}$ -reflection. The proofs involve linking the lengths of (...) $\alpha $ -recursive wellorderings to various forms of stability and reflection properties satisfied by ordinals $\alpha $ within standard and non-standard models of set theory. (shrink)

La investigación se inscribe dentro de un movimiento que busca poner de relieve la pertinencia de textos poéticos para la comprensión de los diálogos de Platón. En este caso, se parte de la comunidad de la expresión “el jardín de Zeus” en la Pítica 9 de Píndaro y en el Discurso de Diotima en el Banquete. Primero, se presenta un esquema temático de los dos textos. Luego, se ofrece un recorrido en tres etapas: el paso del deseo a la mediación, (...) el estudio de la figura del mediador, y la apertura de la mediación al ámbito metapoético y lo que se sigue de ello. En la primera etapa se muestra cómo Eros dirige a la inmortalidad por medio de la generación, que se guía por la virtud en su condición más noble, al instituirse la ciudad, a la vez que, en el diálogo entre Apolo, enamorado de Cirene, y Quirón, se identifican los mismos pasos de una pulsión erótica que conduce a lo cívico. En la segunda etapa se destaca la tarea mediadora de Quirón ante Apolo, semejante a la relación de Diotima con Sócrates; esta mediación de Quirón produce un nuevo ámbito, que lleva su impronta, por lo que se entiende que la mediación de Diotima haya generado al filósofo erótico Sócrates, también ahora mediador. En la tercera etapa se muestra cómo franquea el sabio la diferencia entre los tiempos divino y humano mediante la creación metapoética, cuya consumación poética y filosofica es la constitución de la ciudad bella. (shrink)

Diotima’s speech claims that philosophy ranks among the erōtica. The standard reading of this holds that erōs manifests in philosophical activity. This is puzzling. Eros has a reputation for overpowering the psyche, making reasoning impossible. The major interpretive discussion of this puzzle suggests that Diotima must therefore accept either non-rationalist philosophizing or rationalist erōs. This paper argues for an alternative. The “ancillary activities view” posits that the erōtica do not manifest erōs but are activities undertaken to achieve its telos. On (...) this view, love’s relationship to philosophy is as un-mysterious as wanting something and doing what it takes to get it. (shrink)

What is the strange eros that haunts Foucault's writing? In this deeply original consideration of Foucault's erotic ethics, Lynne Huffer provocatively rewrites Foucault as a Sapphic poet. She uncovers eros as a mode of thought that erodes the interiority of the thinking subject. Focusing on the ethical implications of this mode of thought, Huffer shows how Foucault's poetic archival method offers a way to counter the disciplining of speech. At the heart of this method is a conception of the archive (...) as Sapphic: the past's remains are, like Sappho's verses, hole-ridden, scattered, and dissolved by time. Listening for eros across fragmented texts, Huffer stages a series of encounters within an archive of literary and theoretical readings: the eroticization of violence in works by Freud and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, the historicity of madness in the Foucault-Derrida debate, the afterlives of Foucault's antiprison activism, and Monique Wittig's Sapphic materialism. Through these encounters, Foucault's Strange Eros conceives of ethics as experiments in living that work poetically to make the present strange. Crafting fragments that dissolve into Sapphic brackets, Huffer performs the ethics she describes in her own practice of experimental writing. Foucault's Strange Eros hints at the self-hollowing speech of an eros that opens a space for the strange. (shrink)

This essay examines the feminist literature on ‘eros’ inspired primarily by Audre Lorde’s essay, “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power.” The central argument of this literature is that “our erotic knowledge empowers us” by guiding and inspiring us to pursue what we truly value in life. This literature is useful in emphasizing a human quality that is often overlooked, even by other feminists. Yet it is plagued by the prevailing assumption that our deepest passions and desires will necessarily (...) lead to ethical choices. The underlying assumption is that there is a core, ‘pure’, good eros—which is in turn an expression of a core, pure, good self. This is a form of essentialism. Specifically, it is an attribution of a ‘true’, natural property to women that does little more than reverse the valuation of the traditional attribution of natural ‘emotionality’ to women. (shrink)

Freud speculated that the course all living beings travel from birth to death is determined by a contest between a life instinct and a death instinct. He believed that instinctual repression required by civilization tended to strengthen Thanatos. Herbert Marcuse argued that civilization did not require quite as much repression as Freud assumed. This joyous suggestion was greeted with enthusiasm by the countercultural political movements of the 1960s. I ask whether Marcuse was overly optimistic, given the fact that humanity appears (...) to be hell-bent on destroying itself due to its inability to deal with global warming. (shrink)

We prove Menger’s theorem for countable graphs in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document}. Our proof in fact proves a stronger statement, which we call extended Menger’s theorem, that is equivalent to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document} over \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\tt{RCA}_0}}$$\end{document}.

We prove Menger’s theorem for countable graphs in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document}. Our proof in fact proves a stronger statement, which we call extended Menger’s theorem, that is equivalent to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document} over \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\tt{RCA}_0}}$$\end{document}.

_Eros, Wisdom, and Silence_ is a close reading of Plato’s Seventh Letter and his dialogues _Symposium_ and _Phaedrus_, with significant attention also given to _Alcibiades I_. A book about love, James Rhodes’s work was conceived as a conversation and meant to be read side by side with Plato’s works and those of his worthy interlocutors. It invites lovers to participate in conversations that move their souls to love, and it also invites the reader to take part in the author’s dialogues (...) with Plato and his commentators. Rhodes addresses two closely related questions: First, what does Plato mean when he says in the Seventh Letter that he never has written and never will write anything concerning that about which he is serious? Second, what does Socrates mean when he claims to have an art of eros and that this _techne_ is the only thing he knows? Through careful analysis, Rhodes establishes answers to these questions. He determines that Plato cannot write anything concerning that about which he is serious because his most profound knowledge consists of his soul’s silent vision of ultimate, transcendent reality, which is ineffable. Rhodes also shows that, for Socrates, eros is a symbol for the soul’s experience of divine reality, which pulls every element of human nature toward its proper end, but which also leads people to evil and tyranny when human resistance causes it to become diseased. Opening up a new avenue of Plato scholarship, _Eros, Wisdom, and Silence_ is political philosophy at its conversational best. Scholars and students in political philosophy, classical studies, and religious studies will find this work invaluable. (shrink)

A comprehensive examination of Lacan’s seminar on ethics.

Nietzsche’s conception of eros and its role in the development of philosophers is similar to the conception of those same topics espoused by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Nietzsche and Diotima agree that eros is an insatiable desire to possess the beautiful, that eros aims at immortality through reproduction, and that philosophy requires an ascent beyond sexual desire to “higher” forms of eros, which nevertheless are still modeled on heterosexual reproduction. Understanding these facets of Nietzsche’s view leads to an apparent contradiction (...) in that Nietzsche thinks of philosophy on the model of reproduction and ascribes to the philosopher both the female and the male roles in heterosexual reproduction. I argue that this ambivalence reflects Nietzsche’s view that practicing philosophy requires balancing two conflicting philosophical tendencies: on the one hand, pursuit of truth, which involves dissatisfaction with oneself; on the other hand, creation, which involves acknowledgment of one’s own capacity and value. (shrink)

The Symposium addresses the relation between desire, beauty and the good life, while indicating the fascination that strong teaching arouses in followers. For Plato, unlike for moderns, power, desire and ethics are interrelated. This article takes Socrates as a case study for the Platonic understanding of this interrelation and it will put into play the grounds involved in their modern separation. It focuses on the three speakers in the dialogue who were followers of Socrates as a way of addressing the (...) role of desire in the teacher–student relation. The article demonstrates how the radical interpretive method brings to life the challenges a strong engagement with Eros risks, especially those related to Socrates’ strong and influential teaching, while addressing and exemplifying theorizing’s need for ironic intoxication. (shrink)

For among most contemporaries, the concept of Eros seems to have nothing to do with Christianity. Sifting through the psychoanalysis of sexual fantasy, theologically it says nothing. Our study gives reasons showing that for theologians since the dawn of the Christian era, Eros-love plays a fundamental role.. The connotations of this concept, however, are different from those of today, when its sensory meaning is more restricted to sexuality. Greek theologians of the first centuries after Christ, taught the concept of Plato (...) enshrined as a unifying enthusiasm, the attraction of inferior to superior states, as “hungry and thirsty” for something continuously higher, developing, and enriching the connotation. The work of Dionysius Areopagite, the Idea of Good, leads us step by step up the ascent of the erotically chaste, and is identified with the One-God, who is the very source of love. Consequently, Eros-love originates from God, Eros- love being not only an ascending but firstly a descending love, which calls for a reciprocal communion. (shrink)

In his books Eros and Civilization and An Essay on Liberation, Herbert Marcuse offers a different, but complementary, theory of eros from that of Freud. While sexuality still occupies a central space in the pleasure principle, Marcuse extends the concept to embrace a wider understanding of eros. Now eros is termed the “new sensibility,” which, in his view, has been made possible by the end of scarcity’s rule over human life. In an epoch in which necessary labor can be sharply (...) reduced, we would have time to develop our capacities: arts and crafts, friendships, noncommodified intellectual pursuits, and, of course, love beyond procreation. The new sensibility can be dismissed as a utopian hope in a period of retrenchment of pleasure, but Marcuse refuses the prevailing tendency to ratify repression. (shrink)

In his dialogues, Plato presents different ways in which to understand the relation between Forms and particulars. In the Symposium, we are presented with yet another, hitherto unidentified Form-particular relation: the relation is Love, which binds together Form and particular in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. Love in relation to the beautiful motivates human action to desire for knowledge of the Form, resulting in the lover actively cultivating and bringing into being (...) new beauty in the world, and in herself. Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis offer a survey of the arguments and examples Plato puts forward in the text of the corpus regarding the nature of Forms and the nature of participation, alongside a framework of the traditional interpretations of these two Platonic concepts in the literature. Chapter 3 turns to a close examination of Erôs in the Symposium, arguing that the love Plato presents in this dialogue is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It is an aesthetic and intellectual attraction, capable of stimulating cognitive achievement. Erôs, however, does not stop there. The lover is led not only to contemplation of beauty, but to the generation of beauty, which is the subject of Chapter 4. The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of Erôs, I argue, is the clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through participation in Forms. Erôs leads the lover to produce beauty in the world and in the soul, which explains how love in relation to the beautiful can lead to becoming beautiful. The object of love is the generation of beauty, the mortal mechanism of participation in the Form by which the lover herself becomes beautiful. Finally, Chapter 5 focusses on beauty itself and its role in moral education. Beauty, for Plato, is required for creative generation and can be understood as a uniquely powerful virtue of soul. (shrink)

SUMMARYAnders Nygren's antithetical juxtaposition of eros and agape became enormously influential in twentieth-century Protestant theology. Among other interconnected tenets, Nygren promulgated the idea that eros is eudæmonistic, i.e. always seeking the happiness of the lover. In The Four Loves , C. S. Lewis vehemently denies this. Lewis's use of the word ‘happiness’ in The Four Loves is so close to Nygren's eudæmonism that Risto Saarinen has called it ‘a conscious showdown’. In this article I evaluate this engagement. After presenting and (...) deconstructing it, I challenge Lewis's argument. I argue that eros does, as Nygren claims it does, seek happiness – although not only this. Perhaps surprisingly, Lewis, despite all appearances, may actually be compelled to agree with Nygren on this point. But not on every point. The final analysis reveals what I take to be Lewis's true concern. Contrary to what Nygren thought, for Lewis, the pursuit of happiness is not morally culpable and even eros has an agapistic opening. While getting these points across, Lewis was driven to exaggeration in denying eros's happiness-seeking character altogether. This exaggeration is corrected by the overall argument of his last, posthumously published essay, ‘We Have No “Right to Happiness”’. (shrink)

In his books Eros and Civilization and An Essay on Liberation, Herbert Marcuse offers a different, but complementary, theory of eros from that of Freud. While sexuality still occupies a central space in the pleasure principle, Marcuse extends the concept to embrace a wider understanding of eros. Now eros is termed the “new sensibility,” which, in his view, has been made possible by the end of scarcity’s rule over human life. In an epoch in which necessary labor can be sharply (...) reduced, we would have time to develop our capacities: arts and crafts, friendships, noncommodified intellectual pursuits, and, of course, love beyond procreation. The new sensibility can be dismissed as a utopian hope in a period of retrenchment of pleasure, but Marcuse refuses the prevailing tendency to ratify repression. (shrink)

Dr. Rhoades explains in his opening chapter that “Plato’s constant dramatic refrain is that the healing of a tyrannical eros is necessary to political wisdom. This implies that the study of eros is the study of politics and vice versa. Thus, the Platonic dialogues that we perceive as erotic are also political, and the dialogues that we classify as political are also erotic”. The working out of this thesis in his analysis of the Symposium and the Phaedrus constitute the bulk (...) of this work. But because Rhoades holds that Plato presents Socrates as having knowledge of eros, which is one of the greatest things, and maintains in the Seventh Letter that serious matters are in no way a spoken thing nor should they be written about, it becomes necessary to articulate where Plato and his Socrates stand on what Rhoades calls “their policy of refraining from writing or speaking about serious things” to which he gives the name “Silence.” The investigation of this issue requires a chapter on nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators on Plato and another chapter presenting an extended reading of Plato’s Seventh Letter. (shrink)

The themes of hybris, eros and mania are interconnected in Plato's final opus, the Laws, regarding his narrator's construction of sexually accepted norms for his 'second-best', utopian society. This article examines this formulation, its psychological characteristics and philosophical underpinnings. The role and function of his social programme are considered in the context of the Laws and the hypothetical polis outlined therein. However, this particular formulation is not a new development in later Platonic thought. It is, rather, a logical extension of (...) earlier Platonic ideas, expressed in a number of previous dialogues, and brought to bear in the peculiar circumstances of the 'second-best' polis. This can be especially observed in relation to the Symposium and Phaedrus. Instead of regarding the construction of sexuality in the Laws as a work in isolation, these earlier ideas are here considered intertextually as part of a broader Platonic continuum. (shrink)

(2013). Eros, Education, and Eco-Ethical Consciousness: Re-Membering the “Room of Love” in Wendell Berry's Hannah Coulter. Educational Studies: Vol. 49, Eco-Democratic Reforms in Education, pp. 443-450.

The themes of hybris, erôs and mania are interconnected in Plato’s final opus, the Laws, regarding his narrator’s construction of sexually accepted norms for his ‘second-best’, utopian society. This article examines this formulation, its psychological characteristics and philosophical underpinnings. The role and function of his social programme are considered in the context of the Laws and the hypothetical polis outlined therein. However, this particular formulation is not a new development in later Platonic thought. It is, rather, a logical extension of (...) earlier Platonic ideas, expressed in a number of previous dialogues, and brought to bear in the peculiar circumstances of the ‘second-best’ polis. This can be especially observed in relation to the Symposium and Phaedrus. Instead of regarding the construction of sexuality in the Laws as a work in isolation, these earlier ideas are here considered intertextually as part of a broader Platonic continuum. (shrink)

One of the most intriguing and underappreciated aspects of Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy is his treatment of peace as a civilizational aim of culture. The problem of peace is the subject in the final chapter of Whitehead’s Adventures of Ideas. It is considered along with the other four qualities of civilized societies, “Adventure, Art, Beauty, and Truth.” Although his analysis is driven by examples from Western and Christian history, respectively, the treatment of peace developed is not limited to this or (...) any specific experiential epoch. Peace is a transcultural value, the “harmony of harmonies,” which lies at the heart or in the “nature of things.” Whitehead designates the permanence-flux contrast of peace in human life as a tension between the “dream of youth” and “harvest of tragedy.” Our lives give way to the dance of the possible and actual that both unites and divides us. This article explains how Whitehead attempts to argue for peace by way of “balanced intensity” in response to the triumphs and tribulations of life. Section one deals with the ways in which youth and eros symbolize possibility and orient us toward the possible. Tragedy, or the determination of the individual in its own subjective realization and the consequent nature it produces through the “unity of adventure,” is the focus of the second section. In section three, the erotic-tragic contrast is presented in relation to peace as an “intuition of permanence.” In conclusion, Whitehead’s humanism will be offered as a viable alternative against the modern belief of progress or the quest for worldly success, in which prosperity becomes antithetical to the achievement of peace given its propensity to evade or outrun tragedy. (shrink)