I propose a set of distinctions that demarcate the structure that I consider suitable for the study and determination of the true value of the thesis of conceptual incompatibility between authority and autonomy. I begin with an analysis of the standard conception of authority, i.e., correlativism. I distinguish two versions: the epistemic and the voluntarist. Then I offer an analysis of two conceptions of moral autonomy: self-legislation and self-judgment. I conclude by remarking that we should distinguish two different versions of (...) the conceptual incompatibility thesis: a) the conflict is unsolvable because moral autonomy requires that we always be the authors of the norms we have to obey, while the authority claims that its will is a source of such standards; and b) the conflict is unsolvable because moral autonomy requires that we always judge for ourselves what categorical reasons should guide our action and that we act accordingly. Authority, on the contrary intends that we rest on its judgment and give up acting on our own. (shrink)

The vision of an art masterpiece is associated with brain arousal by neural processes occurring quite spontaneously in the viewer. This aesthetic experience may even elicit a response in the motor areas of the observers. In the neurorehabilitation of patients with stroke, art observation has been used for reducing psychological disorders, and creative art therapy for enhancing physical functions and cognitive abilities. Here, we developed a virtual reality task which allows patients, by moving their hand on a virtual canvas, to (...) have the illusion of painting some art masterpieces, such as The Creation of Adam of Michelangelo or The birth of Venus of Botticelli. Twenty healthy subjects and four patients with stroke performed this task and a control one in which they simply colored the virtual canvas. Results from User Satisfaction Evaluation Questionnaire and the NASA Task Load Index highlighted an appropriate level of usability. Moreover, despite the motor task was the same for art and control stimuli, the art condition was performed by healthy subjects with shorter trajectories and with a lower perception of physical demand. In experiment 2, only the patients treated with artistic stimuli showed a reduction in the erroneous movements performed orthogonally to the canvas. This finding reminds the so-called Mozart effect that improves the performance of subjects when they listen to classic music. Thus, we called this improvement in the performance when interacting with an artistic stimulus as Michelangelo effect. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...) credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist. (shrink)

I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.

Munch-Jurisic’s account of perpetrator disgust raises important new questions concerning the complexity of emotions and their connection with moral actions. In this commentary, we discuss this account by applying some of the author’s ideas to the case of anger. We suggest that just as the relations between disgust and moral action are much more nuanced than previously thought, as Munch-Jurisic explains, analyses of anger can also profit from a more careful approach to such connections. Specifically, we propose that contextual factors (...) can affect the moral character of anger reactions, which in turn can provide them with moral value. We also argue that the contextual view deployed to study disgust reactions can also support distinctions between core forms and socio-moral forms of the same emotion, which in turn raises interesting questions concerning different forms of anger. Lastly, we extend the contextual approach to problems of emotion individuation and theories in emotion science, showing how current scientific emotion theories can learn from a detailed examination of disgust, anger, and other context-sensitive emotions. We aim to highlight some important contributions of Munch-Jurisic’s work to broader discussions on emotions, morality, and how to theorize about emotions overall. (shrink)

El pensamiento vivo de Juan Luis Vives, por Joaquín Xirau.--Páginas escogidas de Juan Luis Vives: De concordia y discordia. Tratado del alma. Introducción a la sabiduría. Del socorro de los pobres. Tratado de la enseñanza.

The founding operation of the American States involves a mediating mechanism that enables the connection between the ideals supporting it and the intent for its popularization among people. Such is the function assigned to the founding heroes, which is analyzed as a cultural operation that aims to enshrine these ideals, thereby eliding the violence contained in the formation of modern States.

In the international sphere, sovereignty and fundamental rights are often at odds, giving these rights little space for action and, in general, only after crisis has led to tragedy, and tragedy to disgrace. International Law, on the other hand, consistently succumbs to forms of domination and power, and its scope of action is often limited to certain codifications which are frequently suspended by political exception. Sixteenth century Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, established the principles for a Law of the people, (...) based on secular civil power that, while still exercising internal sovereignty, could defend and privilege the “rights of all men” over the exercise of power and private interest. This article focuses on this dispute to show Vitoria’s position, who long preceded the great declarations of human rights of the 18 th century, presenting an original doctrine within the framework of an emerging globalization and based on the defense of fundamental rights. (shrink)

What if what is permissible and acceptable today is anathema tomorrow? There is a whole canon of scholarly ethics books written with the express purpose of telling you what is RIGHT and what is WRONG. This is not one such book. Juan Enriquez wants to make it easier for us to talk to one another, to prod one another, to understand and guide one another without an everlasting certainty of strict RIGHT v WRONG.

"Spinoza", à quoi ça sert? Et comment s'en servir? En particulier, comment penser la mise à l'épreuve du rationalisme spécifique dont il est le nom? L'objectif de ce travail est de contribuer à une réévaluation non seulement du rôle de la pratique dans la pensée de Spinoza, mais encore du système lui-même, de sa capacité à s'adapter et à communiquer avec des domaines tels que les sciences expérimentales, l'histoire, la politique ou la médecine. A travers les concepts et problèmes, tels (...) qu'ils sont formulés dans ses textes, mais également leur utilisation contemporaine, il s'agit ici d'analyser l'articulation de la philosophie de Spinoza au champ de l'action humaine, dans ses dimensions éthique, sociale, cognitive et affective - et d'apprécier la puissance de la rationalité qui en est le fondement. Les auteurs viennent d'horizons différents : professeurs, docteurs, doctorants, étudiants ou érudits originaires de divers pays, ils proposent dans les articles ici présentés des approches variées et originales des problèmes qu'ils traitent, offrant ainsi au lecteur un aperçu de la vitalité des réflexions que suscite aujourd'hui l'oeuvre de Spinoza. (shrink)

Manual de dialéctica, retórica y lógica aplicada, que es a la vez, como el texto mismo lo demuestra, una herramienta efectiva para acabar con el sofista, desmontar y anular los artilugios retóricos con los que el demagogo, el charlatán, el político y toda la caterva de embaucadores del discurso ejecutan su engaño.

This chapter offers some insight into Spinoza's understanding of the concept of potentia. As is well known amongst scholars, the concept of potentia is fundamental for Spinoza. From ontology, to ethics and politics, the concept of potentia seems to embody the unity of Spinoza's thought. Unlike E1p9, Spinoza focuses on the independence or in the per se nature of the intelligibility of each attribute. The demonstration of the proposition recalls both the definition of the attribute and the definition of substance (...) as explanations. Having more reality, Spinoza states, means having more powers or strength, that is, more potentia to exist. The chapter shows that Spinoza's radical ontology of power emerges in the propositions preparing the consideration of God's necessary existence, namely E1p9–10. (shrink)