Este artigo é parte do estudo de mestrado que investigou a concepção de educação e pessoa à luz do personalismo de Emmanuel Mounier. Para o personalismo mounieriano a pessoa não nasce perfeita, ou seja, pronta. O homem é chamado a “amadurecer livremente” como pessoa. Isso envolve dois aspectos fundamentais para o seu desenvolvimento – a liberdade, que lhe confere a possibilidade de escolha, e o protagonismo, que o coloca como principal responsável por seu desenvolvimento. O desenvolvimento da pessoa, em Mounier, (...) é um processo que depende, sobretudo, da própria pessoa. Tal protagonismo evidencia que a educação, para o personalismo é, na verdade, autoeducação. (shrink)
La question de l’union entre sagesse et bonheur se situe au cœur même de la tradition morale. Dans la perspective la plus traditionnelle, croître en sagesse revient automatiquement à augmenter son bonheur. La philosophie est ainsi la voie royale pour parvenir à un bonheur plus durable que dans la conception vulgaire, en détachant l’esprit des choses inessentielles et en l’amenant à connaître les vérités qui lui fourniront l’aliment le plus approprié à sa nature réelle. Néanmoins, le lien analytique entre sagesse (...) et bonheur a également été critiqué par la démonstration que l’effondrement de l’un des deux termes n’entraînait pas nécessairement l’effondrement de l’autre. Au premier chef de ces critiques se situent les sceptiques, qui de l’Antiquité à la période moderne s’accordent à nier la possibilité d’une connaissance réelle, tout en maintenant généralement la possibilité d’être heureux. Inversement, cette accessibilité du bonheur a pu être critiquée sans que soit remise en question la connaissance elle-même : c’est ce que révèlent les philosophies tragiques, qui assimilent plutôt sagesse et souffrance. Par la diversité des contributions, qui puisent principalement dans les traditions ancienne et moderne, mais offrent également quelques perspectives contemporaines et non euro-centrées, le présent volume illustre l’affrontement de ces deux grands courants dans l’histoire de la philosophie, et permet de penser à nouveaux frais ce problème essentiel à la morale qu’est l’utilité ou l’inutilité de la connaissance pour être heureux. Sigmund Freud, et surtout Jacques Lacan, m’ont apporté l’éclairage théorique nécessaire. (shrink)
Embodied approaches to human cognition emphasize the role of the body in processes of linguistic comprehension and production. Several empirical studies have presented support to these approaches. The recent linguistic enactivist approach to cognition stands out for suggesting that we have to deepen our concept of the body. In this context, we present: 1) neurological and psychological evidence supporting the claim that concepts are embodied; 2) two theoretical approaches to embodied cognition in the cognitive sciences: the grounded cognition approach, and (...) one approach based on dynamic systems theory – our focus is on how these theories consider the conceptual system; and 3) the enactivist linguistic approach to cognition. Then, based on introductory clarifications on these three theories, we suggest that the empirical evidence supports only a shallow perspective of the role of the body in cognition, by the linguistic enactivist standards, and we emphasize the importance of understanding the empirical reach of linguistic enactivism. Keywords: Language. Body. Cognition. Enactivism. Conceptual system. (shrink)
Background and AimsEnd-of-life discussions can be difficult for seriously ill adolescents and young adults. Researchers aimed to determine whether completing Voicing My CHOiCES —a research-informed advance care planning guide—increased communication with family, friends, or health care providers, and to evaluate the experience of those with whom VMC was shared.MethodsFamily, friends, or HCPs who the AYAs had shared their completed VMC with were administered structured interviews to assess their perception of the ACP discussion, changes in their relationship, conversation quality, and whether (...) the discussion prompted changes in care. Open-ended responses underwent thematic analysis.ResultsOne-month post-completion, 65.1% of AYA had shared VMC completion with a family member, 22.6% with a friend, and 8.9% with an HCP. Among a sample of respondents, family and friends reported a positive change in their relationship with the AYA. Participant descriptions of the experience fell into five themes: positive experience, difficult experience, appreciated a guide to facilitate discussion, provided relief, and created worry/anxiety. Only 1 HCP noted a treatment change. Family, friends, and HCP did not think the AYA would have discussed EoL preferences without completing VMC.ConclusionsVMC has potential to enhance communication about ACP between AYA and their family and friends, though less frequently with HCPs. Participants reported a positive change in their relationship with the AYA after discussing VMC, and described experiencing the conversation as favorable, even when also emotionally difficult. (shrink)
We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).
The actual introduction of a non-reflexive and non-idempotent q -consequence gave birth to the concept of logical three-valuedness based on the idea of noncomplementary categories of rejection and acceptance. A q -consequence may not have bivalent description, the property claimed by Suszko’s Thesis on logical two-valuedness, ( ST ), of structural logics, i.e. structural consequence operations. Recall that ( ST ) shifts logical values over the set of matrix values and it refers to the division of matrix universe into two (...) subsets of designated and undesignated elements using their characteristic functions as logical valuations, cf.  The extension of the idea operates with three-valued function, with the third value ascribed to those elements of the matrix which are neither rejected nor accepted. Accordingly, the logical three-valuedness departs naturally from the division of the matrix universe into three subsets and the ( ST ) counterpart says that any inference based on a structural q -consequence may have a bivalent or a three-valued description. After a short presentation of the three-valued inferential framework, we discuss a solution for further exploration of the idea leading to logical n -valuedness for n > 3. Apparently, the first step in that direction is easy and it consists of a division of the matrix universe into more than three subsets. The next move, i.e. a definition of a matrix consequence-like relation being neither a consequence nor a q -consequence, seems extremely difficult. Therefore, here we consider only finite linear matrices with one-argument functions “labelling” respective matrix subsets. By means of these functions it is possible to represent a q-consequence as a “partial” Tarski’s consequence and, ultimately, to define a logically more-valued consequence-like relation. We believe, that the present partial proposal deserves an attention by itself but also that it may lead to a general approach to logically many-valued inference. (shrink)
The paper is a study of properties of quasi-consequence operation which is a key notion of the so-called inferential approach in the theory of sentential calculi established in . The principal motivation behind the quasi-consequence, q-consequence for short, stems from the mathematical practice which treats some auxiliary assumptions as mere hypotheses rather than axioms and their further occurrence in place of conclusions may be justified or not. The main semantic feature of the q-consequence reflecting the idea is that its rules (...) lead from the non-rejected assumptions to the accepted conclusions.First, we focus on the syntactic features of the framework and present the q-consequence as related to the notion of proof. Such a presentation uncovers the reasons for which the adjective inferential is used to characterize the approach and, possibly, the term inference operation replaces q-consequence. It also shows that the inferential approach is a generalisation of the Tarski setting and, therefore, it may potentially absorb several concepts from the theory of sentential calculi, cf. . However, as some concrete applications show, see e.g., the new approach opens perspectives for further exploration. (shrink)
One of the generalizations of R. W´ojcicki’s concept of referential matrix is so-called pseudo-referential matrix . G. Malinowski, who introduced that concept, also considers a particular case of pseudo-referential matrices called discrete pseudo-referential matrices . In this note we want to show how any generalized matrix determines a semantically equivalent discrete pseudo-referential matrix.
Vital to libraries, teachers, and undergraduate students and their writings, this anthology offers contemporary analysis of American culture in new essays written exclusively for this book by leading anthropologists. The new essays are set against the perspective of several renowned anthropologists (Malinowski, Eric Wolf, Marvin Harris, Marshall Sahlins, etc.) to offer a uniquely anthropological perspective on the most challenging issues of our time, from immigration to job exportation to the recent financial meltdown.
This issue of the Hastings Center Report includes a special report that comes out of a three-year Hastings Center research project on controversies surrounding the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders in children. Over the last couple of decades, the number of children diagnosed with mental disorders has risen significantly, and so, too, has the number of children prescribed medications. Some critics have accused psychiatry of overdiagnosis—of sometimes diagnosing children with psychiatric disorders when their behavior is actually within the range (...) of normal. This controversy led Erik Parens and Josie Johnston, authors of the report and the Hastings Center investigators in this project, to ask what a .. (shrink)
I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...) some judgments which are valid inter-culturally Absolutism: there are at least some particular prescriptions which are valid without exception everywhere and always -/- 2. The traditional proof of prescriptive moral relativism: the argument from variability: Judgments, rules, and shared values are de facto variable in time and space. The traditional counter-proof: examples of variability do not prove what skeptics contend. -/- 3. Pre-history of the doctrine -Ancient sophists: either immoralist or contractualist -Modern moral scepticism (xvii c.): variability as an historical and ethnographic fact supports a sceptical conclusion more moderate than sheer immoralism. - Voltaire, Kant, Reid counter-attack pointing at a universally shared moral sense - Romantics and idealists stage an even more moderate reformulation: instead of universally shared moral sense they point at the Spirit of a People which is: a)alternative to abstract and universal philosophical systems as far as it is lived ‘culture’; b) indivisible unity with an inner harmony and a source of normative standards; c) dynamic, in so far as it is a manifestation of the Spirit through the becoming of National cultures. -/- 4. The birth of Cultural Relativism and its ethical implications 4.1. The 18th c. doctrine was the noble savage (a non-historical doctrine: state of nature vs. social state) 4.2 Edward Tylor (1832-1817) and ethnocentric historicism Savage moral standards are real enough, but they are far and weaker than ours. 4.3 Boas and Malinowski and an holistic reaction to ethnocentric historicism -/- Franz Boas (1858-1942): a) Development of civilizations is not ruled by technical progress nor does it follow a one-way path; instead there are parallel developments (for ex. Agriculture does not follow stock-raising); b) racial characters have no relevance in development of civilization; c) we are not yet in a position to compare externally identical kinds of behaviour till we have not yet understood beliefs and intentions laying at their roots (for ex.: “From an ethnological point of view murder cannot be considered as a single phenomenon”; d) we should distinguish among different practices which are only superficially similar (fro ex. practices traditionally classified under the label “tabù”); e) there is as a fact just one normative ethic, constant in its contents but varying in its extension; f) the implication is not that we cannot judge behavior by members of other groups; it is only a recommendation of caution. -/- Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942): a) against Tylor’s and Frazer’s “magpie” methodology, field-work is required, a culture as a whole should be observed from inside; individual elements are incomprehensible; b) a culture is an organic whole; c) its elements are accounted for by their function (economy), avoiding non-observables (empio-criticism). -/- Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovitz identify Boas’s approach with “cultural relativism”. Benedict: what is normal and abnormal is to be judged on a culture’s own standards, not on our own (“Anthropology and the Abnormal”). Herskovits: “Boas adumbrates what we have come to call cultural relativism” (The Mind, p. 10); “Judgements are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation” (Man and his Works). -/- 4. How analytic philosophy understood and misunderstood the discussion 4.1. At the beginning of the 20th c., the new view in ethics was non-cognitivism (emotivist and subjectivist). Eric Westermark combines this view with an old-style ethnographic approach in support of relativity of moralities. Moralities are codes, or systems of emotive ‘disinterested’ reactions selected by evolution on their usefulness in terms of survival value for the society that is the carrier of such systems or codes. The moral relativity thesis: there are cases of disagreement that cannot be settled even after agreement about facts. 4.2 Anti-realists Brandt, Mackie, Gilbert, Harman adopt Westermark’s approach in a more sophisticated version: a) moralities are codes with an overall function and may be appraised only as wholes; b) variability is an argument for moral subjectivism; c) apparent legitimacy of deriving shift from ought is legitimized only within one institution d) morality should not be described but instead made, and existing moralities may be improved. Is it ‘real’ relativism? It is clearly subjectivism (a metaethical thesis). The normative thesis is that there better and worse codes, and survival values is the normative standard. -/- 4.3 Particularists MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Wiggins, McDowell ‘Wittgensteinian’ prospectivist arguments bent to support weak-relativist claims MacIntyre: there is ‘incommensurability’ between different theoretical systems in both science and ethics. No argument is possible through different systems Different traditions may coexist for a long time without being able to bring their conflicts to a rational solution. -/- 4.4 Kantian universalists Baier, Gewirth, Rawls, Apel, Habermas Shared claim: justice concerns the right and is universal in so far as it may be based on minimal assumptions Other virtues are relative to context in so far as they are related to comprehensive views of the good - O’Neill criticism: a) it is an assumption shared by both alignments; b) after an alleged crisis brought about by alleged loss of metaphysical certainties, theories of justice have dropped demanding assumptions and kept universalism, virtue theories have kept demanding assumptions and dropped universalism; c) the opposition of virtue and justice has arisen in an unjustified way. O’Neill’s positive proposal: ‘constructive’ procedures may be adopted both (i) concerning all the range of virtues and (ii) across cultures once we abandon idealization and confine ourselves to abstraction from real-world cases. -/- 4.5 A metaethical relativist and anti-relativist normative ethicists: Bernard Williams Williams: vulgar relativism may be assumed to claim that: a) 'just' means 'just in a given society'; b) 'just in a given society' is to be understood in functionalist sense; c) it is wrong for one society’s members to condemn another society’s values. It is inconsistent since in (c) uses ‘just’ in a non-relative way that has been excluded in (a). William’s positive proposal: i) keep a number of substantive or thick ethical concepts that will be different in space and time; ii) admit that public choices are to be legitimized through recourse to more abstract procedures and relying on more thin ethical concepts. -/- 5. Critical remarks 5.1 The only real relativism available is ‘vulgar’ relativism (Westermark?) 5.2. Descriptive universalism (or absolutism) has a long pedigree, from Cicero on, reaching Boas himself but it is useless as an answer to normative questions 5.3. Twentieth-century philosophical discussion seems to discuss an ad hoc doctrine reconstructed by assembling obsolete philosophical ideas but ignoring the real theory of cultural relativism as formulated by anthropologists. -/- 6. A distinction between ethoi and ethical theories as a way out of confusions a)There are systems of conventions de facto existing. These may be studies from outside as phenomena or facts. b)There is moral argument and this, when studies from outside, is a fact, but this does not influence in any degree the possible validity of claims advanced. c) the difference between the above claims and Mackie’s criticism to Searle’s argument of the promising game is that promises, arguments etc. are also phenomena, but they are also communicative phenomena with a logical and pragmatic structure. -/- 7.Conclusions: a) cultural relativism, as a name for Boas’s methodology is a valuable discovery, and in this sense we are all relativists; b) ethical relativism, as an alleged implication of cultural relativism, has been argued in a philosophically quite unsophisticated way by Benedict and Herskovits; philosophers apparently discussed ethical relativism in the basis of a rather faint impression of what cultural relativism had been. c) a full-fledged ethical relativism has hardly been defended by anybody among philosophers; virtually no modern philosopher really argued a prescriptive version of the thesis; d) we may accept the grain of truth in ethical relativism by including relativist critique to ethical absolutism into a universalist normative doctrine that be careful in separating open-textured formulations of universal claims from culturally conditioned particular prescriptions. -/- . 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O objetivo central deste estudo é fazer ressaltar as características dos conceitos de animismo, magia e feitiçaria a partir das perspectivas de Sigmund Freud e Bronislaw Malinowski. Em um primeiro momento, analisaremos o animismo. Em seguida, uma vez que as observações etnográficas de Malinowski divergem daquelas de Freud, examinaremos a magia e a feitiçaria com a finalidade de verificar não somente as divergências, mas também as convergências e as aproximações possíveis que existem entres estes dois pensadores e os (...) próprios conceitos entre si. Por fim, mostraremos o que está no centro dessas análises e quais são as razões que fundamentam esses métodos e as resistências que eles podem suscitar. (shrink)
Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...) paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively. (shrink)
No prefácio das _Investigações filosóficas_, Ludwig Wittgenstein revela que ao “estímulo” do economista Piero Sraffa devia “as ideias mais fecundas” da obra. Curiosamente, porém, segundo Amartya Sen, Sraffa considerava seu ponto de vista – que enfatiza a relação entre a linguagem e o meio sociocultural em que ela é empregada – “um tanto óbvio”, achava tedioso conversar com Wittgenstein e nunca se entusiasmou por ter influenciado decisivamente sua filosofia tardia. Para justificar o comportamento de Sraffa, Sen argumenta que seu ex-professor (...) julgava trivial a sua abordagem social da linguagem – que se opõe à abordagem lógica do _Tractatus logico-philosophicus_ – basicamente devido à sua formação marxista. Em divergência a essa explicação de Sen, sustenta-se neste artigo que o ponto de vista de Sraffa é realmente “um tanto óbvio”, tendo uma longa lista de precursores que remonta à Grécia Antiga. A fim de comprovar essa afirmação, são retomadas aqui tanto as obras de filósofos com os quais Wittgenstein dialoga em seus textos, como Platão, Aristóteles e Santo Agostinho, quanto autores prestigiados que ele aparentemente desconhecia, entre os quais os linguistas _William D. Whitney, Hermann Paul e Ferdinand de Saussure._. (shrink)
Gareth Evans was arguably the finest philosopher of his generation; he died tragically young, but the work he completed has had a seismic impact on the philosophies of language and mind. In this volume an outstanding international team of contributors offer illuminating perspectives on Evans's groundbreaking work, paying tribute to his achievements and leading his ideas in new directions. Contributors Josi Luis Bermzdez, John Campbell, Quassim Cassam, E. J. Lowe, John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Ian Rumfitt, Ken Safir, Mark Sainsbury.
This paper argues that in addition to the familiar approach using formal contexts, there is now a need in artificial intelligence to study contexts as social constructs. As a successful example of the latter approach, I draw attention to 'interpretation' (in the sense of literary theory), viz. the reconstruction of the intended meaning of a literary text that takes into account the context in which the author assumed the reader would place the text. An important contribution here comes from Wendell (...) Harris, enumerating the seven crucial dimensions of context: knowledge of reality, knowledge of language, and the authorial, generic, collective, specific, and textual dimensions. Finally, two recent approaches to interpretation, due to Jon Barwise and Jerry Hobbs, are analyzed as useful attempts which also come to grips with the notion of context. It must be noted that there has been a considerable body of contributions connecting linguistic structure with social context. For example, anthropological linguistics, from Bronislaw Malinowski onwards, has underlined the cultural context of discourse as essential to meaning. This viewpoint became prominent with the emergence of the ethnography of speaking in anthropology. Thus, conversation analysis represents a consistent formal effort to contribute to an analysis of the nature of context. While this paper emphasizes and reviews the literary theory approach, it makes various contacts with works of the latter kind (e.g., the landmark contributions of Erving Goffman, John Gumperz, William Hanks, John Heritage, Dell Hymes, et al.) in order to deliver a more balanced and complete study of the dimensions of context. (shrink)
IntroductionThe observation that animals may respond to emotional states of conspecific or even hetero-specific individuals is not new. Darwin broached the question by underlying the ability of animals to express sympathy, i.e. the response to non-self-emotional status, and this across species barriers. More importantly, he tried to find the evolutionary origin of this animal trait, suggesting that it evolved from the selective advantages of kinship behaviour in the struggle for life (Darwin, 1872). Such a behaviour corresponds, for instance, to alloparental (...) care relatively common in mammals and birds, and now also characterized in fishes and insects (Josi, Taborsky, & Frommen, 2019; Wu, Walser, Sun, & Kölliker, 2020). After more than one century, the need of defining what exactly non-human animals are able to feel, and from this starting point, rethink the legal status and place of animals in human societies, suddenly arises. This can mainly be considered as an indirect consequence of people awareness of human-driven dramatic impacts on global climate, biodiversity, but also on a more daily basis on animal life and welfare. However, because assessable currencies are required to establish laws, animals were classified into categories based on ecological (e.g. invasive species, pest, wild, domestic), biological (e.g. vertebrates and invertebrates) or cognitive (e.g. primates, cephalopods) traits. This should help lawyers to define ethical rules of animal use by humans and t... (shrink)
Starting from R. K. Merton's now classic criticism of 'holistic' functionalism, i.e. of a functionalism which postulates social unity, universality and functional in-dispensability, the author stresses certain implications of this criticism more than they have been stressed hitherto. Classical and holistic functionalism) from H. Spencer, B. Malinowski, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, etc to T. Parsons, postulates certain total unities (a global culture, an integrated system, etc.) in which each item (existence, actions, structures, etc.) is considered and defined on the grounds (...) of its consequences for the maintenance of the system as a whole; therefore holistic functionalism as a method is, in effect, the study of the consequences of the system on the items that compose it, since each of these items is defined within the sphere of the system and of its integrative functions. Merton's 'neo-functionalism', on the other hand, is remarkable not only in that it takes into account the 'dysfunctional' and 'nonfunctional' consequences of certain items on the system, but more especially because, within the context of functional analysis, it stresses the possible existence of structural substitutes and alternatives of functions, and therefore of latent structures which are foreign to objective functional consequences, as well as being able to deal with unanticipated and unexpected items and their consequences on the system. 'Neo-functionalism', which is susceptible of further development, is not limited to the study of the consequences of the system on its items: it can also reverse this scheme and study the consequences of certain items on the system. Merton's criticism of holistic functionalism therefore implies a broadening of the scientific resources of this method and a renewal of its interpretative scheme, thanks to which functional analysis ceases to appear as 'the* method of explaining sociology as a science, and becomes an interpretative method which complements the analysis of social structures and relations. Seen in this light the concept of structure becomes emancipated and independent of the concept of system and function; whereas, within the framework of universal functionalism, it was ancillary to the concept of function. Finally, latent structures and unconscious structures, conditions of possibility and subjective dispositions are favourable to social structures and social relations, not excluding those that are neither visible nor observable. This analysis, the author notes, is extremely meaningful and has great possibilities of development, especially in view of the structuralism recently to be noted in the human and social sciences: anthropology, history, linguistics, etc. (shrink)
Drawing on the work of Levi-Strauss, Malinowski, Dumezil, Van Gennep, Eliade and many others, Dr. Marsland proposes a dual/triune structure to early religion--a structure which appears to be worldwide.Marslander discusses the ideas of E.B.Tylor?s PRIMITIVE CULTURE (1872); James Frazer?s GOLDEN BOUGH (1890): the work of the Cambridge Ritualists, such as Jane Harrison?s THEMIS (1912) and F.M.Cornford?s ORIGINS OF ATTIC COMMEDY (1914); and Jessie Weston?s FROM RITUAL TO ROMANCE (1920). Also explored are the epistemological dilemmas of culture-formation and cultural diffusion (...) based on mythic and societal change. This synthesis encompasses in a coherent whole gods, goddesses and their functions, festival rituals, the composition of sacred sites, the meaning of animal emblems and symbols in art, along with tribal social patterns. Taking a post-Lacanian view of the religious origin of culture, Dr.Marslander posits the use and structure of symbol in new and intricate ways. (shrink)
Cirocco, Josie My mini thesis of 'Finding God in Art: Karl Rahner on the Nature of Religious Art' was part of my master's project with the Flinders University, South Australia, completed in December 2014. With my research topic, 'Finding God in Art', in mind, I was seeking to go beyond the classical idea of sacred art to explore the way other art may genuinely be religious even though it is not overtly about a religious subject. To do this I (...) adopted some of the insights of Karl Rahner's theology. The immense success of Rahner's work is a tribute to his ability to speak profoundly about the everyday life of ordinary men and women. I explored Rahner's thought about art, both verbal and non-verbal, within a Christian context. (shrink)
Bronislaw Malinowski and Linguistic Pragmatics In 1923 Bronislaw Malinowski repeated his claim for an "Ethnolinguistic theory" which he enforced 1920 in his first linguistic paper and which became the guideline for his "ethnographic theory of language." In 1997 the linguist William Foley published his monograph "Anthropological Linguistics—An Introduction"; and in the same year the anthropologist Alessandro Duranti published his monograph "Linguistic Anthropology." It seems that with the publication of these two standard textbooks the interdisciplinary field of "ethnolinguistics" has (...) finally gained its due importance within the disciplines of anthropology and linguistics. Bill Foley states in his textbook that "the boundary between pragmatics and anthropological linguistics or sociolinguistics is impossible to draw at present." So if we recognize Bronislaw Malinowski not only as one of the founders of modern social anthropology but also as one of the founding fathers of anthropological linguistics, we should have a closer look at Malinowski's importance for pragmatics in general. This paper presents Malinowski's contributions to the ethnographic theory of language, assesses his role as an apologist of anthropological linguistics, and discusses his influence on developments in linguistic pragmatics. (shrink)
Bronisław Kasper Malinowski was a Polish anthropologist, ethnographer, and sociologist. Malinowski is often considered as a pioneer in the ethnographic field research methods, such as participant observation, interviews, and statistics. His studies focused on beliefs and forms of social organization. Malinowski is often recognized as one of the founders of modern social anthropology and functionalism.
Students coming into a third-year business ethics course I teach are often confused about the use and meaning of the terms social responsibility and ethics. This motivated me to take a closer look at a sample of the management and business ethics literature for an explanation of their confusion. I found that there are inconsistencies in the way the two terms are employed and the way the concepts are defined. This paper identifies the different ways the relationship between social responsibility (...) and ethics has been represented, the various uses of these two terms, and the contrasting views regarding the connection between morality and ethics. While this analysis does not resolve any difficult substantive questions, it does provide conceptual clarity as a necessary first step towards facilitating students critical engagement with the substantive issues. (shrink)