The logician interested in an account of science that is faithful to the actual practice of science has a number of problems, not the least of which are the following: first, the problem of avoiding psychologism, and second, the problem of having historical sources that are illuminating about the logical turns characterizing a piece of research that ended in discovery.

There is ample evidence that Professor Thomas S. Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigms has been accepted as an important, original, and permanent contribution to the discussion and writing on the logic of scientific change, but nevertheless there is something unsatisfactory about it for philosophers in particular.

This paper is about the reference or denotation of the concepts and descriptions of modern physics in contrast to Galilean-Newtonian physics and some reflections therein of some widely influential misunderstandings of Einstein's empiricism.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.