The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for (...) other cognitive domains are drawn, and in particular an analogy is suggested between apparent duration and apparent movement. (shrink)

The Sphere Model of Consciousness (SMC) delineates a sphere-shaped matrix that aims to describe the phenomenology of experience using geometric coordinates. According to SMC, an experience of overcoming of the habitual self and the conditioning of memories could be placed at the center of the matrix, which can be then called the Place of Pre-Existence (PPE). The PPE is causally associated with self-determination. In this context, we suggest that silence could be considered as an intentional state enabling self-perception to be (...) focused on the “here and now,” which in turn improves perception of one’s own body in space. To investigate these hypotheses grounded in the model, the current preliminary study examined the Place of Pre-Existence Technique (PPEt), in which practitioners are guided to focus on a self-defined aim; reach a state of detachment from the habitual self; envision the future. 481 volunteers PPEt practitioners completed self-report questionnaires before and after an intensive 3-day meditative training. We analyzed the possibly relationship between subjective experiences related to physical, emotional, mental, temporal, and spatial aspects, as well as self-determination and silence, before and after training. The results indicated a shift from a prevailing influence of mental dimension on the other aspects of experience, to a prevailing influence of spatial dimension. Silence was reported more often following the training, and predominantly related to the mental and emotional experiences. The results are discussed in relation to the shift from Narrative to Minimal Self and to increased balance among the considered dimensions. (shrink)

The target article, in stressing the balance between neurobiological and psychological factors, makes a compelling argument in support of a continuum of perceptual and hallucinatory experience. Nevertheless, two points need to be addressed. First, the authors are probably underestimating the incidence of hallucinations in the normal population. Second, one should consider the role of absorption as a predisposing factor for hallucinations.

The concept of an altered state of consciousness may be clarified when three major issues are discussed: the phenomenon, its method of induction, and criteria for evaluating the phenomenon. An ASC is a mental state, but it is not clear how such a mental state is related to subjective experience and cognitive functioning. The relationship between the method of induction and the resulting ASC is also unclear at present. Finally, criteria for determining and evaluating the ASC are indistinguishable from the (...) phenomenon itself, leaving the latter ill-defined. These are the basic issues which are addressed in the theoretical formulation here presented. I propose that the cognitive mode distinguishing the normal waking state from an ASC is the mode of meaning employed. (shrink)

The target article is important not only for black-box studies, but also for those interested in tracing cognitive processing and/or subjective experience. I provide two examples taken from my own research. I then proceed to discuss how best to analyze data from the n = 1 study, which has a factorial design.

In attempting to achieve some form of mapping between consciousness and cognition, I distinguish between a weak and a strong version of the hypothesis, indicating a change in mode of thinking of a metaphoric-symbolic nature . The weak version would claim that metaphors, symbols, analogies and images are used in an attempt to depict the experience, which is not easily translatable into words. The strong version would claim that metaphoric thinking is one of the hallmarks of the experience, and is (...) used both in an attempt to depict the experience and also to convey to the reader, and possibly to induce in the reader, some of the qualities of that experience. My discussion of these two options is preceded by some comments on problems inherent in studying altered or alternate states of consciousness. I also discuss the relationships among physiognomic perception, cognitive dedifferentiation, and symbolic cognition. (shrink)

I report an empirical study deriving from a Gestalt-Interactionist approach to metaphor. Both the type of figurative expression and the form of the expression were manipulated in a factorial design. Subjects were asked to evaluate a given figurative expression both with regard to complexity and interest, and in terms of the degree of imageability of the tenor and the vehicle. As hypothesized, the design factors interacted in their influence on these ratings. Specifically, both the metaphor in standardform and the simile (...) in reversed form received relatively higher ratings in degree of interest aroused and degree of complexity, while receiving relatively lower ratings in degree of vehicle imageability. (shrink)

Consciousness6 carries the connotation of a state of consciousness . It is an emergent property of a gestalt phenomenon, namely the psychophysiological state of the organism . In this article, I extend my previous discussion of states of consciousness , embedding this within the wider perspective of both Gestalt psychology and psychoanalytic ego psychology. Gestalt notions, such as Prägnanz and microgenesis, are shown to be highly relevant to this theme. Natsoulas’ recent appraisal of my viewpoint has goaded me into reiterating (...) the argument for looking at a qualitative change in thought, characterizing the shift in consciousness6, as being a promising area for further development. This hypothesized change in mode of thinking is of a metaphoric—symbolic nature, what such authors as Hunt and Haskell would term symbolic cognition. I discuss the relationships among perceptual experience, symbolic cognition and state of consciousness, concluding with some comments on Natsoulas’ reservations. (shrink)

What R&P term the implies that the psi-conducive state is related to the induction of an altered state of consciousness (ASC). Yet there is a problem in embedding psi in the ASC, because one anomaly is replacing another. This seems to be a general strategy in the literature of the anomalous.