Analyzes Schelling's arguments for his idealism and pieces together a description of his theory of nature from among the large number of his writings in this area. It also traces the influence of Naturphilosophie on 19th-century science and connects it with recent System Theory.

Synechism, as a metaphysical theory, is the view that the universe exists as a continuous whole of all of its parts, with no part being fully separate, determined or determinate, and continues to increase in complexity and connectedness through semiosis and the operation of an irreducible and ubiquitous power of relational generality to mediate and unify substrates. As a research program, synechism is a scientific maxim to seek continuities where discontinuities are thought to be permanent and to seek semiotic relations (...) where only dyadic relations are thought to exist. Synechism and pragmatism mutually support each other: synechism provides a theoretical rationale for pragmatism, while use of the pragmatic maxim to identify conceivable consequences of experimental activity enriches the content of the theory by revealing and creating relationships. (shrink)

SummaryPhilosophically speaking, invention is the mother of necessity. This means that Hume's analysis of the idea of necessity utilizing the notion of power, when properly qualified, is essentially sound and not at all a discouraging prospect. The task of the paper, then, is to specify in what respect it is possible to claim, for the various important senses of ‘necessary’, that such a notion is applicable whenever successful control has been exercised.RésuméDu point de vue philosophique, I'invention est la mère de (...) la nécessité. En effet, l'analyse qu'a faite Hume de l'idée de nécessité en recourant à la notion de pouvoir est, lorsqu'elle est con‐venablement nuancée, essentiellement correcte et ne constitue pas du tout une perspective décourageante. Le but de cet article est done de montrer que la notion de »ntcessaire«, prise dans les divers sens importants du mot, est applicable partout ou un contrôle efficace a été obtenu.ZusammenfassungPhilosophisch betrachtet ist die Erfindung der Ursprung der Notwendigkeit. Das bedeutet, dass Humes Analyse der Vorstellung der Notwendigkeit auf Grund des Begriffes der Kraft im Wesentlichen richtig und vielversprechend ist, sofern sie korrekt formuliert wird. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird gezeigt, in welcher Beziehung es für die verschiedenen wichtigen Bedeutungen von »notwendig« möglich ist, die Anwendung eines derartigen Begriffes tiberall dort zu garantieren, wo eine erfolgreiche Kontrolle durchgeführt worden ist. (shrink)

A philosophical yet detailed history of the American party battle explaining why partisan debate is so perverse and how it could be made less so. Building upon the heritage of American pragmatism, from Peirce to Rorty and the new pragmatists, as well as the work of historian Charles Beard, the book identifies that battle as a struggle between nation state and market state, with special emphasis on the perversity of Civil War politics.

It is generally remarked by critics and proponents alike that over the years Wilfrid Sellars has given us a broad philosophical system integrating a great many of the enduring concerns of philosophy. However, what the nature of that system is has not at all been clear. As with Peirce, upon whom Sellars often builds, a variety of positions can be ascribed to him by a careful selection of certain remarks from among his widely ranging articles. Cornman, for example, has argued (...) that Sellars’ claim that persons’ propositional attitudes and conceptual representations cannot be reduced to statements in neurophysiology commits him to a rejection of materialism. Yet, Sellars rejects “materialism” only as a crude form of philosophical typing not capable of characterizing the subtle evolution of conceptual structures embodied in our changing theories of the world, and in fact has himself articulated what he calls a “neo-Hobbesian” view on various occasions. Generally, he has been closely associated with materialism in its most recent and respectable form as Scientific Realism. (shrink)

It is argued that the ethical neutrality of science could be undermined in one or more of the following ways: by the discernment of a tychistic factor in nature, By incorrigible observer-Introduced indeterminacy, By the discovery of neurophysiological limits to knowing, Or by the discovery of an unacceptable neurophysiological cost of learning. At this point science would have to confront the moral choice either to maintain or reject certain classical assumptions upon which its self-Identity currently rests.