I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Republic 596a introduces a One over Many principle that has traditionally been considered as an argument for the existence of Forms, according to which, one Form should be posited for each like-named plurality. This interpretation was challenged by (Smith, J. A. 1917. “General Relative Clauses in Greek.” Classical Review 31: 69–71.), who interpreted it rather as a statement that each Form is unique and correlated to a plurality of things that have the same name as it. (Sedley, D. 2013. “Plato (...) and the One-over-Many Principle”, in Chiaradonna & Galluzzo 2013, 113–37.) has offered a forceful defence of Smith’s interpretation. I argue that Sedley’s defence fails and that the traditional interpretation should be preferred. (shrink)

In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that (...) they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude. (shrink)

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that anti-realism about de re necessity entails anti-realism about the individuation and identity of objects. In this paper I address one argument for this view, due to Sidelle, according to which the only way in which a de re modal conventionalist can avoid being refuted by a well-known argument based on the contingency of conventions is by also accepting conventionalism about objects. I show that Sidelle’s argument is not successful and, in this way, I also show that (...) the combination of de re modal anti-realism and realism about objects is at least not threatened from this direction. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto y que parece consistir en elegir entre: aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional de esta elección, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Sócrates desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible (...) conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Según mi interpretación, lo que dice Sócrates es que se deben rechazar los dos términos de la “elección imposible”, (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en el que el juicio falso es posible sin tener que aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. (shrink)

We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition (A-supposing and C-supposing). It is (...) subsequently argued that the proposed acquisition and manifestation conditions are rationally interdependent, and that such harmony affords explanations of connections between different facets of belief in necessity that otherwise remain mysterious. (shrink)

En el libro V de la República Platón intenta distinguir a los verdaderos filósofos de un grupo de personajes que son solo parecidos a los filósofos, pero que en realidad no lo son. Platón utiliza diferentes términos para referirse a estos pseudo-filósofos pero el más recurrente es el de philotheámones (φιλοθεάμονες). Los estudiosos de Platón han tenido muy diversas interpretaciones sobre la identidad de estos personajes. En este trabajo defiendo que dentro del grupo en cuestión están los sofistas, una interpretación (...) cuya intuición principal fue defendida por Vegetti (2000) pero criticada recientemente por Meinwald (2017). Aquí ofrezco tanto razones textuales como filosóficas y contextuales a favor de esta interpretación. (shrink)

Religionsphilosophie hat sich nach Jörg Splett mit einer Fundamentalfrage zu befassen: Woher stammt die Idee des Guten, deren Sollensanspruch den Menschen unmittelbar trifft und ihm als Grund zur Mitliebe und Dankbarkeit aufleuchtet? Die vorliegende Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag des Jubilars versammelt Beiträge im Spannungsfeld von Vernunft, Glaube und Liebe, die den Menschen in welthaften Symbolbeziehungen – z. B. des Spiels, der Ehe, der Personalität, der Individualität, des Mutterseins, der Theodizee, der Sinnfrage, der „Grenze der Sprache“ und der Suche nach Transzendenz (...) – denken. Im Mitlieben der Welt symbolisiert sich der Ursprung des Guten. (shrink)

Volume 13, Issue 2, May 2019, Page 115-116.

Abstract:There is a storied history of Native and Indigenous feminisms on Turtle Island (North America). We are fortunate that many of those stories birthed from an ancestral tradition of storytelling and survivance were captured in the canonical feminist anthology This Bridge Called My Back: Writings of Radical Women of Color. In celebration and commemoration of 40 years since This Bridge was first published we visit with three of the books original Native and Indigenous contributors–Chrystos, Max Wolf Valerio, and Jo Carrillo–to (...) recount old as well as new stories as they explore what Native and Indigenous feminisms mean to them and their continued work for Indigenous visibility. The conversation provides a unique intergenerational vision for conceptualizing contemporary Native and Indigenous feminisms all the while building upon the legacy and path set forth by amazing Native and Indigenous women trailblazers. (shrink)

Edgar Morin prône une refonte profonde de l'éducation, centrée sur sa mission essentielle telle que l'envisageait Rousseau : enseigner à vivre. Il s'agit de permettre à chaque individu d'acquérir une autonomie, de se prémunir contre l'erreur et l'illusion, de pratiquer la compréhension d'autrui, d'affronter les incertitudes, en somme de le préparer à affronter les problèmes du “vivre”. (4e de couv.).

Edgar Morin, philosophe militant pour une réforme de pensée qui affronte les complexités, et Tariq Ramadan, penseur et théologien militant pour une réforme radicale de la tradition islamique, dialoguent ensemble sur leurs divergences et sur la nécessité d'un humanisme revivifié. Les interlocuteurs, au-delà de leurs désaccords, attestent l'urgence d'affronter les problèmes essentiels de notre humanité et de résister au pire. De cette rencontre féconde naissent ces échanges sur la condition humaine et les grandes questions de notre temps – de (...) l'économie à l'art, de la philosophie à l'histoire, en passant par l'anthropologie et les sciences. Un livre-manifeste, contre le repli sur soi, une exhortation à l'ouverture et au dialogue. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage introduit l'épistémologie de la complexité d'Edgar Morin (1921-), qui épouse l'esprit de la métaphysique de la connaissance consacrée aux relations complexes entre la simplicité, la simplicité et la complexité. Deux raisons à cette dialogique pensante : d'abord, Morin contribue de manière significative à la critique du scientisme et de l'apriorisme. Ensuite, son corpus transversal ouvre un espace des possibles de méditation de l'être pris dans son indétermination totale et dans une tension essentielle entre ce qui est et (...) ce qui pourrait être. C'est donc une contribution à l'avènement d'une pensée interstitielle qui ne dévalorise pas les conditions de possibilité d'une science de la complexité. (shrink)

This book provides a new all-round perspective on the life and work of Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He was close to the Vienna Circle and has been hitherto almost exclusively referred to in terms of the so-called “Zilsel thesis” on the origins of modern science. Much beyond this “thesis”, Zilsel’s brilliant work provides original insights on a broad number of topics, ranging from the philosophy of probability and statistics to the concept of “genius”, from (...) the issues of scientific laws and theories to the sociological background of science and philosophy, and to the political analysis of the problems of his time. Praised by Herbert Feigl as an “outstanding brilliant mind”, Zilsel, being as a Social-Democrat of Jewish origins, mostly led a life of hardship marked by emigration and coming to a sudden and tragic end by suicide in 1944. The impossibility of an academic career has hindered the reception of Zilsel’s scientific work for a long time. This volume is a contribution to its late reception, providing new insights especially into his work during his years in Vienna; moreover, it shows the heuristic value of Zilsel’s ideas for future Scholar research – in philosophy, history, and sociology. -/- (ISSN: 0929-6328). (shrink)

1951, L'homme et la mort est le premier travail anthropologique d'Edgar Morin. Il ouvre un champ de recherches qui ne s'épanouira qu'une quinzaine d'années plus tard en France. L'Homme n'est pas fait pour la mort, et pourtant il y est voué. Depuis le fond des âges, il créé des sépultures et manifeste ainsi son humanité, en même temps que son refus de la fatalité mortelle. À partir de deux mythes fondateurs - la mort-renaissance et la survie du double - (...) des croyances et des idéologies se sont forgées. L'ouvrage en dresse la vaste fresque pour constater que depuis près de deux siècles les sociétés occidentales vivent une véritable " crise " de la mort : l'homme a perdu le sens des rites et n'est plus protégé par l'espoir d'une survie post-mortem. Edgar Morin imagine l'avènement d'une vie prolongée presque indéfiniment grâce aux découvertes de la biologie, alors même que l'humanité reste aveugle au risque d'une méga-mort, nucléaire, écologique, ou sanitaire. Ce livre qui relie nature et culture, anthropologie et biogénétique, évoque inséparablement le tragique et l'espoir. (shrink)

In the 1960’s Brian Goodwin published a couple of mathematical models showing how feedback inhibition can lead to oscillations and discussed possible implications of this behaviour for the physiology of the cell. He also presented key ideas about the rich dynamics that may result from the coupling between such biochemical oscillators. Goodwin’s work motivated a series of theoretical investigations aiming at identifying minimal mechanisms to generate limit cycle oscillations and deciphering design principles of biological oscillators. The three-variable Goodwin model (adapted (...) by Griffith) can be seen as a core model for a large class of biological systems, ranging from ultradian to circadian clocks. We summarize here main ideas and results brought by Goodwin and review a couple of modeling works directly or indirectly inspired by Goodwin’s findings. (shrink)

José Jorge Mendoza argues that the difficulty with resolving the issue of immigration is primarily a conflict over competing moral and political principles and is, at its core, a problem of philosophy. This book brings into dialogue various contemporary philosophical texts that deal with immigration to provide some normative guidance to immigration policy and reform.

The most outstanding feature of this book is that here, for the first time, is made available in a single volume all the important historical essays Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) published during WWII on the emergence of modern science. This edition also contains one previously unpublished essay and an extended version of an essay published earlier. In these essays, Zilsel developed the now famous thesis, named after him, that science came into being when, in the late Middle Ages, the social (...) barriers between the intellectuals and the artisans were eroded, due to the fact that the rapidly expanding commercial classes of that period had a keen interest in improvements in technology. This class was city-based and stimulated a social environment in which men of learning came to regard the craftsmen and technicians with a new respect, in which they no longer felt any contempt for manual work and in which theory and practice were eventually combined to produce modern science. This critical edition also carries a long introduction in which much new material about Zilsel's life and work is presented. It suggests that a radical new look at Zilsel's project needs to be taken. Zilsel's essays on the history of science look like a standard case study to substantiate a particular position on the origins of modern science, but they were also an attempt to show that lawlike explanation in history and social theory is possible. It is claimed that Zilsel's historical essays were a part of another project he was working on which focused on the idea that social phenomena were open to causal explanation as much as physical phenomena. Hence the volume also contains the essays Zilsel wrote in relation to this other project. Previously there have been published a German and an Italian edition of the Zilsel essays. This edition is the first in English; compared to the other two editions this one is the first that includes unpublished material and the first to undertake a serious effort to research Zilsel's life and work. What is special about this volume is the well-articulated social perspective it takes on the origins of modern science. Audience: Students in early modern social history/history of science as well as professional philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Varela’s Radical Proposal: How to Embody and Open Up Cognitive Science” by Kristian Moltke Martiny. Upshot: I examine Varela’s relationship with Husserl’s phenomenology, highlighting Varela’s acknowledgment of the pragmatic dimension of its phenomenological reduction. I argue that Varela sees, in some developments of phenomenology, a deconstruction of the subject-object duality and an embodied view of the mind. I also highlight the existential dimension of Varela’s radical proposal, which contributes to (...) further opening up and embodying cognitive science. (shrink)

The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics, a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are (...) contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed. (shrink)