Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 4-5, May–June 2022.

If you blinked you may have missed it. The Department of Health and Human Services published its strategic plan for the 2018–2022 fiscal years, which includes the statement that HHS accomplishes its mission through programs and initiatives that serve and protect “Americans at every stage of life, from conception.” Of note, the “from conception” language is new and, depending on the direction President Trump's administration plans to go, could have profound implications for the regulation of reproductive services ranging from abortion (...) to in vitro fertilization (IVF). (shrink)

An increasing number of jurisdictions allow individuals to obtain medication prescribed by their physicians for medical assistance in dying (MAID). But discussion of whether (and to what extent) individuals have the right to use the health care system to control the time and manner of their death is not limited to MAID. The right also exists in other contexts, such as directing the withdrawal of life‐sustaining treatments. Palliative (or terminal) sedation involves medications to render a patient unconscious, coupled with either (...) the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration or their not being administered at all. In high‐enough doses, these medications may further suppress already‐weakened cardiopulmonary function even if there is no intent to hasten death. When teaching about these topics, I challenge students to consider whether there are meaningful differences between practices like euthanasia, MAID, aggressive use of morphine, terminal sedation, or the withdrawal of ventilator support. Whether their differences are morally, ethically, or legally meaningful can be difficult to tease out. After recently watching a loved one, whom I call “Stephan,” direct the time and manner of his death within hospice care in a state that does not allow MAID, I am less inclined than ever to believe that the differences are meaningful in a way the law should recognize. (shrink)

As Professor Dov Fox points out in his essay, reference to “potential life” in American abortion jurisprudence is both indeterminate and underspecified. This commentary highlights that use of the phrase “potential life” by courts also obscures the fact that a position has been taken that biological life is not the equivalent of legal personhood. Worse, the position has been imposed on those who do not share it without offering reasons to justify its imposition in terms that those who oppose it (...) can reasonably be expected to endorse. (shrink)

In their article “Therapeutic, Prophylactic, Untoward, and Contraceptive Effects of Combined Oral Contraceptives. Catholic Teaching, Natural Law, and the Principle of Double Effect When Deciding to...

The latest trend in abortion restrictions in the United States targets a woman's reasons for terminating a pregnancy. Fourteen states have attempted to enact laws prohibiting abortion on the basis of fetal sex, race, and/or genetic anomaly. These laws are different from regulations tied to a government interest in protecting women's health. Laws that restrict reasons implicate a different set of government interests to be weighed against a woman's constitutional right first recognized in Roe v. Wade. These laws also seek (...) to reframe the nature of the right asserted by the woman. To date, the Supreme Court has declined to address the constitutionality of laws that restrict reasons, and the Court's most recent abortion decisions provide little guidance. It is possible that a conservative majority of the Supreme Court would uphold a law that prohibits reasons for having an abortion that appear discriminatory. But such laws would be difficult to enforce and therefore may be relegated to policy statements rejecting discriminatory norms as opposed to being effective means of restricting access to abortion. (shrink)