9 found
  1.  31
    The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan StB. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
  2.  35
    Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand it After 25 Years?Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45-110.
    The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...)
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  3.  30
    Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  4.  21
    The mental model theory of conditional reasoning: critical appraisal and revision.Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
  5.  23
    When can we say ‘if’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
  6.  35
    Supposition and representation in human reasoning.Simon J. Handley & Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):273-311.
    We report the results of three experiments designed to assess the role of suppositions in human reasoning. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning. Our first experiment compared two types of problem that could be solved by a suppositional strategy. Our results showed no difference in difficulty between problems requiring affirmative or negative suppositions and very low logical solution rates throughout. Further analysis of the error data showed a (...)
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  7.  14
    Reasoning with knights and knaves: A discussion of rips.Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):85-90.
  8.  33
    Background beliefs and evidence interpretation.Aidan Feeney, Jonathan StB. T. Evans & John Clibbens - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (2):97-124.
    In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one's background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just (...)
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  9.  20
    Mental models as an explanation of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):93-97.