Critical Theories and the Budapest Schoolbrings together new perspectives on the Budapest School in the context of contemporary developments in critical theory. Engaging with the work of the prominent group of figures associated with Georg Lukács, this book sheds new light on the unique and nuanced critiques of modernity offered by this school, informed as its members' insights have been by first-hand experiences of Nazism, Soviet-type societies, and the liberal-democratic West. With studies of topics central to contemporary critical theory, such (...) as the political and historical consciousness of modernity, the importance of bio-politics, the complexity of the human condition, and the relevance of comedy and friendship to developing critical perspectives, the authors draw on the works of Ágnes Heller, Maria Márkus, György Márkus, and Ferenc Fehér, demonstrating their enduring relevance to critical theory today and the ways in which these philosophers can inform new perspectives on culture and politics. An innovative reassessment of the Budapest School and the importance of its legacy, this book opens a much-needed and neglected dialogue with other schools and traditions of critical theorizing that will be of interest to scholars of sociology, philosophy, and social theory. n inform new perspectives on culture and politics. An innovative reassessment of the Budapest School and the importance of its legacy, this book opens a much-needed and neglected dialogue with other schools and traditions of critical theorizing that will be of interest to scholars of sociology, philosophy, and social theory. (shrink)

György Márkus’s Culture, Science, Society: The Constitution of Cultural Modernity is the most sophisticated attempt among contemporary philosophies to proffer a radical critical theory of culture based upon a Marxian philosophical anthropology and an emphatically post-metaphysical re-interpretation of the paradigm of production. In this paper, I aim to evince how the content of Márkus’s published writings is related to the cultural form of his philosophical practice that he describes as ‘orientation in thought’. First, I provide an overview of several key (...) features appertaining to Márkus’s heuristic conceptual framework. Second, I clarify the theoretical and practical horizons of his project through a schematic characterization of the three categories of studies that Márkus has not included in his theory of cultural modernity. In conclusion, I raise the question of the exclusion of religion from high culture and propose some counter-arguments. (shrink)

The works of György Márkus and Hannah Arendt represent two irreconcilable tendencies of contemporary radical philosophy. Whereas Márkus’s critical theory of culture actively refrains from attributing metaphysical significance to its heuristic concepts and the mutable practices they contingently designate, Arendt’s phenomenological methodology attempts to elucidate the constitution of the modern world in order to evince the ontological significance of the political. Due to the inimical nature of their respective projects, Márkus’s writings largely consign its references to Arendt to marginalia. In (...) this article, I consider the exception by taking as my point of departure Márkus’s only substantive comments about Arendt in ‘Beyond the Dichotomy: Poiesis and Praxis’. From a culturological perspective, I then reconstruct the ambivalent conceptions tacitly inhering in Arendt’s principal accounts of culture. In doing so, I reaffirm that Arendt denigrates poiesis, but also show that she regards culture and cultural reception as derivative to the political and praxis. The purpose of this exposition is not to resolve the dispute in one or the other direction, but to render perspicuous the fundamental choice evident in their opposition. (shrink)

This paper situates the critical attitude undergirding Ágnes Heller’s theory of modernity by elucidating her conceptualization of its ‘undialectical dialectics’ relative to the dialectical philosophies of Kant and Hegel. For Heller, the methodological commitments orienting a philosopher’s decision on how to conceptualize the dynamics of modernity are not merely theoretical but also ethico-practical, for they attempt to overcome the duality of life and spirit in the singular personality. For the denizens of contemporary modernity – who recognize contingency inhering in their (...) institutions – and for philosophers – who recognize the fallibility of their theoretical claims – a form of skepticism is warranted. By engaging with the work of György Márkus, Heller attempts to evince a notion of ‘normative skepticism’ that may exhibit both a critical attitude appropriate to conceiving modernity as ‘undialectical dialectics’ and to attenuate for the threat of ‘existential failure’ in the choice of oneself as a philosopher. (shrink)