A natural deduction formulation is given for the intermediate logic called MH by Gabbay in [4]. Proof-theoretic methods are used to show that every deduction can be normalized, that MH is the weakest intermediate logic for which the Glivenko theorem holds, and that the Craig-Lyndon interpolation theorem holds for it.

The usual rule used to obtain natural deduction formulations of classical logic from intuitionistic logic, namely.

In 1939, Curry proposed a philosophy of mathematics he called formalism. He made this proposal in two works originally written then, although one of them was not published until 1951. These are the two philosophical works for which Curry is known, and they have left a false impression of his views. In this article, I propose to clarify Curry’s views by referring to some of his later writings on the subject. I claim that Curry’s philosophy was not what is now (...) usually called formalism, but is really a form of structuralism. (shrink)

Evidence is given that implication (and its special case, negation) carry the logical strength of a system of formal logic. This is done by proving normalization and cut elimination for a system based on combinatory logic or λ-calculus with logical constants for and, or, all, and exists, but with none for either implication or negation. The proof is strictly finitary, showing that this system is very weak. The results can be extended to a "classical" version of the system. They can (...) also be extended to a system with a restricted set of rules for implication: the result is a system of intuitionistic higher-order BCK logic with unrestricted comprehension and without restriction on the rules for disjunction elimination and existential elimination. The result does not extend to the classical version of the BCK logic. (shrink)

Because the main difference between combinatory weak equality and λβ-equality is that the rule \begin{equation*}\tag{\xi} X = Y \vdash \lambda x.X = \lambda x.Y\end{equation*} is valid for the latter but not the former, it is easy to assume that another way of defining combinatory β-equality is to add rule (ξ) to the postulates for weak equality. However, to make this true, one must choose the definition of combinatory abstraction in (ξ) very carefully. If one tries to use one of the (...) more common abstraction algorithms, the result will be an equality, = ξ , that is either equivalent to βη-equality (and so strictly stronger than β-equality) or else strictly weaker than β-equality. This paper will study the relations = ξ for several commonly used abstraction algorithms, distinguish between them, and axiomatize them. (shrink)