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Jonathan D. Payton
Bilkent University
  1.  73
    How to Identify Negative Actions with Positive Events.Jonathan D. Payton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):87-101.
    It is often assumed that, while ordinary actions are events, ‘negative actions’ are absences of events. I claim that a negative action is an ordinary, ‘positive’ event that plays a certain role. I argue that my approach can answer standard objections to the identity of negative actions and positive events.
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  2.  76
    How to Identify Wholes with Their Parts.Jonathan D. Payton - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 18):4571-4593.
    I claim that a whole is identical to its parts. Many find this claim incredible: it seems that a whole and its parts must be distinct, for the whole is one thing while its parts are many things. Byeong-uk Yi has developed a version of this argument which exploits the resources of plural logic. Yi provides logical analyses of the predicates ‘one’ and ‘many’ which seem to show that nothing can satisfy them both. But there are two senses of the (...)
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  3.  18
    Counting Composites.Jonathan D. Payton - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    I defend the thesis that Composition Entails Identity (CEI): that is, a whole is identical to all of its parts, taken together. CEI seems to be inconsistent, since it seems to require that the parts of a whole possess incompatible number properties (for instance, being one thing and being many things). I show that these number properties are, in fact, compatible.
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  4.  24
    Composition as Identity, Now with All the Pluralities You Could Want.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8047-8068.
    According to ‘composition as identity’, a composite object is identical to all its parts taken together. Thus, a plurality of composite objects is identical to the plurality of those objects’ parts. This has the consequence that, e.g., the bricks which compose a brick wall are identical to the atoms which compose those bricks, and hence that the plurality of bricks must include each of those atoms. This consequence of CAI is in direct conflict with the standard analysis of plural definite (...)
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  5.  62
    The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences.Jonathan D. Payton - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):855-876.
    It is typically assumed that actions are events, but there is a growing consensus that negative actions, like omissions and refrainments, are not events, but absences thereof. If so, then we must either deny the obvious, that we can exercise our agency by omitting and refrainment, or give up on event-based theories of agency. I trace the consensus to the assumption that negative action sentences are negative-existentials, and argue that this is false. The best analysis of negative action sentences treats (...)
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  6.  1
    Ruben's Account of Traditions and True Successors: Two Modifications and an Extension.Jonathan D. Payton - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (11):40-46.
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  7.  16
    Composition and Plethological Innocence.Jonathan D. Payton - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):67-74.
    According to Composition as Identity, a whole is distinct from each of its parts individually, but identical to all of them taken together. It is sometimes claimed that, if you accept CAI, then your belief in a whole is ‘ontologically innocent’ with respect to your belief in its parts. This claim is false. But the defender of CAI can claim a different advantage for her view. Following Agustín Rayo, I distinguish ontology from plethology. I then show that CAI allows us (...)
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  8.  30
    Attempts.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):363-382.
    It’s generally assumed that, if an agent x acts by ϕ-ing, then there occurs an event which is x’s ϕ-ing. But what about when an agent tries to do something? Are there such things as attempts? The standard answer is ‘Yes’. But in a series of articles, and now a book, David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the answer is ‘No’: what happens when x tries to ϕ isn’t that an attempt occurs; rather, what happens is simply that a certain subjunctive (...)
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  9. Con-Reasons and the Causal Theory of Action.Jonathan D. Payton - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):20-33.
    A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con- reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory (...)
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  10.  1
    Keeping Successorhood and Inheritance Apart: Reply to Lebens and Ruben.Jonathan D. Payton - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (1):14-19.
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  11.  26
    Two Problems for the Constitution View of Omissions: A Reply to Palmer.Jonathan D. Payton - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1447-1455.
    Palmer defends the ‘Constitution View’ of omissions. According to this view, every omission is constituted by, though not identical to, some positive event. I argue that Palmer’s version of this view can’t do all the work he wants it to do. First, it can’t provide an answer to the ontological question to which he addresses himself: ‘What kind of thing is an omission?’ Second, it doesn’t give us the resources to determine which positive events serve as the ultimate constituters of (...)
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  12.  1
    Two Problems for the Constitution View of Omissions: A Reply to Palmer.Jonathan D. Payton - 2020 - Annalen der Philosophie 87 (3):1447-1455.
    Palmer defends the ‘Constitution View’ of omissions. According to this view, every omission is constituted by, though not identical to, some positive event. I argue that Palmer’s version of this view can’t do all the work he wants it to do. First, it can’t provide an answer to the ontological question to which he addresses himself: ‘What kind of thing is an omission?’ Second, it doesn’t give us the resources to determine which positive events serve as the ultimate constituters of (...)
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  13.  22
    Book Review: Steven D. Hales Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. A Bradford Book. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. Cloth. 216 Pp. [REVIEW]Patrick J. J. Phillips & Jonathan D. Payton - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):623-626.
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  14.  2
    Mereological Destruction and Relativized Parthood: A Reply to Costa and Calosi.Jonathan D. Payton - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-10.
    Metaphysicians of various stripes claim that a single object can have more than one exact location in space or time – e.g. endurantists claim that an object persists by being ‘all there’ at different moments in time. Antony Eagle has developed a formal theory of location which is prima facie consistent with multi-location, but Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi argue that the theory is unattractive to multi-location theorists on other grounds. I examine their charge that Eagle’s theory won’t allow an (...)
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