We consider the problem of pricing in a network industry focussing in particular on the issue of cross-network pricing (e.g. cross-network cell phone charges). Economic theory tells us in relation to cross-network pricing that collusion or network monopoly may yield welfare as well as profit benefits although any welfare benefits from cross-network collusion may be more than offset by a reduction in competition elsewhere. To address this, we introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent. The agent sets prices (...) on cross-network goods taking either (i) a complete, or (ii) an arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit. We examine welfare and profits with and without agent type (i) and (ii) with collusion (network monopoly) between the non-agent firms and without collusion (independent network duopoly). We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating independent network duopoly) may be inferior for both society and firm(s) compared with a network monopoly ‘regulated’ by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over network monopoly and network duopoly. Indeed, employing the agent may reduce welfare losses by a large proportion while having relatively little effect on profit. (shrink)

We consider fixed and asking price strategies in the context of selling an asset with Bernoullian updating of the seller’s subjective probability of sale at a given price. The determination of optimal fixed, asking and endogenous reservation prices is discussed under risk-neutrality and expected utility maximisation. With risk-neutrality, the optimal asking price exceeds the optimal fixed price when the expected gain is a strictly concave function. The seller’s choice between the fixed and the asking price strategies depends on several factors: (...) the expected cost of haggling, price competition and the seller’s attitude towards risk. (shrink)

This book will provide a cutting-edge, theoretically innovative, and analytically detailed response to significant developments occurring in the fields of indigenous governance.

Concerns of intellectual property infringement in China slow the dissemination of clean technology (Cleantech) innovation that could help bring the pace of global warming under control. We use the U.S. post‐World War 2 policy decisions with respect to Japan and Europe (the Marshall Plan) to show how this problem can be addressed. To help Japan become a western style democracy and stem the tide of communism, the U.S. transferred much of its extant intellectual property to Japan with a promise to (...) open US markets to Japanese goods. The United States did not require Japan to open its markets to U.S. goods. As a result, Japan became a staunch U.S. political ally in Asia, but also a serious economic competitor to the United States. While the Marshall Plan deployed different resources, the political outcomes were similar to Japan: Western Europe was a bulwark against communism. As global warming has become a major strategic issue, we argue that a comparable IPR initiative is required for China. This is not just a matter of doing the right thing as members of global commons, but is also matter of national security. We propose that by facilitating and managing the flow and sharing of U.S., EU, and Japanese Cleantech intellectual property with China—through a Cleantech Marshall Plan—a positive strategic relationship may be built while helping to bring global warming under control. (shrink)