For a century now Marxists have been searching for a 'rational kernel' of Hegelian 'dialectics' inside the 'mystical shell' of the Hegelian system. As against this entire tradition, Rosenthal insists that Hegelian philosophy is mysticism all the way through. He argues that Marx's supposed 'dialectic method' is simply a myth and proposes the provocative thesis that it is not, after all, Hegel's 'method' of which Marx made use in Capital but rather precisely Hegel's mysticism.

We show that the first order theory of the lattice $\mathscr{L}^{ (S) of finite dimensional closed subsets of any nontrivial infinite dimensional Steinitz Exhange System S has logical complexity at least that of first order number theory and that the first order theory of the lattice L(S ∞ ) of computably enumerable closed subsets of any nontrivial infinite dimensional computable Steinitz Exchange System S ∞ has logical complexity exactly that of first order number theory. Thus, for example, the lattice of (...) finite dimensional subspaces of a standard copy of $\bigoplus_\omega$ Q interprets first order arithmetic and is therefore as complicated as possible. In particular, our results show that the first order theories of the lattice L(V ∞ ) of c.e. subspaces of a fully effective ℵ 0 -dimensional vector space V∞ and the lattice of c.e. algebraically closed subfields of a fully effective algebraically closed field F ∞ of countably infinite transcendence degree each have logical complexity that of first order number theory. (shrink)

In this article, the author proposes to reconstruct Kant's "transcendental deduction" without in any way making use of the results of the so-called "metaphysical" one. His suggestion is that what Kant baptizes "pure concepts" or "categories" are in fact not "concepts" at all, strictly speaking, but rather the very forms of judgment from which these "concepts" were supposed to have been derived in the "metaphysical deduction". The task of the "transcendental" deduction is, then, to show that such forms of judgment (...) can legitimately be applied to empirical contents: to demonstrate, in other words, the possibility of empirical knowledge. (shrink)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussion of alternatives to capitalism has increasingly ceded place to discussion of alternative "models" of capitalism. In this literature, "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism is frequently opposed to "Rhenish" capitalism. A classic example of the idiom is Michel Albert's Capitalism Against Capitalism. Albert and other "rhenanophiles" favorably contrast the generous social welfare provisions characteristic of the German "social market" economy to the relative lack of social protection that obtains in the United States and Great Britain. The (...) "solidarity" exhibited within the "Rhenish" model is, however, limited to members of the "national community." Millions of "foreigners" in Germany continue to have a legal status that not only restricts their access to social benefits, but makes them subject to expulsion. The withholding of citizenship discharges the same economic function as the generalized suppression of social welfare in "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism: viz, controlling "surplus" population and thus social costs. (shrink)

At least since the publication of Roman Rosdolsky's "The Making of Marx's Capital", the Grundrisse has been an essential reference for anyone wishing to demonstrate a significant dependence of Marx's political economy upon Hegelian "logic." Contrary to Rosdolsky's interpretation, however, the "Grundrisse" can in fact be read as the drama of Marx's escape from his Hegelian philosophical heritage. Hegel's "dialectical method" is not a method of logical argumentation, but a "method" of paralogical mystification. Marx's own attempts to construct "dialectical derivations" (...) of economic categories in the "Grundrisse" lead him into theoretical culs-desac, and he is only able to make real progress in his economic investigations by precisely foregoing such adventures. The persistence, nonetheless, of certain characteristically Hegelian formulae—though, n. b., not characteristically Hegelian argumentational structures—in "Capital", and especially in the first chapter, is a function of the ontological peculiarity of Marx's initial object of inquiry, viz., money, and does not reflect any "methodological" choice. Marx's arguments in "Capital" are not "dialectical" but rather "transcendental" in nature, starting from given market phenomena (prices, profit, etc.) and working back to their conditions of possibility. (shrink)