The notion of racial blood in Gobineau's Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines is not deployed in a strictly physiological manner. Gobineau refers to blood in a number of passages designating a spiritual and historical substance accounting for the unity of a people. This use of the term cannot be discredited by a chemical or genetic analysis of the material blood because Gobineau is not engaged in a classification of physical body types but rather a historical explanation of civilizations’ progress (...) and degeneration. The blood refers to more than a mere biological trait. And the term is deployed in an attempt to comprehend one's physical, psychical, social, political, and, above all, historical ways of being. (shrink)

Deutscher's reading of Darwin states that future generations are conditioned by the work of natural selection over long periods of time, whereby the random variations that are most favorable to the local conditions prevail over those organisms that are less well adapted. The work of this selection of the favorable varieties is not a human responsibility; rather, it lies in the hands of “chance.” However, I believe that, by prioritizing competition between organisms in the process of natural selection, Darwin in (...) fact ends up subscribing to a kind of evolutionary progress. Because Darwin subscribes to a kind of evolutionary progress whereby the “better” varieties push the lower forms into extinction, one cannot say that natural selection is random but, rather, that it follows a general trajectory of improvement. The fact that nature proceeds slowly in this fashion must be read alongside Darwin's comments on race as well as the numerous times he explicitly advocates Galton's eugenic program in The Descent of Man. (shrink)

Eric Voegelin’s writings on the historical development of the concept of race in the early 1930s are important to philosophy today in part because they provide a model upon which scholars can further integrate modern philosophy with the critical philosophy of race. In constructing his history, Voegelin’s methodological orientation depends on the centrality of both Kant’s work and the problem of the mind–body union to the concept of race. This essay asks how one might hold these premises if Kant seems (...) to reject the dominant approach to the mind–body union in the mid-eighteenth century, physical influx, and then go on to publish several essays on race that do not thematize that doctrine in any way. I argue that Kant’s racial union of mind and body cannot be understood as an interaction in space, as his contemporaries had presumed. Rather, the union must be approached as a repetition in time. In this way, Kant’s four racial categories are not merely a part of the mind–body problem, but instead each is a veritable mind–body union. This permits the conclusion that ‘race’, as Kant understood it, is a viable solution to the mind–body problem. (shrink)