This book reexamines ideas about linguistic relativity in the light of new evidence and changes in theoretical climate.

To the memory of Ian McFetridge 1948?1988 The general concern of the essay is with the question of whether cognitive states can be accounted for in naturalistic (i.e. physicalist) terms. An argument is presented to the effect that they cannot. This turns on the idea that cognitive states involve modes of presentation the identity and individuation conditions of which are ineliminably both intentional and intensional and consequently they cannot be accounted for in terms of physico?causal powers. In connection with this (...) the recent attempt by Robert Stalnaker to provide a naturalistic theory of intentionality is examined and rejected. In conclusion it is suggested that a more radical solution to the problem of how to relate cognitive and material phenomena may be available in the pluralistic naturalism of Aquinas (and, perhaps, Wittgenstein). (shrink)

A few years ago philosophy of mind in the main English-language tradition was characterized by marked optimism about progress and by broad agreement that a correct theory would be a version of physicalism that admitted the sui generis nature of psychological descriptions and explanations. Now consensus seems to have given way to chaos supervenient physicalism has become so weak as to be virtually contentless and reductionism has become no more plausible than when it was generally rejected. The essay presses these (...) points and suggests the need of more radical alternatives. (shrink)

In this paper I refute the chief arguments for cultural relativism, meaning the moral (not the descriptive) theory that goes by that name. In doing this I walk some oft-trodden paths, but I also break new ones. For instance, I take unusual pains to produce an adequate formulation of cultural relativism, and I distinguish that thesis from the relativism of present-day anthropologists, with which it is often conflated. In addition, I address not one or two, but eleven arguments for cultural (...) relativism, many of which contribute to its popularity but receive scant attention from its critics. To elicit the failings of these arguments I deploy a host of pertinent but often neglected distinctions. (shrink)

After 1905, Einstein's miraculous year, physics would never be the same again. In those twelve months, Einstein shattered many cherished scientific beliefs with five extraordinary papers that would establish him as the world's leading physicist. This book brings those papers together in an accessible format. The best-known papers are the two that founded special relativity: On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies and Does the Inertia of a Body Depend on Its Energy Content? In the former, Einstein showed that absolute time (...) had to be replaced by a new absolute: the speed of light. In the second, he asserted the equivalence of mass and energy, which would lead to the famous formula E = mc 2 . The book also includes On a Heuristic Point of View Concerning the Production and Transformation of Light , in which Einstein challenged the wave theory of light, suggesting that light could also be regarded as a collection of particles. This helped to open the door to a whole new world--that of quantum physics. For ideas in this paper, he won the Nobel Prize in 1921. The fourth paper also led to a Nobel Prize, although for another scientist, Jean Perrin. On the Movement of Small Particles Suspended in Stationary Liquids Required by the Molecular-Kinetic Theory of Heat concerns the Brownian motion of such particles. With profound insight, Einstein blended ideas from kinetic theory and classical hydrodynamics to derive an equation for the mean free path of such particles as a function of the time, which Perrin confirmed experimentally. The fifth paper, A New Determination of Molecular Dimensions , was Einstein's doctoral dissertation, and remains among his most cited articles. It shows how to calculate Avogadro's number and the size of molecules. These papers, presented in a modern English translation, are essential reading for any physicist, mathematician, or astrophysicist. Far more than just a collection of scientific articles, this book presents work that is among the high points of human achievement and marks a watershed in the history of science. Coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the miraculous year, this new paperback edition includes an introduction by John Stachel, which focuses on the personal aspects of Einstein's youth that facilitated and led up to the miraculous year. (shrink)

Addressing perspectives about who "we" are, the importance of place and home, and the many differences that still separate individuals, this volume reimagines cosmopolitanism in light of our differences, including the different places we all inhabit and the many places where we do not feel at home. Beginning with the two-part recognition that the world is a smaller place and that it is indeed many worlds, Cosmopolitanism and Place critically explores what it means to assert that all people are citizens (...) of the world, everywhere in the world, as well as persons bounded by a universal and shared morality. (shrink)

In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral theory which, (...) like Wollaston's, locates the wrongness of an act in a property that can reside in non-actions no less than in actions. (shrink)

Several recent articles raise an issue long unaddressed in the medical literature: physician compliance with patient or family requests for futile or ineffectice therapy. Although they agree philosophically that such treatment ought not be given, most physicians have followed the course described by Stanley Fiel, in which a young patient dying of cystic fibrosis was accepted “for evaluation” by a transplant center even though he has already passed the threshold of viability as a candidate for a heart-lung transplant. Dr. Fiel (...) reported this action was taken not in the hope of doing the transplant but so that the family could assure themselves they had done “everything possible.” The patient, after a long and stressful cross-country flight, arrived at the hospital in respiratory failure. He died soon thereafter far from home and familiar surroundings. (shrink)

As the only nation in the western world without a national health insurance program, the United States faces ongoing issues of access and fairness in health care coverage. The Clinton administration tried and failed to address the problem of universal coverage. Since then we have focused on the narrower, but nonetheless real, issues of fairness and equity in the benefits package provided in insurance plans. The LORAN Commission spent two years trying to devise agreed-upon principles to govern such issues. The (...) lesson learned was the same as that of the Ethics Force study: there was no possibility of getting agreement, let alone consensus, among the participants on how to decide what should be a covered benefit. There were, however, two generally agreed upon principles that emerged regarding health care: “Every individual should be treated alike,” and “When it comes to health, cost cannot be a consideration.” That formula translated into providing everyone with everything. The only certain outcome from such a policy would be fiscal insolvency and ultimately bankruptcy. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify how one might understand philosophy as necessarily involving both third-person and first-person perspectives. It argues, first, that philosophy must incorporate the first-person perspective in order to provide an adequate account of consciousness and the prereflective awareness of the self and, second, in opposition to Dennett’s hetero-phenomenology that this incorporation is possible only within a transcendental perspective. The paper also attempts to meet the challenge of those who claim that the notion of the self—and along with (...) it, the idea of first-person perspective—is dependent upon a second-person perspecive. It argues that the second-person challenge depends upon a sense of “self ” different from that at stake in the first-person perspective operative in prereflective self-awareness. (shrink)

The question "Why should I be moral?," taken as a request for reasons to be moral, strikes many philosophers as silly, confused, or otherwise out of line. Hence we find many attempts to dismiss it as spurious. This paper addresses four such attempts and shows that they fail. It does so partly by discussing various errors about reasons for action, errors that lie at the root of the view that "Why should I be moral?" is ill-conceived. Such errors include the (...) mistake of confusing different uses of "moral reason for A to ø" and the mistake of treating as axiomatic, as in need of no argument, the view that moral considerations furnish every agent with practical reasons. Among the philosophers discussed are John Hospers, Philippa Foot, Stephen Toulmin, H. A. Prichard, and William Frankena. (shrink)

Science and technology policy in the developing world involves special problems since much of the financial support for S&T originates outside the countries where research is done. The development of information for policy and strategic planning decisions is therefore critical for national research policymakers, international organizations, and donors. However, prior attempts have been plagued by serious methodological problems. We describe a multifaceted approach for generating systematic information on scientific and technological institutions in developing countries based on the concept of the (...) research system as a multiorganizational network. By providing an account of how this approach was implemented in a three-country study we hope to shed light on several related problems in developing information for policy. First, how can relevant actors in research systems be identified? Second, how can a national research system be systematically surveyed? Third, how can system-wide estimates of organizational linkages and performance be obtained? (shrink)

Two Short Communications:R. A. Markus, Gregory the Great and In I Regum, by Francis ClarkAquinas's Claim ‘Anima Mea Non Est Ego’, by Stephen Priest.

This remarkable reconstruction of Søren Kierkegaard's work based on a reading of original Danish sources could have been entitled Phenomenology of Spirit or, perhaps, Itinerarium Cordis Ad Deum. In ten chapters it attempts to uncover SK's ethico-religious understanding of the humanjourney towards the transcendent God. It is a journey away from speculative absorption in nature and universal history, away from the hubris of poetical self-creation, away even from ethical awareness of the universally human and a kind of Pelagian self-confidence in (...) one's ability to do the good. Thejourney ends with the recognition of one's own powerlessness and nothingness—a recognition that can lead either to prideful despair or to humble faith. (shrink)

Whether Meletus, the accuser of Socrates, is to be identified with Meletus, the accuser of Andocides and participant in the arrest of Leon of Salamis , has recently been discussed, with inconclusive results, by H. Blumenthal. The strongest argument against the identification, it may be thought, is that Socrates mentions the arrest without implicating Meletus. I propose to argue that the Meleti are one, that there is a veiled allusion to Meletus in this passage and that Socrates effects this allusion (...) in two ways. (shrink)

Thirty years later we seem no closer to a consensus on the ethics of sterilizing profoundly mentally compromised young girls than was Judge Blumenfeld.

For years, both psychologists and the general public have been fascinated with the notion that there are gender differences in cognitive abilities; even now, flashy cover stories exploiting this idea dominate major news magazines, while research focuses on differences in verbal, mathematical, spatial, and scientific abilities across gender. This new volume in the Counterpoints series not only summarizes and addresses the validity of such research, but also questions its ideology and consequences. Why do we search so intently for these differences? (...) And what are the social and cultural implications of this relentless emphasis? Do biological mechanisms, in fact, contribute to the male-female differences in cognition? These are just a few of the questions generated by this controversial topic as it is debated throughout the book. (shrink)

This volume is a reissue of an 1889 translation of Fichte’s third book, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, which first appeared in Jena in 1796. Fichte here attempts to reconcile his belief in the sacredness of the rights of the individual with his conviction that the individual is a member of a community of rational beings, and thus man develops his moral self only through relationship to others. ‘…Ego is the individual, the rational being determined as such through (...) opposition to another rational being’. His thesis is that human rights are essentially social rights and that, since the freedom of the individual implies responsibility, concrete freedom is necessarily finite. This affirmation of the limitation of a self by its relation to other selves corresponds with Fichte’s exposition of the mutual limitation of the ego and the non-ego in his theory of the intellect in his Science of Knowledge. Fichte declares that the fundamental principle of The Science of Rights is that each individual must restrict his freedom through the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the other. (shrink)

This anthology contains selections from the writings of early American thinkers, the pragmatists, and many later twentieth-century philosophers in America. Accordingly, the book is divided into three major parts: the first deals with Edwards, Franklin, Jefferson, Emerson, and Thoreau; the second includes Fiske, Wright, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Royce; and the long third section contains selections from the early realists, Thomists, process philosophers, systematic metaphysicians, phenomenologists, new empiricists, language philosophers, and moral philosophers. Each chapter in each of the three parts (...) begins with a brief introduction by the editor, and concludes with “study questions” and a bibliography. Finally, there is a brief epilogue, “Is There an American Philosophy?”, which reviews some of the literature concerning the defining characteristics, if any, of philosophical thought in America. (shrink)