The three leading normative theories of business ethics are the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contracttheory. Currently, the stockholder theory is somewhat out of favor with many members of the business ethics community. Thestakeholder theory, in contrast, is widely accepted, and the social contract theory appears to be gaining increasing adherents. In thisarticle, I undertake a critical review of the supporting arguments for each of the theories, and argue that the stockholder theory is neitheras outdated nor as (...) flawed as it is sometimes made to seem and that there are significant problems with the grounding of both thestakeholder and social contract theory. I conclude by suggesting that a truly adequate normative theory of business ethics must ultimately be grounded in individual consent. (shrink)

The three leading normative theories of business ethics are the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contracttheory. Currently, the stockholder theory is somewhat out of favor with many members of the business ethics community. Thestakeholder theory, in contrast, is widely accepted, and the social contract theory appears to be gaining increasing adherents. In thisarticle, I undertake a critical review of the supporting arguments for each of the theories, and argue that the stockholder theory is neitheras outdated nor as (...) flawed as it is sometimes made to seem and that there are significant problems with the grounding of both thestakeholder and social contract theory. I conclude by suggesting that a truly adequate normative theory of business ethics must ultimately be grounded in individual consent. (shrink)

The nature of stakeholder theory and its fundamental normative prescriptions are the subject of much confusion and academic debate. This article attempts to provide an account of both the fundamental normative implications of stakeholder theory and the theory’s range of application that both stakeholder advocates and critics can agree upon. Using exclusively the language of leading stakeholder theorists, the article identifies the essential prescriptions of the theory and the type of organizations to which stakeholder theory applies in the hope of (...) facilitating effective discussion and evaluation of the normative dimension of stakeholder theory. (shrink)

In his 2007 Ethics article, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Philip Pettit argued that corporations qualify as morally responsible agents because they possess autonomy, normative judgment, and the capacity for self-control. Although there is ongoing debate over whether corporations have these capacities, both proponents and opponents of corporate moral agency appear to agree that Pettit correctly identified the requirements for moral agency. In this article, I do not take issue with either the claim that autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are the requirements for (...) moral agency or the claim that corporations possess them. I claim that if both of these claims are correct, then corporate moral agency entails that, in a liberal democracy, corporations should have the right to vote. I show that under the conception of democracy supported by most liberal political theorists, all parties subject to the law are entitled to the right to vote, and all parties that possess autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are subject to the law. Therefore, if the proponents of corporate moral agency are correct, then corporations satisfy the requirements for the right to vote. I then consider potential objections to this argument. I show that the strongest objection to the corporate right to vote is undermined by Pettit’s own argument for corporate autonomy. I then show that objections derived from other arguments for limiting the rights of corporations are equally unavailing. I conclude with some observations about the implications of my argument for the question of corporate speech rights. (shrink)

The academic debate over the propriety of attributing moral responsibility to corporations is decades old and ongoing. The conventional approach to this debate is to identify the sufficient conditions for moral agency and then attempt to determine whether corporations possess them. This article recommends abandoning the conventional approach in favor of an examination of the practical consequences of corporate moral responsibility. The article’s thesis is that such an examination reveals that attributing moral responsibility to corporations is ethically acceptable only if (...) it does not authorize the punishment of corporations as collective entities, and further, that this renders the debate over corporate moral responsibility virtually pointless. (shrink)

Business ethics is usually taught either from a philosophical perspective that derives guiding normative principles from abstract theories of philosophical ethics or from an atheoretical perspective that has students analyze cases that present difficult ethical issues and propose solutions on a casuistic basis. This article proposes a third approach—the Principles Approach—that derives guiding normative principles teleologically from the nature of market activity itself. The articledemonstrates how the Principles Approach can meet the four main challenges facing those who teach ethics in (...) business schools—the challenges of definition, abstract, cultural relativism, and integration. (shrink)

Abstract: The corporate scandals of the past few years have brought renewed attention to the problem of curtailing dishonest and fraudulent business practices, a problem on which strategic, ethical, and law enforcement interests should be aligned. Unfortunately, several features of federal criminal law and federal law enforcement policy have driven a wedge into this alignment, forcing managers to choose between their ethical obligations and their obligation to obey the law or aid law enforcement. In this article, I examine the nature (...) and implications of the growing divergence between managers’ ethical and legal obligations. After describing the traditional approach to business ethics analysis, I identify the features of federal criminal law and law enforcement policy that are responsible for the divergence and show how they are undermining the efficacy of the traditional approach. I illustrate this effect with the issue of workplace confidentiality. I then argue that the traditional approach must be reformed to give explicit recognition to the legal dimension of normative analysis, and demonstrate how such a reformed approach would function by applying it to three illustrative issues—organizational justice, privacy, and ethical auditing—and supplying a case study—KPMG’s allegedly abusive tax shelters. (shrink)

Legal scholars and business ethicists are interested in many of the same core issues regarding human and firm behavior. The vast amount of legal research being generated by nearly 10,000 law school and business law scholars will inevitably influence business ethics research. This paper describes some of the recent trends in legal scholarship and explores its implications for three significant aspects of business ethics research—methodology, theory, and policy.

Natural rights theorists such as John Locke and Robert Nozick provide arguments for limited government that are grounded on the individual's possession of natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Resting on natural rights, such arguments can be no more persuasive than the underlying arguments for the existence of such rights, which are notoriously weak. In this article, John Hasnas offers an alternative conception of natural rights, “empirical natural rights,” that are not beset by the objections typically raised against traditional (...) natural rights. Empirical natural rights are rights that evolve in the state of nature rather than those that individuals are antecedently endowed with in that state. Professor Hasnas argues that empirical natural rights are true natural rights, that is, pre-political rights with natural grounds that can be possessed in the state of nature, and that, when taken together, they form a close approximation of the Lockean rights to life, liberty, and property. He furthers argues that empirical natural rights are normatively well-grounded because respecting them is productive of social peace, which possesses instrumental moral value regardless of one's conception inherent value. Professor Hasnas thus offers his conception of rights as solved problems as an alternative and potentially more secure footing for the traditional natural rights arguments for limited government associated with Locke and Nozick. Footnotesa I wish to thank my fellow contributors to this volume, Ellen Frankel Paul, and Ann C. Tunstall of SciLucent, LLC, for their exceedingly helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and Annette Hasnas for the keen insight she provided into how human beings behave in the state of nature. (shrink)

The corporate scandals of the past few years have brought renewed attention to the problem of curtailing dishonest and fraudulent business practices, a problem on which strategic, ethical, and law enforcement interests should be aligned. Unfortunately, several features of federal criminal law and federal law enforcement policy have driven a wedge into this alignment, forcing managers to choose between their ethical obligations and their obligation to obey the law or aid law enforcement. In this article, I examine the nature and (...) implications of the growing divergence between managers’ ethical and legal obligations. After describing the traditional approach to business ethics analysis, I identify the features of federal criminal law and law enforcement policy that are responsible for the divergence and show how they are undermining the efficacy of the traditional approach. I illustrate this effect with the issue of workplace confidentiality. I then argue that the traditional approach must be reformed to give explicit recognition to the legal dimension of normative analysis, and demonstrate how such a reformed approach would function by applying it to three illustrative issues—organizational justice, privacy, and ethical auditing—and supplying a case study—KPMG’s allegedly abusive tax shelters. (shrink)

The over-exploitation of commonly-held resources is typically analyzed as an instance of market failure that calls for legislation to internalize the social costs that private activities impose on the environment. In this article, I argue that to the extent that this analysis ignores the regulatory effect of the common law, it is unsound. In The Tragedy of the Commons, Garret Hardin points out that there are two solutions to the tragedy: privatize the resource or restrict access to it. Environmental legislation (...) is a means restricting access to the commons. The evolutionary development of common law is a means of privatizing the commons. These represent alternative methods of environmental regulation. Proper public policy analysis requires a comparative assessment of the efficacy of these methods for resolving any particular environmental problem. In many, if not most cases, such an assessment will show common law regulation to be superior to environmental legislation. (shrink)

This essay argues that there can be a duty to obey the law when it is produced by the evolutionary forces at work in the customary and common law. Human beings' inherent epistemic limitations mean that they must rely on the trial and error learning built into the common law process to discover rules that facilitate peaceful social interaction. Hence, a duty to obey the law produced by the common law process can arise from individuals' natural duty to promote social (...) peace. This argument cannot be extended to ground political obligation. It does not give rise to a duty to obey the state. (shrink)

This article challenges the traditional argument for the state that holds that because the market is unable to supply the rule-making, adjudicative, and enforcement services that are essential to life in society, the state must, and hence is morally justified. The author argues that the market's inability to supply these basic services proves only that the state must ensure that they are supplied, not that it must supply them itself. This implies that the traditional concept of the minimal state as (...) one that supplies only these basic services is flawed. The `remedial state' (one that regulates the private provision of these services) is actually the minimal state. Key Words: anarchy • libertarianism • minimal state • political obligation • protective agency • public goods. (shrink)

In his thoughtful Commentary on my article, “Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency,” Kenneth Silver incorrectly asserts that I endorse Robert Dahl’s Principle of Affected Interests and social contract theory. To the extent that Silver’s criticism of my argument is based on the claim that I appeal to either theory as the ground for my claim that corporate moral agency entails a corporate right to vote, it is misguided. I rely (...) only on the Rawlsian equal participation principle that invests those subject to the law with the right to vote. To the extent Silver’s criticism is directed to that assertion, it is on point. (shrink)

Advocates of the privatization of law often assume that unless law springs from some act of agreement, some express or implicit social contract by which individuals consent to be bound, it is nothing more than force. In this Article, I argue that this is a false dilemma. Although law is rarely grounded in consent, this does not imply that law necessarily gives some individuals command over others. Law can arise through a process of evolution. When this is the case, those (...) subject to law are indeed bound, but not by the will of any particular human beings. Although this depoliticized law is inherently coercive, it is not inherently a vehicle for domination. This Article argues that such a system of depoliticized law is consistent with the ideal of the rule of law, and, in fact, is free market law, when that phrase is properly understood. (shrink)

The fundamental requirement of Anglo-American criminal law is that crime must consist of the concurrence of a guilty mind—a mens rea—with a guilty act—an actus reus. And yet, the criminal law is shot through with discordant lumps of strict liability—crimes for which no mens rea is required. Ignoring the conventional normative objections to this aberration, I distinguish two different types of strict criminal liability: the type that arose at common law and the type associated with the public welfare offenses that (...) are the product of twentieth and twenty-first century legislation. Using famous cases as exemplars, I analyze the two types of strict liability, and then examine the purposes served and incentives created by subjecting individuals to strict liability. I conclude that common law strict liability is rational in that it advances the purposes of the criminal law, while the public welfare offenses are at best pointless and at worst counterproductive. I suggest that in this respect the common law contains more wisdom than the results of the legislative process. (shrink)