. In a number of papers I have sought to discuss and cast some doubt on a certain strategy of response to an argument that purports to show that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. This argument proceeds from the alleged ‘fixity of the past’ to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. William Lane Craig has criticized my approach to these issues. Here I should like to respond to some of Craig's claims. My goal is (...) to attempt to achieve a clearer, more penetrating view of some of the issues pertaining to the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The focus here will be on a strategy of response to the incompatibilist's argument which is associated with William of Ockham. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Persians TIMOTHEUS (Translated by John Warden)... urging on their floating bronze-beaked chariots ram by ram furrowing the waves with pointed teeth....... with humped heads stripped away arms of fir, thumped ’em on the left, mariners tumbled, smashed ’em on the right in their pinewood towers, back on their feet again. Ha! Tear off flesh to their rope-bound ribs, sink ’em with thunderbolts, rip away gilded splendour with (...) iron-helmed rams. Thonged javelins fly fire-like, shafts trembling in pierced limbs, wood slivers ablaze long-winged brazen-headed, slaughtered victims swarm. ◊♦◊ Sea with glass-green hair its furrows stained with blood; shouts of victors, screams of vanquished; the barbarous fleet borne away over the fish-crowned gleaming curves of Amphitrite’s breast. ◊♦◊ Lord of a daywide land, islander out for a sail ha! listing, tipping, arms and feet arion 28.1 spring/summer 2020 96 the persians thrashing in the buffeting waves, cries to the sea god, “Father...” Winds drop and veer, smite him on the other side. No Bacchus poured that liquid into his wine jar belly. He vomits up the boiling sea flood, screaming through clenched teeth against the defiling sea: “Was once not enough to have your proud neck yoked with bonds of hemp? See, now my lord will churn you with pine trees born in the mountains, encompass your watery plains with mariners, you madcap, long-loathed, faithless plaything of the swift-surfing winds.” Gasps out the words and a disgusting stream of sour sea water comes belching from his belly. ◊♦◊ Homeward they scurry, the Persian fleet, the foreigners squadron smashing into squadron in the long-necked strait jolts from their hands their mountain feet, leap from their mouths their gleaming helpmates; bodies without breath, without light, festoon the starsprent sea, weigh down the headlands. Survivors on the shore sit naked and freezing, tears dripping from their howled laments. Possessed by the dirge-song of grief, they keen and beat their breasts: “O vales of Mysia with your trees like a woman’s hair, take me home. For the winds are carrying me away. Timotheus 97 Never will the dust of earth receive my body....... in a cave where nymphs are born, below the ocean floor. Protect me from Helle, ship-bridged bringer of war. Had my lord not built that far-travelled causeway, never would I have come from Tmolus or Lydian Sardis to keep at bay the Greek war god. But now where shall I find sweet refuge from unbending fate? Who will free me from suffering and bring me home to Troy? Could I but fall at the ivy-robed knees of the Queen, the Mountain Mother, embrace her lovely arms and pray: ‘Goddess of golden hair, mother, I beg you rescue me, rescue me from the devious steel that slits the throat, from the wave-skimming gales, ship breakers, from Boreas that freezes by night. The winds will dash me to pieces. Already the cruel waves have torn the clothing from my body. Now I shall lie wretched, my flesh a feast to the tribes of birds.’” ◊♦◊ See a Greek with a sword of iron grab a man from Celaeno, rich in flocks, bereft in battle, drag him by the hair. Arms twined around knees, he breaks the seal of his lips seeking Greek in the shrill voice of Asia: Listen Mister not me why come. Not me, no never, big master send me, me no never come fight. Stay home Sardis, Sousa, Ecbatana. Great god Artemis 98 the persians Ephesus guard me. Swift-running backward-running they pursue their flight, cast from their hands the twin-mouthed javelins, tear the flesh from their faces, rip from their breasts their sumptuous Persian gowns, raise in one voice their Asiatic wailing. Those round the King are loud in panic at the coming disaster. The King looks down at the mingled host in flight, falls to his knees, defiles his body. Tossed in fate’s waves he speaks: Root and branch my house has fallen! The flaming ships of the Greeks have slain the flower of our youth. There is no way home, our ships consumed by the blazing might of harsh... (shrink)

This article is a companion to an article by the same author in issue 33.3 of Criminal Justice Ethics on the question of the standard by which the severity of punishment is determined to be proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which it is inflicted. Its chief argument is that basing the determination on what the offender deserves to suffer is morally problematic because it conflicts with principles of humanity that call for our taking the good of human (...) beings as our end. By contrast, it is also argued, basing the determination on promoting public safety or preserving civil order is not similarly problematic because punishment inflicted to serve either of these ends is compatible with principles of humanity. The article concludes with a comment on how the harsh sentencing laws enacted in the United States in the past 40 years should be seen as a product of the former mode of determining punishment and not the latter. (shrink)

Over the last forty-five years, there have been three monumental stories on the national American crime scene: a run up in crime in the 1960s, a move towards a more punitive American justice system starting in the 1970s, and a strong decline in US crime rates beginning in the 1990s. At the center of understanding these three stories lies Gary Becker's pioneering work on the economics of crime . Becker offered a price theoretical model in which criminals are viewed as (...) rational actors seeking to maximize their benefits in choosing certain criminal actions while minimizing their costs. Becker's model has not only shaped academic debate on the topic of criminal behavior since the 70s, but it has also had a powerful impact on governmental policies regarding crime and justice. Most significantly, Becker's work_—with some of its nuance overlooked_—ended up providing intellectual backing to the increasingly punitive and harsh nature of the American justice system, as reflected in the massive increases in incarceration levels and the revival of the use of the death penalty.While Becker correctly predicted that massive increases in incarceration would have a dampening effect on crime, the supporters of this policy have not been attentive to the need to weigh costs as well as benefits in assessing the major prison build-up. Evidence that equal crime reductions could be achieved through targeted social spending merits consideration, since Becker noted that improving the legal opportunities available to potential criminals could be as potent a deterrent to crime as increasing the cost of criminal choices. Furthermore, I review current research in the death penalty debate and argue that—contrary to the positions defended by Becker and many ardent disciples of price-theory— the empirical evidence does not currently support the conclusion that the death penalty as administered in the United States has served as a deterrent to crime. (shrink)

Lévinas’s harsh criticisms of the sacred have irked not just his critics but even some who sympathize with his work. Taken at face value, some of Lévinas’s comments concerning the sacred appear prejudicial towards non-monotheistic religions. But a closer reading of his analysis of the sacred shows that his preoccupation with the sacred has to do with a questionable “temptation” or disposition found in every human being. Drawing on the insights of the Bible, Shakespeare, and Lévy-Bruhl, Lévinas shows how (...) this temptation involves a primitive wish to escape one’s responsibilities as a human being. For Lévinas, the phenomenon of the sacred promotes the illusion of a direct and immediate experience of the absolute or the Infinite. Genuine transcendence, for Lévinas, is possible only within the ethical drama of self and Other. The apex of human life involves not the eclipsing of the self—the fundamental motivation behind the sacred—but a heightening of the self’s radical uniqueness that only moral engagement makes possible. (shrink)

Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the (...) opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views. (shrink)

Grotius argued that it was sometimes permissible to excuse from punishment those who commit crimes out of extreme poverty. The grounds for doing so were separate from the grounds of the right of necessity. Leniency was possible because the seriousness of the crime and the degree of guilt of the offender were separate considerations. Punishment should be related to guilt, which, according to Grotius, was partly a matter of the circumstances and motives of the offender. He thought there were some (...) circumstances, such as extreme poverty, which people cannot be reasonably expected to endure. Smith's retributivist theory ruled out the possibility of moderating punishment for crimes committed out of extreme poverty. Justice requires the self-command to endure our personal hardships rather than harm the innocent. Smith was optimistic about the capacity of people to endure harsh conditions and also about the possibility of improving them. (shrink)

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...) factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 189-202 [Access article in PDF] Spinoza in Denmark and the Fall of Struensee, 1770-1772 John Christian Laursen * Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza was the arch-heretic of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was denounced in half a dozen languages from the time he began to publish until at least the 1780s, when Lessing's allegiance to Spinoza became the heart (...) of a literary scandal. 1 In time-honored fashion, some of these denunciations led to the burning of books and the imprisonment or banning of authors. The most spectacular case, however, led to the trial of a prime minister, the cutting off of his right hand and of his head, and the drawing and quartering of his body in full public ceremony. The year was 1772, the prime minister was Johann Friedrich Struensee, and the country was Denmark.Late eighteenth-century Denmark was not known for barbarities of the type represented by Struensee's execution. Previously disgraced prime ministers had merely been imprisoned, and other political enemies of the ruling powers had [End Page 189] merely been exiled. 2 Why such harshness with Struensee? What was at stake in the fall of Struensee?The answers to these questions are complex, but an important element of those answers lies in Struensee's public image, which made it seem both necessary and justifiable to treat him with such harshness. In turn, public opinion about Struensee was closely tied to the reputation of Spinoza. This essay will show that charges of Spinozism were part of the campaign that poisoned public opinion against Struensee. This was an unusually clear case of a theological and philosophical debate having direct political effects.Before getting to the role of Spinozism and anti-Spinozism in eighteenth-century Denmark, let us fill in important points of the story. The charge against Struensee was lèse majesté, for plotting the death of the King and for usurping power in violation of the constitution. Behind these charges was a further element which encouraged outrage: sleeping with Queen Caroline Matilda. That much was true, as both the Queen, a sister of George III of England, and Struensee admitted, each in order to save the other. The King knew about it all along but did not care. He did not care because he had become a libertine, going out to whorehouses most nights with rowdy friends, and he figured that what was good for the gander was good for the goose. He was also schizophrenic and easily manipulable by those around him, so that Struensee and the Queen encountered no disapproval from him until he fell under other people's influence. After Struensee and the Queen were taken into custody, the King was forced to divorce the Queen and she was sent to live in a Hannoverian castle in Celle because her brother did not want the embarrassment of having her back in England. She died there a few years later. 3It is an irony that we owe our knowledge of the state of public opinion in Denmark in this period to Struensee. Until shortly before the fatal events mentioned above, the Danish press had been subject to censorship that might have prevented the expression of many of the subsequent attacks on Struensee. But in September 1770 Struensee persuaded the king to declare freedom of the press in all his realms (consisting of the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway, the Duchies of Slesvig and Holsten [Schleswig and Holstein in German], Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, and colonies in India, Africa, and the Caribbean). 4 It is not widely [End Page 190] known that Denmark was the first country to declare unlimited freedom of the press as official public policy. For much of the century England and the Netherlands had effective freedom of the press, but it had never been declared official policy. The next to do so was rebellious Virginia, in the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), followed by other colonies and then the Bill of Rights of the new... (shrink)

This reply offers a detailed refutation of some of the objections raised in Christopher Coope's extended discussion of The Spiritual Dimension. It explains the ‘non-partisan’ strategy of the book, which Coope systematically misunderstands, and exposes some serious problems with Coope's own preference for a harshly exclusivist form of Christianity. Several issues connected with religious belief are then discussed, including emotional involvement versus detachment in the assessment of religious claims; layers of meaning in religious language; human autonomy and divine authority; the (...) problem of evil; apophatic theology and transcendence; divine action in the world; and the doctrine of the afterlife. (shrink)

In this essay I’d like to help readers prepare to learn from Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.1 Such an essay is needed, as truer words were never spoken than when Deleuze said of it in his "Letter to a Harsh Critic": "it's still full of academic elements, it's heavy going"2 Now part of the “academic” aspect of the work comes from Deleuze having submitted Difference and Repetition to his jury as the primary thesis for the doctorat d'Etat in 1968.3 (...) But that doesn’t lessen the need for help when first approaching the book. The context of Deleuze’s remarks in his “Letter” should be noted: he has just been noting that "the history of philosophy plays a patently repressive role in philosophy, it's philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex."4 Deleuze continues that he tried to subvert this repressive function by various means. First, by writing on authors such as Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza and Nietzsche who contested the rationalist tradition by the "critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the externality of forces and relations, the denunciation of power [pouvoir]." Second, and quite notoriously, by “a sort of buggery [enculage] or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception.” That is, by making the author say something in their own words that would be “monstrous.”5 These are famous lines, and the last is certainly amusing in an épater les bourgeois sort of way. But what's really important in my view comes next, when Deleuze explains what it means to finally write "in your own name," as he claims he first did in Difference and Repetition. (shrink)

In the face of economic and political changes following the end of the Soviet Union, total fertility rates fell significantly across the post-Soviet world. In this study we examine the dramatic fertility transition in one community in which the total fertility rate fell from approximately five children per woman before 1993 to just over one child per woman a decade later. We apply hypotheses derived from evolutionary ecology and demography to the question of fertility transition in the post-Soviet period, focusing (...) on an indigenous community (Ust’-Avam) in the Taimyr Region, northern Russia. We employ a mixed parametric accelerated failure-time model that allows comparison of age at first birth, interbirth interval, and reproductive postponement or cessation prior to and following 1993. We find that short-term reproductive delay alone does not explain the dramatic drop in fertility in Ust’-Avam. Age at first birth remains constant. Interbirth intervals increase moderately. The estimated fraction of women who have ceased or indefinitely postponed reproducing doubles (for parities 2 through 4) or triples (for nulliparous women). We caution against assuming that environmental harshness necessarily leads to earlier and more rapid reproduction. An evolutionary theory of fertility responses to acute environmental shocks remains relatively undeveloped. In such contexts it is possible that selection favors a conservative reproductive strategy while more information is learned about the new environment. When investigating fertility responses to environmental stressors we suggest researchers examine postponement and stopping behavior in addition to changes in age at first birth and interbirth interval. (shrink)

Summary In the trial of Galileo there is a small but significant discrepancy between the text of his condemnation by the Holy Office and the text of his recantation, which has been generally overlooked or ignored. The offence that he was required to recant was more serious than the one of which he had been found guilty. The most plausible explanation seems to be that the two texts were drawn up independently of each other by the Inquisitors and the Pope (...) respectively, and that the latter wished to deal more harshly with Galileo than the former. There is some independent evidence for this supposition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics in Early BuddhismJohn M. KollerEthics in Early Buddhism. By David J. Kalupahana. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995. Pp. ix + 171.Ethics in Early Buddhism by David J. Kalupahana is a small volume that makes a large contribution to the study of Buddhist ethics. As the title suggests, Kalupahana, an internationally recognized scholar of early Buddhism, focuses his scholarship on the discourses of the Buddha contained in (...) the Pāli canon. But his philosophical concerns are as broad as the field of ethics itself, and his understanding of Buddhist ethics is based on a careful analysis of the full development of Buddhism, Mahāyāna as well as Theravāda texts. As in his earlier work, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), Kalupahana argues cogently for a pragmatic, experientially grounded, understanding of Buddhist [End Page 628] thought, rejecting the essentialist and absolutist interpretations of experience that characterize so much philosophical thought, Asian as well as Western.Part 1 situates early Buddhist ethics in its historical context, contrasting it with the deontological ethical theory that characterized much of the Upaniṣads and that culminated in the Bhagavad Gītā on the one hand and with the utilitarian theory that grounded much ancient Indian practical thought, including the realpolitik of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra on the other. This historical context contributes to our ability to see how the Buddha steered a middle path between moral absolutism and the moral relativism of self-interest.In part 1 Kalupahana also tackles the problem of knowledge, for much of moral theory is shaped by epistemological concerns, with epistemological absolutism giving rise to moral absolutism and epistemological relativism giving rise to moral relativism. Here Kalupahana analyzes the Buddha's experiential method of insight and understanding, which gave rise to the central Buddhist insight into the nature of existence, namely interdependent arising (paṭicca samuppāda), a middle view that eschews essentialism and eternalism on the one hand and nihilism on the other. His conclusion is that early Buddhist ethics is a middle way rooted in the middle-way ontology of paṭicca samuppāda and grounded in an experiential way of knowledge. Part 1 concludes with illuminating explorations of what this middle way ethics has to contribute to the important ethical issues involved in the fact-value distinction, the problem of will or choice, and the relation of the individual and society.In part 2, the heart of the book, Kalupahana proceeds to analyze the Buddhist conceptions of the moral life, its underlying principle, and its justification. As he notes, the early discourses present various accounts of the moral life. Integrating these accounts, Kalupahana examines Buddhist morality in terms of its beginnings in the cultivation of virtues (sīla), its flowering in the practice of the eightfold path, and its fulfillment in the attainment of the freedom of nibbāna.In a careful analysis of the Brahmajāla Sutta, the seven virtue clusters that are mentioned or discussed in many places in the early discourses are identified and clearly explained. The first virtue cluster includes non-hurting (ahiṁ), which, in its positive sense, is the virtue of friendliness and compassion. The second, non-stealing, in its positive sense, is being satisfied with what one has. The third, avoiding vulgar sensuality and evil, focuses on living the "higher" life of brahmacariya. The fourth focuses on telling the truth and being trustworthy, while the fifth extends the virtue of truth-telling to refraining from malicious speech and using speech to create harmony, and the sixth extends right speech even further, renouncing all harsh speech and taking care always to speak lovingly to help others. The seventh virtue cluster is also about speech, namely refraining from gossip and frivolous talk and, positively, to use speech that is appropriate to the occasion and that promotes morality and well-being in the community.These seven virtues, which advance the well-being of both the individual and society, are the foundation of Buddhist morality on which the morality of the noble eightfold path builds. As Kalupahana points out, "These seven virtues are embodiments [End Page 629] of... (shrink)

Dostoevsky wrote that love in action is a harsh and terrible thing compared to love in dreams. That reality is particularly evident in medicine, where there is an almost universal, involuntary participation of physicians and other healthcare workers in the suffering of their patients. This paper explores this phenomenon through the paradigm of ‘mystery’ as explained by the French existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel. A mystery is different from a problem in the sense that the former requires the active immersion (...) of the person involved in order to be truly experienced. It is a ‘meta-problem’ that cannot be analyzed objectively and separately from the person that it affects, without changing the nature of the thing experienced. The authors contend that the human suffering encountered in medicine is one such phenomenon, and the paper draws on illustrations of this concept in art and literature. Awareness of the subtle but important difference between mystery and problem may help physicians better understand their personal entanglement with the suffering of patients. (shrink)

The original edition of What Computers Can't Do comprised three roughly equal parts: (i) a harsh critical survey of the history and state of the art in AI, circa 1970; (ii) a brilliant philosophical expose of four hidden assumptions shoring up AI's rmsplaced optimism; and (iii) a much more tentative exploration of ways to think, about intelligence without those assumptions. Part I, because it was the most combative (and also the easiest to understand), got most of the attention. Also, (...) since that discussion was the most timely — hence the most quickly obsolete — it is what the excellent substantive introductions to the later editions.. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill has several good claims to be considered as one of the founders of modern social and political thought, particularly given his central role in the foundations of liberalism, and thus, though a good deal has been written about him already, a book on Mill in this ‘Founders’ series should be welcomed. Frederick Rosen brings his wealth of scholarship on both Mill and Jeremy Bentham to play, giving a fresh and informative perspective. The book is structured around (...) Mill’s two largest compositions, the texts which made him famous in his own age—namely, the System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843) and Principles of Political Economy (1848)—which Rosen follows Alexander Bain in describing as being where ‘Mill’s creative energy was mainly confined’ (7). It is refreshing to find a book on Mill which is not centred around On Liberty or Utilitarianism as being the only works of interest in Mill’s canon, though Bain’s remarks seem a little harsh.Rosen’s avouched plan is to .. (shrink)

Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent (...) disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 425-444 [Access article in PDF] The Passions and Animal Language, 1540-1700 R. W. Serjeantson "Do not think, kind and benevolent readers, that I am proposing a useless subject to you by choosing to discuss the language [loquela] of beasts. For this is nothing other than philosophy, which investigates the natures of animals." 1 The Italian medical professor Hieronymus Fabricius ab Aquapendente (...) began his 1603 treatise On the language of beasts with this captatio benevolentiae with good cause. For early modern natural philosophers almost universally insisted that only humans were capable of language and speech. In this they followed, sometimes explicitly, their ancient authorities. "Man," Aristotle had said in the Politics, "is the only animal that has the gift of speech." "Men," wrote Cicero in the De inventione, "most excel the beasts in this, that they can speak." 2 They were sentiments echoed throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. "There is no true language among beastes," said Sir Kenelm Digby. "Language" (loquela), concurred G. J. Vossius, "is unique to man." And according to John Ray in The Wisdom of God (1691), speech was "a quality so peculiar to Man, that no Beast could ever attain to it." 3Language was a subject of absorbing interest to numerous early modern philosophers. They investigated its origin, its production, its signification, and its use. But behind almost all of these investigations lay one of the most profound suppositions in early modern anthropology: the uniqueness of the human [End Page 425] capacity for language, and the brutishness of the brute beasts. Harsh judgments were passed on those who thought that animals might be able to speak. Lawyers held that belief in animal language was sufficient evidence of idiocy. According to Kenelm Digby it was only vanity, ignorance, and a specious desire for reputation that had led some authors to argue that animals used "compleate languages as Men haue to discourse with one another in." And the seventeenth-century English writer on the passions, Edward Reynolds, thought that only "melancholy men" believed "that Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a language whereby they discourse with one another." 4Yet despite this pervasive assumption that humans spoke and animals did not, the question of animal language kept arising in early modern culture. Readers met speaking animals in beast fablesand on Lucianic voyages. There was a popular belief in early modern England that "in the olde tymes" animals could speak. 5 Theodore Zwinger, Claude Duret, and G. J. Vossius all recorded many accounts of human communication with birds, with the ancient claim that Apollonius of Tyana could understand birdsong being particularly notorious. 6 In the Old Testament Balaam's ass asks his owner what he has done to deserve being beaten. 7 And St. Basil had even suggested that before the Fall Adam and Eve had been able to talk to the animals as well as to name them--a suggestion that both Thomas Browne and Joseph Glanvill gave short shrift. 8 But my purpose in this paper is not to follow speaking animals through early modern fables, popular beliefs, or even Biblical commentary. Instead, I propose to explore the serious investigations of zoosemiotics and animal communication that were undertaken by numerous philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 9For then as now, the question of animal language, broadly interpreted, was a serious one for the sciences. It was a question that was addressed across a wide range of disciplines, from logic to natural history. As such it was an important component of the many discussions of the nature of animal reason--discussions that provided a means for skeptical moral philosophers to humble human pretensions [End Page 426] to rationality and wisdom. 10 Natural philosophers, too, undertook detailed inquiries into the question of animal expression, exploring issues of articulacy, anatomy, and function. Almost all early modern authors agreed that animals could not speak and did not possess language in the same way that humans did. But this still left a great deal of scope for considering the extent... (shrink)

Smith's correspondence of this period of his life suggests that he believed that raising a revenue in a non‐discriminatory way did not gravely affect the tendency towards price equilibrium on which economic efficiency depends. There was also the necessity of providing for justice, education, and public works in Scotland. Smith was consequently willing, on the grounds of utility, to regulate and enforce the mercantile system, even though he viewed some of its features as unwise and unjust, for example, prohibiting certain (...) imports and punishing smugglers harshly. Smith's activities as an administrative judge and director of import police are assessed, and highlights of his service are described, such as his coastguard command role in gathering intelligence about the entry of John Paul Jones with units of the American navy, supported by France, into the Firth of Forth in September 1779. As well, his views of this time about the issue of free trade for Ireland are examined. (shrink)

John Wilson; Concepts, Contestability and the Philosophy of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 3–15, https://.

The Mississippi River flows through American history and culture as a mythic waterway brimming with tragedy and hope, and awash in passionate ambitions and harsh realities. In 1953, a young Charles Dee Sharp traveled twice down the Mississippi to make a documentary film of it, taking black-and-white photographs of the river, its communities, and its people. While Sharp’s documentary never came to fruition, the striking images he captured survived as moving and evocative historical testaments to a lost era, now (...) collected in his new book The Mississippi in 1953. These images create a vivid portrait of America’s heartland a half century ago, and they are enriched with excerpts from Sharp’s original trip journal, intriguing anecdotes from the people he encountered along his journey, and an engaging environmental history of the river by historian John O. Anfinson. The Mississippi in 1953 offers an original and poignant look at the living artery of the American landscape and how it molded the United States into the nation it is today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Garrulus sum et loquax et expedire nescio. Diu te tenui in istis, sed de cetero procedam.” These are the words of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, a thirteenth-century Scholastic and lecturer at the Universities of Paris and Oxford. Rufus is apologizing to his readers: “I am garrulous and loquacious, and I don’t know how to be efficient. I have detained you with these things a long while, but let me (...) now proceed to another topic.” This apology introduces the third part of the Speculum animae, a preliminary modern edition of which we publish here. In this short treatise, Rufus presents a unique Aristotelian theory of perception, describes what is and is not intelligible, and finally proves to his own satisfaction the immortality of the rational soul. To us this would hardly seem the place to apologize for being long-winded; indeed, we might wonder how Rufus could accomplish such an ambitious task in such a short treatise. We would certainly not accuse him of excessive verbosity. But Rufus was a man of exceptional humility, who once referred to himself as the least of the lesser thinkers of his time.1Despite Rufus’s humility, he was no minor figure in the development of Scholastic philosophy. A teacher at the Universities of Paris and Oxford ,2 he is the author of the earliest known, surviving lectures on several of Aristotle’s major texts, including the Metaphysics, the Physics, De generatione et corruptione, and De anima3 . In fact, Rufus was one of the very first lecturers to teach the libri naturales at Paris after a ban on such instruction was effectively lifted in 1231 A.D. His works were influential not only among his contemporaries, but also among later authors, particularly John Duns Scotus. Roger Bacon, though a harsh critic of Rufus, acknowledged Rufus’s influence and fame decades after his death, albeit among what Bacon termed the “vulgar multitude.”4The Speculum animae is one of Rufus’s later works. He begins the treatise by posing the following question: “In what way is the soul all things?” This refers, of course, to a familiar doctrine Aristotle establishes in the De anima—that the soul is, in some way, all things —and Rufus is here seeking to clarify it. But this is, in fact, only the first of five questions addressed in the Speculum. The five questions Rufus posits and answers in this treatise are, in order:1. In what manner is the soul all things?2. In what manner do a sensible and the sense, or an intelligible and the possible intellect, become one?3. What is predicated and of what is it predicated?4. What is intelligible?5. What is the cause of the immortality of the soul?In this short work, therefore, Rufus addresses apparently diverse topics including perception, understanding, logic, and the nature of the soul. But, in fact, the Speculum is principally a summary of Rufus’s theory of human perception and understanding. Like other medieval theories of perception and understanding, Rufus’s theory centers around the notion of species, a kind of form that is received in the soul when a person senses something or grasps something intellectually.5 In this, and in other aspects of the theory, Rufus was heavily dependent on Aristotle and St. Augustine. Rufus was working in a philosophical tradition based on Aristotle’s categories that had been accepted for centuries in the West. But in his lifetime, the Aristotelian corpus was enlarged to include Aristotle’s psychology and more generally his natural philosophy and metaphysics, together with the commentaries of Averroës . As is well known, this philosophical tradition was respected and continued not just by Rufus but by many authors after his time.So what makes Rufus’s theory.. (shrink)

This volume is a state-of-the-art review of the evidence and theory supporting the existence and significance of automatic processes in our daily lives, with chapters by the leading researchers in this field today.

The psychological mechanisms implicated in psychopathy do not limit their activity to those behaviors that support a cheater strategy in social games. They result in a number of other clearly maladaptive behaviors that do not directly involve other individuals. Thus, any gains that might arise from the use of a cheater strategy in social situations are probably lost elsewhere.

John Passmore was a renowned Australian empirical philosopher and historian of ideas. In this book, which was originally published in 1952, Passmore's intention was to disentangle certain main themes in Hume's philosophy and to show how they relate to Hume's main philosophic purpose. Rather than offering a detailed commentary, the text provides an account based on specificity and critical scholarship, seeking to complement the other more comprehensive works on Hume's philosophy that had become available around the same time. This (...) book will be of value to anyone with an interest in perspectives on Hume and Passmore's philosophical approach. (shrink)

In August 2001, the Maryland Court of Appeals harshly criticized the Kennedy Krieger Institute of Johns Hopkins University for knowingly exposing poor children to lead-based paint. The court’s decision made national news, and is worth examining because it raises several very important issues for research ethics.The research conducted by the Institute was an attempt to understand how successful different lead abatement programs were in reducing continued lead exposure to children. Previously, Julian Chisolm and Mark Farfel, of John Hopkins University, (...) had disclosed the dangers of traditional dust-generating deleading practices. In the current study, Dr. Farfel and colleagues sought to document the longevity of various lead-based paint abatement strategies. (shrink)

The authors argue, against Frank Jackson, that weakness (and strength) of will involves higher-order mental states. The authors hold that this is compatible with a decision-theoretic belief-desire psychology of human action.

John Arthur philosophically addresses the problems of racism and the legacy of past racial discrimination in the United States. Offering a thorough analysis of the concepts of race and racism, Arthur also discusses racial equality, poverty and race, reparations and affirmative action, and merit in ways that cut across the usual political lines. A philosopher, former civil-rights plaintiff and professor at an historically black college in the South, Arthur draws on both his personal experiences as well as his rigorous (...) philosophical training in this account. His conclusions about the meaning of merit, the defects of affirmative action, the importance of apology, and the need for true equality deal productively with one of America's most vexing problems. His book is also relevant to any society struggling with racial differences and past injustices. (shrink)

Implementation of existing ethical guidelines for international collaborative medical and health research is still largely controversial in sub-Saharan Africa for two major reasons: One, they are seen as foreign and allegedly inconsistent with what has been described as an ‘African worldview’, hence, demand for their strict implementations reeks of ‘bioethical imperialism’. Two, they have other discernible inadequacies – lack of sufficient detail, apparent as well as real ambiguities, vagueness and contradictions. Similar charges exist(ed) in other non-Western societies. Consequently, these guidelines (...) have been correctly judged as an inadequate response to the complex and ever shifting dilemmas met by researchers and research regulators in the field. This paper proposes a framework for effective implementation of existing guidelines without much worry about bioethical imperialism and other inadequacies. This framework is proposed using an analogy of Legal Realism, specifically its key assertions on how, in reality, judicial systems operate using general legal rules to settle specific cases. Legal realists assert that in judicial decision-making, general legal rules do not totally dictate court decisions in specific cases. This analogy is used to coin a new term, ‘Bioethical Realism.’ The framework suggests that local Research Ethics Committees ought to be construed as analogues of judicial courts with the resulting implications. Consequently, just like legal rules are general rules that do not always dictate court decisions, similarly international bioethical guidelines are general ethical rules that should not always dictate local RECs’ decisions and such decisions (ought to) enjoy considerable immunity from outsiders. (shrink)

John J. Stuhr, a leading voice in American philosophy, sets forth a view of pragmatism as a personal work of art or fashion. Stuhr develops his pragmatism by putting pluralism forward, setting aside absolutism and nihilism, opening new perspectives on democracy, and focusing on love. He creates a space for a philosophy that is liable to failure and that is experimental, pluralist, relativist, radically empirical, radically democratic, and absurd. Full color illustrations enhance this lyrical commitment to a new version (...) of pragmatism. (shrink)

While dominant management thinking is steered by profit maximisation, this paper proposes that sustained organisational growth can best be stimulated by attention to the common good and the capacity of corporate leaders to create commitment to the common good. The leadership thinking of Kautilya and Ashoka embodies this principle. Both offer a common good approach, emphasising the leader's moral and legal responsibility for people's welfare, the robust interaction between the business community and the state, and the importance of moral training (...) of leaders in identifying and promoting the common good. We argue that the complex process of re-orientating corporate priorities towards the common good requires alertness and concerted effort if both business and society are to truly benefit. As Ashoka said: ‘A good deed is a difficult thing’. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution (...) of individual responsibility is appropriate . One such case is oral health or significant aspects of this. It is appropriate, the paper argues, to hold people responsible for a number of factors that affect their oral health. A luck egalitarian approach inspired by John Roemer can assess whether people have acted responsibly by comparing their choices to those of their peers. A luck egalitarian approach to oral health would recommend prioritizing scarce resources in a responsibility-weighted queuing system and include copayment and general taxation among its measures of financing. (shrink)

Levack, John Having just read another poem about how a city-bred agnostic finds God after spending a weekend away in the Australian bush..

Bishop was both fully at home in, and fully estranged from, Nova Scotia and Brazil. In Nova Scotia, after Bishop’s father had died, her mother went insane; Bishop lived there with her grandparents from the age of three to the age of six. She then left to be raised by an aunt in Massachusetts, but spent summers in Nova Scotia till she was thirteen. Subsequent adult visits north produced poems like “Cape Breton,” “At the Fishhouses,” and “The Moose”; and Bishop (...) responded eagerly to other poets, like John Brinnin and Mark Strand, who knew that landscape. Nova Scotia represented a harsh pastoral to which, though she was rooted in it, she could not return. Brazil, on the other hand, was a place of adult choice, where she bought and restored a beautiful eighteenth-century house in Ouro Prêto. It was yet another pastoral, harsh in a different, tropical way—a pastoral exotic enough to interest her noticing eye but one barred to her by language and culture . Foreign abroad, foreign at home, Bishop appointed herself a poet of foreignness, which is, far more than “travel,” her subject. Three of her books have geographical names—“North and South,” “Questions of Travel,” and “Geography III”—and she feels a geographer’s compulsions precisely because she is a foreigner, not a native. Her early metaphor for a poem is a map, and she scrutinized that metaphor, we may imagine, because even as a child she had had to become acquainted through maps with the different territories she lived in and traveled back and forth between. In the poem “Crusoe in England,” Bishop’s Robinson Crusoe, shipwrecked on his island, has nightmares of having to explore more and more new islands and of being required to be their geographer: I’d have nightmares of other islands stretching away from min, infinities of islands, islands spawning islands, ………………………………………… knowing that I had to live on each and every one, eventually, for ages, registering their flora, their fauna, their geography.This recurrent anxiety marks the end of one of Bishop’s earlier dreams—that one could go home, or find a place that felt like home. In “A Cold Spring,” a book recording chiefly some unhappy years preceding her move to Brazil, there had yet survived the dream of going home, in a poem using the Prodigal Son as surrogate. He deludes himself, by drinking, that he can be happy away, but finally his evening horrors in exile determine him to return: Carrying a bucket along a slimy board, he felt the bats’ uncertain staggering flight, his shuddering insights, beyond his control, touching him. But it took him a long time finally to make his mind up to go home. [“The Prodigal Son”] Helen Vendler is Kenan Professor of English at Harvard University. She has written books on Yeats, Stevens, Herbert, and Keats, and is now working on a study of Shakespeare’s sonnets. She has recently edited the Harvard Book of Contemporary American Poetry. (shrink)