IN 1903, commenting on an article he had written more than thirty years before, Charles Peirce said that he had changed his mind on many issues at least a half-dozen times but had "never been able to think differently on that question of nominalism and realism" (1.20). For anyone acquainted with Peirce's writings, this remark alone could justify a study of "that question.".

Peirce's references to Ockham are less frequent and less fulsome both in detail and in praise than his references to Scotus. And if one expects a critique of “the greatest nominalist that ever lived” to be especially revealing, they are also somewhat disappointing. Nevertheless, the comparison and contrast with Ockham offers another occasion to examine the “question of nominalism and realism” which Peirce thought to be so important.

Scotus argues that the will of a rational agent has two basic inclinations: for benefit and for justice. Having examined in other articles why he picks these two, I ask here how the combination produces a unified thing. At one point, Scotus proposes an analogy for the two inclinations with the relations of genus and differentia which produce a unified definition. In arguing that the analogy does not succeed, I hope to have given a clearer understanding of the theory of (...) dual affections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and the Problem of Universals JOHN F. BOLER ABAILARD t IS A CLEVERman, but in one respect he is just like the rest of us: Given one clear idea of which he is convinced, he tends to become intolerant, thinking the worst of everyone else. Abailard's clear idea goes something as follows. In what does universality consist? It consists, says Abailard, in the signifying of many things by (...) one sign? Abailard's predecessors had been searching for some thing which was universal. But a sign must signify many things to be universal; and furthermore, the sign itself, as a thing--a noise, gesture, or statue--is individual. ~ It may help to describe the model which crops up here and there in Abailard's examples and which, I think, dominates his analysis. Consider, then, a statue which is not meant to stand for any one particular individual: for example, the Minute Man at Concord, Massachusetts.* First of all, the statue is an individual thing. Second, just as a piece of metal, it need not stand for anything--anymore than a bird bath would, had the town council decided to build that instead. What is more, it is information from other sources which leads us to take the statue as "general" rather than as depicting some individual (like Nathan Hale). And even though the statue stands for "all" minute men, not only is the statue an individual thing but all those things for which it stands are (or were) individuals. And finally, we might also point out that the statue must be taken as signifying; it does not have "representative" qualities in quite the same way that it has properties like weight and shape. t The text of Abailard to which I have referred is: Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schrqte, herausgegeben yon Dr. Bernhard Geyer, I Die Logica "Ingredientibus,'" II Die Logica "'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum" which is to be found in Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XXI (1933). A partial translation of this text appears in R. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers (New York: Scribners, 1929), II, 208-258. Hereafter I shall refer to the latin text as "G" followed by the page number and lines; and to the translation, where possible, as "'M" with the page number. 9Abailard feels that when Aristotle says that a universal is what is fitted for being predicated of many things, it is the signifying of many things which is at stake; and he chides Aristotle for seeming to ascribe universality to things as well as to words. G ~ (M 221). The reference to Aristotle is On Interpretation, 17a (38-40). *See note 7, below. 9I have interpolated on two passages: G 22t~-~ (M 241-242), and G 522*t-=. [37] 38 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The upshot of Abailard's insight is that universality pertains to the interpretation of signs: the effort to locate universal things is misguided. Some want to say that the universal is a collection; but do collections signify their members? ~ Some want to say that the universal is a substance of which individuals are accidents; but is a substance predicated of its accidents? e And some want to say that universals are words--that is noises; but noises are also individual things. ~ In short, to signify or to show ("monstrare") pertains to words; to be signified or shown pertains to things. 8 And to transfer the properties of one to the other leads to hopeless difficulties. ~ One can understand Abailard's exultation (and exaltation) at having shown both sides of a seething controversy to be equally misguided? ~ But what then remains as the problem of universals? It is this: one would expect that every sign would have some subject which it signifies; but universals seem to lack a proper subject. And does this not mean that universals are fictions (like goat-stag or chimera)? = Having thus set out rather baldly what I take to be Abailard's "clear idea," let me now try to show more fully how he goes about establishing the problem and providing for a solution. Abailard's position on universals is set forth in his two logic books, both of which begin... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 95 OCKHAM ON INTUITIVE COGNITION t In the first part of what follows, I try to locate Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition in the context of one set of philosophical problems rather than another. The device I use is to emphasize the major error Ockham wants to avoid: "platonism" rather than scepticism. In the second part, I try to show how difficulties raised by some recent (...) commentary result from the wrong orientation. This very limited project involves neither exposition nor assessment of Ockham's proposed solutions for the philosophical problems. But hopefully it will prove useful or at least suggestive for others working in this or related areas in Ockham. According to Ockham, 2 someone can be said to hold to or cognize a proposition evidently when he knows it to be true. The paradigm of knowing something to be true is seeing that it follows from the premisses in a demonstrative syllogism. However, first principles, or any proposition per se nota, can also be known to be true or cognized evidently. And, what is most important for our purposes, contingent propositions can be cognized evidently when, as one might say, they are known in experience. When someone is looking at a white wall, to ~se one of Ockham's examples, he can cognize evidently the proposition "The wall is white." 3 i Aside from a few quotations, I have given only the location of references in Ockham. Only very extensive quotations would make the article self-sufficient or, for that matter, even be helpful to the reader. My effort is both tentative and parasitic on earlier commentary and can, perhaps, be excused from providing logistic support that would far exceed its own weight. Moreover, I have tried to direct the reader to the most convenient materials, using fairly common or obvious abbreviations for Ockham's writings and the symbols given in the brackets for each of these sources. [Baudry] L Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris, 1958). [McKeon] R. McKeon, Selections /tom Medieval Philosophers, Vol. II (New York, 1929). This almost literal translation of selected Quodlibeta is sufficient for my present purposes. The Strasbourg edition of 1491, of course, is not more readily available m the reimpression from Louvain, Editions de la Biblioth~que Sd., 1962. [OPW] P. Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings (New York, 1957). The page numbers given are from the Nelson edition, containing both Latin and English. The Library of Liberal Arts (Bobbs-Merrill) edition which consists only of the English text runs from one to sixteen pages ahead as a result of numbering the blank pages at the beginning of each section. [Ordinatio] Opera Philosophica et Theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967). Vol. I: Scripture in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Prologus et Distinctio Prima, edited by G. Gal and S. Brown. The lines referred to are given as superscripts to the page numbers. a Expos. Physicorum, Prologue ([OPW] pp. 4-5). See also [Baudry] under scire and evidens. a The issue of translation raises a host of problems of varying degrees of philosophical importance. I am not settled in my own mind about the best English equivalents for many important terms, and in my translations and commentary I have not tried for consistency. In principle, I prefer odd or quaint terms, since they bear their faults on their 96 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY At one point, Ockham gives this description: Whoever knows some proposition evidently cannot dissent from that proposition by the power of the will alone, but it is necessary that he be persuaded by an argument more strongly moving his intellect to dissent, or it is necessary that he have forgotten something evidently known.4 Let me call your attention to the un-Cartesian way in which Ockham removes the judgement of some contingent (and all necessary) propositions from the (total) dominion of the will. I may remain silent or talk of something else, or I may avail myself of questions and conditionals, but if I intend to deal head-on with equals added to equals or (while looking at the white wall) with walls and whiteness, I cannot but assert that equals added to equals are equal or... (shrink)

Na primeira seção, discuto a atitude ambivalente de Peirce para com os pensadores medievais – algumas avaliações elogiosas, algumas críticas duras. Na segunda parte, considero três críticas feitas por Max Fisch ao meu livro Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism. Meu livro apresentou o realismo de Peirce como se fosse de cabo a rabo uma única posição. E eu quero ajustar isso sob a luz dos argumentos de Fisch. Desejo agora distinguir seu realismo escolástico de seu desenvolvimento contínuo do realismo. Para (...) esse fim, ofereço um significado mais preciso e restrito para “realismo escolástico” – grosso modo, um anti-platonismo no qual a natureza comum é encontrada como um elemento nas coisas. Esse significado, penso, permanece constante para Peirce; embora eu concorde com Fisch, em que isso é somente uma parte do desenvolvimento de seu realismo. Na terceira seção, desenvolvo a conexão entre a noção escolástica de potencialidade e os “would-be’s” [seriam] de Peirce. Ainda que suficientemente interessante (para mim), essa não é uma influência que o próprio Peirce reconheça. Também indico ali que Peirce chega a dispensar a noção escolástica de forma, que ele pensa ser uma perversão da posição mais útil (se não vaga) de Aristóteles. (shrink)