No consensus yet exists on how to handle incidental fnd-ings in human subjects research. Yet empirical studies document IFs in a wide range of research studies, where IFs are fndings beyond the aims of the study that are of potential health or reproductive importance to the individual research participant. This paper reports recommendations of a two-year project group funded by NIH to study how to manage IFs in genetic and genomic research, as well as imaging research. We conclude that researchers (...) have an obligation to address the possibility of discovering IFs in their protocol and communications with the IRB, and in their consent forms and communications with research participants. Researchers should establish a pathway for handling IFs and communicate that to the IRB and research participants. We recommend a pathway and categorize IFs into those that must be disclosed to research participants, those that may be disclosed, and those that should not be disclosed. (shrink)

This article presents evidence supporting the claim that ethical reasoning is a skill that can be taught and assessed. We propose a working definition of ethical reasoning as 1) the ability to identify, analyze, and weigh moral aspects of a particular situation, and 2) to make decisions that are informed and warranted by the moral investigation. The evidence consists of a description of an ethical reasoning education program—Ethical Reasoning in Action —designed to increase ethical reasoning skills in a variety of (...) situations and areas of life. ERiA is housed at a public, major comprehensive U.S. university—James Madison University—and assessment of the program focuses on interventions delivered prior to and during orientation for incoming first-year students. Findings indicate that the interventions measurably enhance the ability of undergraduate students to reason ethically. ERiA’s competency-targeted program and positive student learning outcomes offers a promising model for higher education ethics programs seeking to connect classroom learning in ethics to decision-making in everyday life. (shrink)

Sport doping is not a recent phenomenon. Athletes have used many forms of performance enhancements going back to antiquity. Within the sport philosophy literature, sport doping is entangled in a multitude of ethical discourses, some denouncing, and some supporting, doping in sport. Our aim is to use a systematic approach to classify ethical discourses put forward by scholars focused on doping. To take stock of these ethical discourses, and to advance the sport philosophy literature on doping, this paper provides an (...) empirical account of the types of arguments used in the peer-reviewed sport philosophy literature. This empirical account is intended to provide a map of the ethical discourses in circulation, to highlight the most common arguments, and to show where other types of arguments are absent or less well developed. To map the ethical discourses, the authors use an ethical discourse typology from a university-based ethical reasoning program. (shrink)

We provide a positive solution for Post’s Problem for ordinal register machines, and also prove that these machines and ordinal Turing machines compute precisely the same partial functions on ordinals. To do so, we construct ordinal register machine programs which compute the necessary functions. In addition, we show that any set of ordinals solving Post’s Problem must be unbounded in the writable ordinals.

Annals, i. 31. 4: ‘implere ceterorum rudes animos: uenisse tempus quo…’. Implore has been suspected and impellere has been suggested. Andresen says ‘implere… womit, zeigen die folgenden Reden. Curt. x. 1. 28 credulas regis aures implebat’. The passage of Curtius continues not with an accusative and infinitive but with the words dissitnulans causam irae. A better defence is to be seen in Livy, xlv. 31. 6.

Professor W. B. Anderson'S paper ‘Livy and the Lexica’ in C.Q. XXV., 1931, pp. 38–48, prompts me to put together from my notes this further list of words and idioms used by Livy but not recorded in the lexica as Livian. With one or two clearly indicated exceptions, I have included nothing which is given in Lewis and Short, Forcellini-Corradini-Perin or Georges, and I have included nothing in which Mr. Anderson has anticipated me, except that in a few places I (...) have added to the citations he gives; but my citations make no more claim to be exhaustive than his do. I have given within parentheses the authors who are cited by the lexica for a particular word or use, but I have refrained from adding other authorities. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus. Looking behind the self-consciousness of science, he discusses the tense relationship between truth and methodology. In examining the different experiences of truth, he aims to "present the hermeneutic phenomenon in its fullest extent.

It seems worth while giving some account of this MS., because in recent years it has been said to contain certain pieces of the Moralia which it does not, and not to contain others which it does. At the foot of the first page of the text the MS. carries the pontifical shield with the arms of the Medici, and from this it is reasonable to suppose that there was a time when it belonged either to Leo X., who was (...) Pope from 1513 to 1521, or to Clement VII., who was Pope from 1523 to 1534. This being so, 1534 is established as the terminus ante quem of its writing. Towards the end of this century, about 1598, it was acquired by the Spanish Cardinal Saverio de Zelada. In 1801 the Cardinal Archbishop Antonio de Lorenzana bought in Rome a certain number of Greek and Oriental manuscripts which had formerly been in the collection of Cardinal Saverio de Zelada, and placed them in the Chapter Library at Toledo. Included with these was this MS. of the Moralia, which remains there to this day. (shrink)

In developing artificial intelligence (AI), researchers often benchmark against human performance as a measure of progress. Is this kind of comparison possible for moral cognition? Given that human moral judgment often hinges on intangible properties like “intention” which may have no natural analog in artificial agents, it may prove difficult to design a “like‐for‐like” comparison between the moral behavior of artificial and human agents. What would a measure of moral behavior for both humans and AI look like? We unravel the (...) complexity of this question by discussing examples within reinforcement learning and generative AI, and we examine how the puzzle of evaluating artificial agents' moral cognition remains open for further investigation within cognitive science. (shrink)

The attempt to arrive at some consensus on precisely what qualifies a human as a person represents one of the more persistently debated and widely significant issues in modern biomedical ethics. The attribution of personhood has been and continues to be a powerful tool in moral discourse. Biomedical and bioethical debates about personhood seem especially morally significant in late modernity given the recent trends in biomedical technology. Our attempts to formally articulate universally agreed upon criteria for personhood represent some of (...) the last vestiges of the hope that we can achieve substantial moral agreement in an otherwise morally fragmented world. In this essay, we argue that, from the perspective of certain strands of the Christian tradition, all bioethics grounded in attempts to develop formal, objective criteria by which we may designate a given individual a person are misguided. Criteria centering on the possession of reflective mental capacity, moreover, are for Christians especially problematic. We suggest that there are no morally neutral ways of designating personhood. (shrink)

A argumentação desenvolvida no presente artigo se propõe a defender a interpretação austera do construtivismo em Kant das objeções a ela levantadas por Jeremy Schwartz (2017) em seu artigo _Was Kant a ‘Kantian Constructivist’?_. Tendo isso em vista, primeiramente, procede-se à reconstrução da interpretação de Schwartz para a distinção analítico-sintética na esfera prática a partir da caracterização por contradição e à indicação de objeções para sua aceitação. Na sequência, apresenta-se a caracterização de analiticidade por continência e como esta pode ser (...) transposta para o caso dos imperativos sem resultar em conflitos com a interpretação austera do construtivismo. Por fim, delineiam-se considerações quanto à formalidade dos princípios constitutivos da razão prática e seu escopo, chegando à conclusão de que não se pode estabelecer uma identidade entre construtivismo austero e logicismo prático. (shrink)