Part way through Stephen Frears’s film, The Queen , the monarch undergoes an extraordinary, magical experience whilstjourneying into the Scottish landscape that surrounds Balmoral, her grandancestral holiday home. Despite the anxious offers from her estate workersto chauffeur her, she drives alone into the mountains and proceeds to breakdown in the centre of a fast flowing river. While awaiting help a strangeevent occurs: a stag appears magically as if from nowhere and, unable tohide her admiration for the beast, the Queen gently (...) utters the words, ‘Oh!You beauty’ before the animal disappears as mysteriously as it arrived.Framed in a painterly way, and providing a marked punctuation to the urbansettings that have dominated the film so far, this short sequence presents aseries of sumptuous landscape images that elicit a spectator response whichis instinctive and intuitive. When analysed using an aesthetic approach – amethodology one might use for the examination of a painting – anemotional relationship is mobilised between the spectator and the film: asentiment not necessarily available through a narrative reading. (shrink)

Twaalf studies over ethische en wijsgerige vraagstukken van de hoogleraar aan de Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg (1919-1981).

This study was conducted to determine how culture influences the ethical perception of managers. Most studies conducted so far have only stated similarities and differences in ethical perception between cultural or ethnic groups and little attention has been paid towards understanding how cultural values influence the ethnic groups' ethical perception. Moreover, most empirical research in this area has focused on moral judgement, moral decision making and action, with limited empirical work in the area of ethical perception. A total of 22 (...) interviews were conducted and the questionnaire survey yielded 272 managerial responses. Three implications were obtained based on the findings of the study. The first implication is that differences in ethical perception can exist when one culture attributes moral significance to something that another culture does not. The results of the study also suggest that similarities in ethical perception can occur when a situation is viewed as an accepted and institutionalised part of doing business. Finally, the findings of the study also show that the influence of culture on ethical perception varied according to the different types of scenarios. (shrink)

In the scholium to proposition 49 of Part 2 of the Ethics, Spinoza addresses a number of prejudices that tend to obscure the essentially judgmental nature of ideas. One warning is issued against those who do not distinguish accurately between ideas and images, and, for this exact reason, fail to see that every idea, insofar as it is an idea, always involves an affirmation that something is the case. This paper shows that in order to properly understand Spinoza's remarks in (...) this passage, we must redirect attention to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, and more particularly to the objections raised against them by Hobbes. Specifically, I argue for the identification of Hobbes and other likeminded “imagists” as Spinoza's main targets, and not, as is often assumed, Descartes himself or Cartesians in general. My identification not only resolves interpretative confusion surrounding this passage, but it also confirms Spinoza's commitment to a key rationalist assumption: the existence of a mind that can grasp or exhibit natures by clear and distinct perceptions. While both adequate and inadequate ideas are necessitated beliefs or judgments in which we assent to something, virtue consists in being propelled by the intellect. (shrink)

The target article by Locke & Bogin (L&B) focuses on the evolution of language as a communicative tool. They neglect, however, that from infancy onwards humans have the ability to go beyond successful behaviour and to reflect upon language (and other domains of knowledge) as a problem space in its own right. This ability is not found in other species and may well be what makes humans unique.

Nietzsche and Modern Times: A study of Bacon, Descartes and Nietzsche. Laurence Lampert. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 475. 35.00 Nietzsche and Metaphysics. Peter Poellner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 320.

Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction. With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three meanings of the word ?argument?: argument as a reason, argument as a structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange. (...) All three meanings are integral to a complete understanding of human reasoning and cognition. Cognitive psychological research on argumentation has focused mostly on the first and second of these meanings, so we present perspectives on argumentation from outside of cognitive psychology, which focus on the second and third. Specifically, we give anoverview of the methods, goals, and disciplinary backgrounds of research on the production, the analysis, and the evaluation of arguments. Finally, inintroducing the experimental studies included in this special issue, which were conducted by researchers from a range of theoretical backgrounds, weunderline the breadth of argumentation research as well as stress opportunities for mutual awareness and integration. (shrink)

A substantial body of theoretical literature testifies to the evolutionary functions of emotions. Relatively little has been written about their developmental functions. This article discusses the developmental functions of emotions from the perspective of differential emotions theory (DET; Izard, 1977, 1991). According to DET, although all the emotions retain their adaptive and motivational functions across the lifespan, different sets of emotions may become relatively more prominent in the different stages of life as they serve stage-related developmental processes. In the first (...) section, we present a brief overview of relevant aspects of the theory. In the second section, we discuss how emotions play a central role in helping the individual achieve developmental milestones and tasks during four major periods of life: Infancy, toddler through preschool years, middle to late childhood, and adolescence. The underlying thesis of this article is that emotions play a central role in stimulating social cognitive attainments at each stage of development. (shrink)

How should historians speak truth to power--and why does it matter? Why is five hundred years better than five months or five years as a planning horizon? And why is history--especially long-term history--so essential to understanding the multiple pasts which gave rise to our conflicted present? The History Manifesto is a call to arms to historians and everyone interested in the role of history in contemporary society. Leading historians David Armitage and Jo Guldi identify a recent shift back to longer-term (...) narratives, following many decades of increasing specialization, which they argue is vital for the future of historical scholarship and how it is communicated. This provocative and thoughtful book makes an important intervention in the debate about the role of history and the humanities in a digital age. It will provoke discussion among policymakers, activists and entrepreneurs as well as ordinary listeners, viewers, readers, students and teachers. (shrink)

This paper gives an analysis of the Chinese distributivity marker dou 'all', which can occur not only with definite plural NPs but also with NPs whose determiner is a quantifier word such as mei 'every' or dabufen-de 'most'. Besides normal distributive predicates, it can also occur with certain types of collective predicates. The difficulties of giving a compositional interpretation to constructions of these kinds are discussed in detail. I show that we can solve those difficulties if we treat dou as (...) a generalized distributivity marker in the sense of Schwarzschild (1991, 1996), which distributes over the members of a plurality cover. Apart from the above topic, which is more narrowly a semantics topic, this paper also discusses some syntax-semantics interface issues related to the distribution of dou's associates. (shrink)

This book proposes an approach to Eurocentrism as a paradigm of knowledge production and interpretation rooted in the Western narrative of modernity and its racial governmentalities. It contributes to the critique of the contemporary workings of Eurocentrism and racism that have frustrated the struggles for the decolonization of knowledge and continue to shape our understandings of the world order in racially hierarchical terms, by re-centering the West/Europe"--Provided by publisher.

English summary: Until well into the 18th century, the concept of the soul played a major role in the scientific, religious, aesthetic and metaphysical discussion of humanity representing the highest level of existence. In modernity, this concept of the soul has lost its significance. It seems to have been replaced by terms such as subjectivity, personality and individuality. At the same time a symbolic added value which deifies clear description appears to have attached itself to the definition of the soul. (...) These developments and their interpretation are examined by the contributions in this collection. The volume includes contributions from Roderich Barth, Ulrich Barth, Jurgen Brunner, Brigitte Boothe, Jorg Dierken, Dirk Evers, Ferdinand Fellmann, Daniel Fulda, Johannes Hubner, Marco Ivaldo, Malte Dominik Kruger, Martin Kurthen, Rudolf Lang Thaler, Wolfgang Mack, Notger Slenzcka, Florian Steger and Anne Steinmeier. German description: Der Begriff der Seele hatte bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein eine prominente Stellung in naturwissenschaftlichen, religiosen, asthetischen und metaphysischen Erorterungen des Menschlichen als hochster Stufe des Lebendigen. Diese Stellung hat der Seelenbegriff in der Moderne eingebusst. Er scheint von Begriffen wie Subjektivitat, Personalitat und Individualitat abgelost worden zu sein. Gleichwohl scheint der Bezeichnung der Seele ein symbolischer Mehrwert anzuhaften, der sich allerdings einer klaren Fassung entzieht. Diesen Entwicklungen und ihren Deutungen gehen die Beitrage des Sammelbandes nach. Eine Leitfrage ist dabei: Steht die Rede von der Seele fur die prareflexive Selbstgegebenheit der Subjektivitat, wie sie sich vorrangig in der Leiberfahrung und (allenfalls?) nachrangig in der Wissenschaftsreflexion ausdruckt? (shrink)

The embedding and promotion of social change is faced with aparadoxical challenge. In order to mainstream an approach to socialchange such as responsible research and innovation and makeit into a practical reality rather than an abstract ideal, we need tohave conceptual clarity and empirical evidence. But, in order to beable to gather empirical evidence, we have to presuppose that theapproach already exists in practice. This paper proposes a social labmethodology that is suited to deal with this circularity. Themethodology combines the (...) defining features of social labs emergingfrom the literature such as agility and real-world focus withestablished theories and approaches such as action research andexperiential learning. Thereby it enables the parallel investigationand propagation of RRI. The framework thus constructed provides atheoretical embedding of sociallabs and overcomes some of theknown limitations of the constitutive approaches. (shrink)

Die moderne Philosophie steht im Schatten des Skeptizismus: Alle Wissensansprüche scheinen fallibel, alle Theorien nur vorläufig, alle Gewissheiten nur temporär zu sein. In dieser gespannten Situation ist die Versuchung groß, das Wesen des vernünftigen Denkens in der Form zu suchen. Vernunft gilt dann als ein allgemeines Vermögen, das bei wechselnden Inhalten seine kritische Kompetenz bewahrt. Doch solche Formalismen müssen scheitern: Wer Erfahrung nur als «Wahrnehmung» oder «Gehalt» adressiert, übergeht die dynamische und überschreitende Natur alles Erfahrens, ohne die Denken und Wissen (...) nicht zu haben sind. -/- In dieser Studie wird gezeigt, dass der Pragmatismus von Peirce und Dewey als eine Philosophie der Erfahrung gelesen werden muss, die eine effektive Kritik der formalen Vernunft formuliert. Dabei bettet sie diese Philosophie in den weiteren Kontext der philosophischen Diskussion des 20. Jahrhunderts ein, in dem der Logische Empirismus und die postanalytische Philosophie auf die dynamische Natur des Wissens reflektieren. Die Frage nach der Erfahrung, so zeigt sich, ist selbst eine Reflexion auf die geschichtliche Erfahrung einer kontingenten Moderne. (shrink)

John Dewey’s _Experience and Nature _has been considered the fullest expression of his mature philosophy since its eagerly awaited publication in 1925._ _Irwin Edman wrote at that time that “with monumental care, detail and completeness, Professor Dewey has in this volume revealed the metaphysical heart that beats its unvarying alert tempo through all his writings, whatever their explicit themes.” In his introduction to this volume, Sidney Hook points out that “Dewey’s _Experience and Nature _is both the most suggestive and most (...) difficult of his writings.” The meticulously edited text published here as the first vol­ume in the series The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953_ _spans that entire period in Dewey’s thought by including two important and previously unpublished documents from the book’s history: Dewey’s unfinished new introduction written between 1947_ _and 1949,_ _edited by the late Joseph Ratner, and Dewey’s unedited final draft of that introduction written the year before his death. In the intervening years Dewey realized the impossibility of making his use of the word “experience” understood. He wrote in his 1951_ _draft for a new introduction: “Were I to write _Experience and Nature _today I would entitle the book _Culture and Nature _and the treatment of specific subject-matters would be correspondingly modified. I would abandon the term ‘experience’ because of my growing realiza­tion that the historical obstacles which prevented understand­ing of my use of ‘experience’ are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable. I would substitute the term ‘culture’ because with its meanings as now firmly established it can fully and freely carry my philosophy of experience.”. (shrink)

This book explores solving the problem of complexity for science in the 21st century.