Pt. I. The apparent good. Evaluative cognition -- Perceiving the good -- Phantasia and the apparent good -- pt. II. The apparent good and non-rational motivation. Passions and the apparent good -- Akrasia and the apparent good -- pt. III. The apparent good and rational motivation. Phantasia and deliberation -- Happiness, virtue, and the apparent good -- Practical induction -- Conclusion : Aristotle's practical empiricism.

Is there a need for a distinctively diachronic conception of metaphysical emergence? Here I argue to the contrary. In the main, my strategy consists in considering a representative sample of accounts of purportedly diachronic metaphysical emergence, and arguing that in each case, the purportedly diachronic emergence at issue either can (and should) be subsumed under a broadly synchronic account of metaphysical emergence, or else is better seen as simply a case of causation. In addition, I consider and argue against the (...) suggestion that 'in-principle unpredictability' accounts of diachronic emergence support there being distinctively diachronic metaphysical emergence. (shrink)

Plato's Epistemology presents an original interpretation of one of the central topics in Plato's work: epistemology. Moss argues, against the grain of much modern scholarship, that Plato's epistemology is radically different from our own.

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

While many people today might turn to ancient Sanskrit philosophers for meditation or yoga, probably few would turn to them for help with difficult contemporary problems, such as what counts as "fake news" or navigating Internet debates. Philosopher Malcolm Keating argues that, in fact, a group of premodern Indian philosophers known as "Nyāya" have important things to say about how we can distinguish truth from falsity and reason well together, both of which are crucial to living a good life. (...) -/- In Reason in an Uncertain World, Keating teaches us what's distinctive in Nyāya approaches to knowledge and discussion, explaining these ideas in relationship to ordinary examples readers can understand. What are the limits of our reasoning? What counts as good evidence for our beliefs? How do we know if someone is a trustworthy source of information? What do we do when we are gripped by doubt? When is a debate with someone worth our time, and how can we discuss contentious topics? The answers to these questions are as relevant today as they were in ancient India. There, they were the focus of Nyāya philosophy, one of the most influential traditions of Indian philosophy, which few outside of scholarly communities have heard of. (shrink)

did plato and aristotle have anything to say about belief? The answer to this question might seem blindingly obvious: of course they did. Plato distinguishes belief from knowledge in the Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the Posterior Analytics. Plato distinguishes belief from perception in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the De anima. They talk about the distinction between true and false beliefs, and the ways in which belief can mislead and the ways in which (...) it can steer us aright. Indeed, they make belief a central component of their epistemologies.The view underlying these claims—one so widespread these days as to remain largely unquestioned—is that when Plato and Aristotle talk... (shrink)

MacIntyre’s theory of practices, institutions, and their respective kinds of goods, has revived and enriched the ethical critique of market economies, and his view of politics as centrally concerned with common goods and human flourishing presents a major challenge to neutralist liberal theorists’ attempts to exclude distinctively ethical considerations from political deliberation. However, the rejection of neutrality does not entail the rejection of liberalism tout court: questions of human flourishing may be accorded a legitimate role in political decisions-including those about (...) economic systems - provided that the powers of the state remain subject to certain recognizably liberal constraints. Further, although neutralist liberals often defend market economies on the mistaken grounds that they alone are consistent with the principle of ethical neutrality, a non-neutralist defence of them should not be ruled out, especially if the substantive theory of goods used to evaluate them is somewhat less restrictive than MacIntyre’s. (shrink)

The second edition of this volume is a comprehensive, practical and up-to-date analysis of the principles and rules of construction and post-probate issues, including how the courts interpret wills once they become the subject of litigation. This comprehensive work takes account of all recent case law-as well as new legislation such as the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009-pertaining to trustees, trusts, trusts of land, and the amendments of the Rules of the Superior Courts by SI No 254 of (...) 2016 relating to the conduct of trials, and SI No 255 of 2016 which deals with pre-trial procedures. Part 1 provides the principles and rules of construction, and the rules of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, which are applied by the courts when attempting to ascertain and give effect to a testator's intention from vague or uncertain language used by him or her in creating gifts. Part 2 deals with issues that may arise in construction suits concerning, not only uncertain language used in the creation of gifts, but also the actual legal validity of such gifts. Part 3 supplies a useful constructive and interpretative methodology that may be applied for construing and interpreting relevant statutory provisions. Part 4 deals with the forms and procedures required for instituting construction suits, and with issues involving the award of costs. This book is written primarily with legal practitioners in mind and will be of practical use in construction and probate litigation matters. It will also be a useful resource for academic lawyers, students engaged in professional courses, and those undertaking law degrees. [Subject: Wills & Trusts, Irish Law]. (shrink)

The place of play in the education of young children has been the focus of much interest in the past. But the findings from this research project demonstrate that there remains a significant amount of confusion about the role that play has in young children's education. In particular we found that there is a clear distinction between the rhetoric and reality of play in the reception class. Further, there was evidence of real anguish for some early years workers who were (...) failing to offer the play activities that they knew should be provided. These findings are particularly interesting at present, since the debate on the role of play has once again emerged as fundamental in the attempt to define a curriculum appropriate to the needs of the 3-6 year olds who, from the year 2000, will be required to work within the highly contentious Foundation Stage of the National Curriculum. (shrink)

According to a number of contemporary theorists, aesthetic reasons can invite or entice us but never compel us. In this paper, I develop a Kantian account of the normative force of aesthetic reasons. While Kant would likely agree that aesthetic reasons do not give rise to obligations, his account nevertheless gives us the resources for explaining how aesthetic reasons can still have more force than merely enticing reasons. This account appeals to the distinct normativity of aesthetic judgments on Kant's theory (...) and the way in which this kind of normativity structures aesthetic exchanges with other judging subjects. I argue that, in addition to the moral reasons we have for appreciating and preserving beauty, Kant’s account can accommodate distinctly aesthetic reasons for doing so that stem from our membership in aesthetic communities. (shrink)

I argue that the best explanation of the multiplicity of available frameworks for treating any given philosophical topic is that philosophy currently (though not insuperably) lacks fixed standards; I then go on to identify three barriers to philosophical progress associated with our present epistemic situation. First is that the lack of fixed standards encourages what I call “intra‐disciplinary siloing,” and associated dialectical and argumentative failings; second is that the lack of fixed standards makes room for sociological factors (including elite influence (...) and disciplinary inertia) to be determinative of which philosophical frameworks are embraced; third is that the lack of fixed standards encourages (implicit and/or explicit) bias. I close by offering some suggestions about how to move beyond these barriers, even in the absence of fixed standards. (shrink)

Should perfectionist ideals of meaningful work play a significant part in the design of economic systems? In an influential article (Meaningful Work and Market Socialism), Richard Arneson rejected this traditional socialist view. Instead, he maintained, it should be left to the market, as a system that is consistent with the principle of neutrality, to determine the extent to which such work is available, and socialists should restrict their normative concerns primarily to issues of distributive justice. Against this it is argued (...) here that market economies appear to be neutral only if understood in neo-classical, rather than institutionalist terms. From the latter perspective, market economies can be shown to take a number of institutionally distinct forms, which differ significantly in how far they favour the satisfaction of preferences for meaningful work. Collective choices between these alternative systems should take account of these differences, and the adoption of market economies does not avoid the need for perfectionist judgments in politics. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays written by Bob Hale (three co-authored), with a critical introduction from Kit Fine. They comprise Hale’s final years of work, adding to and extending beyond his landmark monograph Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (OUP, 2013, 2nd edition 2015). The essays develop and consolidate several key themes in Hale’s work, most notably the notion of definition, especially as it extends beyond definition of a word to definition of (...) a thing more generally, and its relations to essence and existence; how the recently influential notion of truthmaking relates to and illuminates some of these issues; and ontological questions connected with Hale’s metaphysical commitments on the one hand, and his commitments in the foundations of mathematics on the other. Several of the essays engage with and respond to work by Kit Fine, and contributions to Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale (OUP 2018). As such, these essays also demonstrate a rich and fruitful philosophical dialogue between Hale and his critics and friends. (shrink)

What are rules? -- Why are rules important? -- Rules for the classroom -- Rules at school -- Rules in the community -- Follow the law! -- Rules and laws must be fair -- All together now -- It's good to have rules.

In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a veridical cognition (in an event of knowing). For just about all Indian thinkers, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the foundational pramāṇas, although they debated energetically over how to characterize the content of the resultant cognitions and how to explain the basis for the authority of these pramāṇas. Debate also includes the relationship of knowledge to religious liberation, the role of scripture in knowing, and (...) the possibility of omniscience. (shrink)

As Axel Honneth has recently noted, the critical concerns of social philosophers during the past three decades have been focused primarily on questions of justice, with ethical issues about the human good being largely excluded. In the first section I briefly explore this exclusion in both ‘Anglo-American’ political philosophy and ‘German’ critical theory. I then argue, in the main sections, that despite this commitment to their exclusion, distinctively ethical concepts and ideals can be identified both in Rawls’s Theory of Justice (...) and in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, taking these as exemplary, representative texts for each theoretical school. These ethical elements, and their implications for the critical evaluation of economic institutions, have gone largely unnoticed. In the final section I indicate the kinds of debates that might be generated, were these to be given the attention they arguably deserve. I focus especially on the significance of empirical issues, and hence on the role of social science in social criticism. (shrink)

Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" - supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability - is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory,for on the usual understandings of causal power bestowal, it is trivially (...) satisfied or falsified. I offer a revision of CCP which incorporates the evident fact that causal powers are grounded in fundamental forces. (shrink)

Here I compare two accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI): first, the 'meta-level' approach described by Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron in the companion to this paper, on which every state of affairs (SOA) is itself precise/determinate, and MI is a matter of its being indeterminate which determinate SOA obtains; second, my preferred 'object-level' determinable-based approach, on which MI is a matter of its being determinate---or just plain true---that an indeterminate SOA obtains, where an indeterminate SOA is one whose constitutive object (...) has a determinable property, but no unique determinate of that determinable. In S1, I first note an important difference between our accounts, concerning whether MI is taken to induce propositional indeterminacy; in S2, I highlight and defend certain advantages of my account; in S3, I address certain of Barnes and Cameron's objections to my account. (shrink)

O povo Kaingang é o mais populoso do Sul do Brasil e está entre os mais numerosos povos indígenas do país. Neste trabalho faz-se uma relação entre as informações encontradas na literatura e a atualidade na Terra Indígena Kaingang em relação ao conhecimento que possuem sobre o uso de plantas para a cura de doenças e como interpretam a ação da erva no organismo. Para isto, realizou-se uma pesquisa de campo em uma Terra Indígena Kaingang no Paraná, cujo entrevistas forneceram (...) confirmações históricas em relação aos etnoconhecimentos da etnia, da evolução dos aspectos químicos e das atitudes perante a química e os remédios de origem farmacêutica e natural. (shrink)

de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion (...) of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, arguing that its account of akrasia as involving ignorance is compatible with, and in fact crucially supplements, the more straightforward account we find elsewhere in the corpus of akrasia as a struggle between desires. (shrink)

Applied naturalism -- Natural rights -- Applied positivism -- A concept of interpretive methodology -- Application of principles of public policy -- Interpretative sources of law -- The formulation of legal principles -- The formulation and application of principles of interpretative construction -- The formulation and application of principles of constructive interpretation -- Application of appropriate equitable principles -- The formulation and application of determinant legal tests and criteria by the courts -- The practical adoption of the jurisprudential process of (...) conceptualisation -- Legal factors and formulae determining correct motion procedures -- The usefulness of templates and principles in maintaining integrity of law in legal practice. (shrink)

The null morpheme POS -- The null morpheme EVAL -- Implicature : a brief review -- Evaluativity as implicature -- Extensions of the evaluativity implicature.

Arneson says that he disagrees both with the main claims of Arneson (1987) and with my criticisms of these in Keat (2009). What is arguably the most important of the former disagreements is left until the final paragraphs, where he declares that he (now) rejects the principle of state neutrality and that we are comrades in believing that good perfectionist arguments for the promotion of meaningful work can be constructed (and may legitimately provide a basis for state action). I am (...) more than happy to be counted a comrade in this respect. But otherwise I disagree with much of what he says in his response: I not only continue to support the criticisms I made in Keat (2009), but also disagree with another of Arneson’s main criticisms of Arneson (1987). So I shall both defend myself from his objections, and defend Arneson from his own. (shrink)

Drawing on the moving story of the last year of the life of her own treasured dog, Ody, she presents an in-depth exploration of the practical, medical, and moral issues that trouble pet owners confronted with the decline and death of their ...

This is a comprehensive discussion of determinables, determinates, and their relation ('determination', for short), covering the historical development of these notions, the theoretical options for understanding them, and certain of their contemporary applications.

Contemporary Bioethics: A Reader with Cases is the most cutting-edge bioethics anthology/casebook available. Incorporating introductions, readings, and cases that span the breadth of the discipline, this exceptional volume captures the spirit of bioethics as a rich, exciting, and continuously evolving field. Addressing all of the essential topics--including abortion, reproductive ethics, end-of-life care, research ethics, and the allocation of resources--it also moves beyond the "classic" approach of other books by extending into timely and provocative issues like terrorism, cosmetic surgery, immigration, genetic (...) manipulations, links between first- and third-world health, and--unique to this book--environmental sustainability and climate change. In addition, Contemporary Bioethics is the only book of its kind that includes both philosophical and religious perspectives.The text opens with a substantial introduction that presents key ethical principles, theories, and methods and shows students how to use these tools to frame and address ethical dilemmas in medicine. Covering the brief yet captivating history of the field, the introduction also considers the role of religion in the development of bioethics and examines differences between secular and religious modes of argumentation. Each of the seven topical chapters contains an in-depth introduction, a selection of concise readings representing a diverse range of moral perspectives, discussion questions, and a collection of full-length and provocative case studies that enable students to further explore the issues.Ideal for introductory courses in bioethics and biomedical ethics, Contemporary Bioethics is supplemented by a Instructor's Manual on CD and a Companion Website containing resources for both students and professors, including chapter summaries, additional cases with discussion questions, ideas for further reading, vocabulary flashcards, self-quizzes, and more. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editor’s NoteJessica HeybachThis issue of education and culture offers readers theoretical in-sights and clarifications to social dilemmas as well as the concerns of the classroom. The authors contained in this issue take up questions of political literacy, moral judgment, the mathematics curriculum and classroom, and the social studies curriculum and classroom. If I had to offer a throughline within these articles, it is the pragmatist conception of judgment that (...) should be cultivated through social relations and classroom practices. These authors are concerned with citizens’ capacity for intelligent judgment within communities and society at large. Pushing back against prevailing logics, these authors offer corrective arguments by positioning Dewey’s thought and pragmatism in contrast to the current logics operating in classrooms and society.Charles Lowery takes up the consequences of modern society’s “conflation of an associated way of living with government, and government with politics, and politics with partisanship” on conceptions of community in his article, “The Role of Education in The Public and Its Problems: A Deweyan Perspective on Political Literacy.” Building on key authors that have previously advanced this line of inquiry central to Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems, Lowery attends to how contemporary education and the development of a politically literate citizenry through democratic habits rather than knowledge accumulation should be centered as the central task of schooling. Lowery highlights current obstacles to cultivating political literacy in the schools such as dogma, disinformation, divisiveness, and de-democratization, and concludes by underscoring the work of school leaders as central to the task of political literacy.Davin Carr-Chellman puts forth a provocative argument which attends to the consequences of instrumental rationality and identity thinking on moral judgment in his article, “Education for Moral Judgment: Situational Creativity and Dewey’s Aesthetics.” Drawing from critical theory, Carr-Chellman emphasizes how dehumanization, moral indifference, and alienation are byproducts of instrumental rationality, measurability, and identity thinking. He then engages Dewey’s aesthetics and Joas’s concept of situational creativity as possible resources to reconstruct human experience and renew the human capacity for moral judgment. According to Carr-Chellman, small acts of creativity and relationship-building become essential to resisting human relations that have become “abstract, impersonal, vague, and competitive.” Thus, an education for moral judgment must humanize through authentic relationships and meaning-making learning opportunities that resist the alienation now culturally rampant. [End Page 1]Marshall Gordon argues that mathematics curriculum and classroom should be understood as a site for developing habits of mind that foster democracy in his article, “Teaching Mathematics with Democracy in Mind.” Gordon elaborates on the problematic persistence of abstracted, procedural mathematics which valorizes memorization and calls for mathematics to capitalize on the unrealized democratic potentials in the mathematics classroom. Drawing on Dewey’s claim in Democracy and Education that “Education is not an affair of ‘telling’ and being told, but an active and constructive process,” Gordon describes a mathematics for democracy. Gordon describes mathematics as a powerful force in the development of students’ reflective intelligence and their capacity for problem-solving by problem-clarifying strategies rather than problem-solving procedures (for example, “take things apart, make the problem simpler, reason by analogy, and tinker”) and collaboration through “multiple-centers” which capitalizes on shared-interest investigations.Dave Powell explores the relationship between inquiry and Dewey’s pragmatic epistemology to advance democratic citizenship education in the social studies classroom in his article, “Has Anybody Here Seen My Old Friend John? Making the Case for a More Pragmatic Social Studies.” In particular, Powell attends to educators’ stance on truth and how “reframing their epistemological orientations” opens up possibilities for different future actions. He begins by describing how pragmatist thinking and Dewey’s philosophical commitments of child-centeredness could shape conceptions of inquiry and allow a reflective practitioner to ask different kinds of questions associated with social studies. Through a rich discussion of what Deweyan thought makes possible in social studies, Powell advances the promise of a citizenry able to think pragmatically in a democracy. He argues that social studies can reject fixed notions of truth, foster trust among students as they exchange ideas, reject opportunities for reverse indoctrination, and cultivate intelligence, as practical... (shrink)

A core principle of modern science holds that a scientific explanation must not attribute will or agency to natural phenomena.The Restless Clock examines the origins and history of this, in particular as it applies to the science of living things. This is also the story of a tradition of radicals—dissenters who embraced the opposite view, that agency is an essential and ineradicable part of nature. Beginning with the church and courtly automata of early modern Europe, Jessica Riskin guides us (...) through our thinking about the extent to which animals might be understood as mere machines. We encounter fantastic robots and cyborgs as well as a cast of scientific and philosophical luminaries, including Descartes and Leibnitz, Lamarck and Darwin, whose ideas gain new relevance in Riskin's hands. The book ends with a riveting discussion of how the dialectic continues in genetics, epigenetics, and evolutionary biology, where work continues to naturalize different forms of agency.The Restless Clock reveals the deeply buried roots of current debates in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles (...) versus ‘commons’, including being. But underlying these ontological distinctions is a psychological one: the lower mental states are confined to their lower objects because they are passive; the higher mental states have access to higher objects because they result from questioning appearances and making active affirmations about how things are. This doctrine of doxa anticipates both the Hellenistic one and modern accounts of belief as ‘aiming at truth’; it also shows Plato's views of doxa to have more in their favour philosophically and to cohere better with one another than generally thought. (shrink)

Two studies tested whether observers could differentiate between two facets of pride—authentic and hubristic—on the basis of a single prototypical pride nonverbal expression combined with relevant contextual information. In Study 1, participants viewed targets displaying posed pride expressions in response to success, while causal attributions for the success (target's effort vs. ability) and the source of this information (target vs. omniscient narrator conveying objective fact) were varied. Study 2 used a similar method, but attribution information came from both the target (...) and an omniscient narrator; the congruence of these attributions was varied. Across studies, participants tended to label expressions as authentic pride, but were relatively more likely to label them as hubristic pride when (a) contextual information indicated that targets were arrogant and (b) no mitigating information about the target's potential value as a hard-working group member (i.e., that success was actually due to effort) was presented. (shrink)

In December 2019, President Trump pardoned Eddie Gallagher, a Navy Seal convicted of war crimes committed while serving in Iraq in 2017. Did Gallagher commit these crimes because he is a bad person, or were his actions the result of situational factors, such as stress and fatigue? These different explanations of Gallagher’s crimes reflect two ways of thinking about the causes of war crimes and how to prevent them: character-based views and situationist accounts. Character-based views attribute war crimes to failures (...) of individual military personnel to live up to military virtues, whereas situationist accounts focus on external factors (such as battlefield stress) as the primary cause of war crimes. While both situationist and character accounts highlight important aspects of the causes of war crimes, in this article I argue that they do not account for the fact that war crimes can (and have) come to be seen as compatible with military virtues. By not acknowledging this fact, these accounts of war crimes fail to address the fact that some of the most egregious war crimes occurred not because military personnel failed to embody the military virtues of their institution, but because they embodied them all too well. (shrink)

Prepare for practice with the essential text dedicated to Canadian legal and ethical issues! Focused solely on the ever-changing, and often complex health care landscape in Canada, Ethical & Legal Issues in Canadian Nursing 4th, Edition expertly covers the often intertwined ethical and legal issues that health care professionals face today. This fourth edition includes discussion points at the end of every chapter along with tables and illustrations to help you fully comprehend the material. Plus, the clear and straightforward writing (...) style presents information just as you will encounter it in your day-to-day practice, ensuring you're even more prepared to make an impact from the start! -- From the publisher. (shrink)

The debate about the ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence dates from the 1960s :741–742, 1960; Wiener in Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine, MIT Press, New York, 1961). However, in recent years symbolic AI has been complemented and sometimes replaced by Neural Networks and Machine Learning techniques. This has vastly increased its potential utility and impact on society, with the consequence that the ethical debate has gone mainstream. Such a debate has primarily focused on principles—the (...) ‘what’ of AI ethics —rather than on practices, the ‘how.’ Awareness of the potential issues is increasing at a fast rate, but the AI community’s ability to take action to mitigate the associated risks is still at its infancy. Our intention in presenting this research is to contribute to closing the gap between principles and practices by constructing a typology that may help practically-minded developers apply ethics at each stage of the Machine Learning development pipeline, and to signal to researchers where further work is needed. The focus is exclusively on Machine Learning, but it is hoped that the results of this research may be easily applicable to other branches of AI. The article outlines the research method for creating this typology, the initial findings, and provides a summary of future research needs. (shrink)