The present study aimed to translate and identify the psychometric properties of the Behavioral Emotion Regulation Questionnaire in 315 university students from Lima, Peru, aged 16 to 44 years. The BERQ and the Multicultural Inventory of Trait State Depression were administered for the assessment. Evidence of internal structure validity was obtained through confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory structural equation modeling, while evidence of validity in relation to other variables was obtained through linear regression analysis. The results indicate that the pentafactorial (...) structure is replicated in the Peruvian sample; that adaptive strategies significantly predict eutres, and that maladaptive strategies predict distress; in addition, reliability values were acceptable. At the end, theoretical and practical aspects of the findings and the importance of continuing to provide evidence for its use in different populations and contexts are discussed, taking into account that this is the first time that a Spanish version of the BERQ has been analyzed. (shrink)

In the seven chapters constituting Khedrup Jé's presentation of mind and awareness, he primarily explains the full range of objects, including all phenomena that can be known, and object possessors, things that engage objects, such as consciousness and persons. In the first chapter, Khedrup Jé starts by explaining objects of knowledge. Chapter 2 gives an explanation of various non-valid awarenesses. Chapter 3 explains what it means to be a valid cognizer and divides valid cognizers into various categories. In chapter 4, (...) the first division, valid direct perceivers, is discussed. Chapter 4 further defines the four main categories of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceivers. In chapter 5, Khedrup Jé gives a brilliant elucidation of this essential teachings of the Buddha. The realizations of the path, explained in chapter 6, are results of valid cognizers. Direct realization of selflessness can only come about by having realized it in a conceptual manner-that is, by generating a valid inference realizing selflessness-first. How to generate this kind of inference is precisely explained in chapter 7. In order to give readers some sense of the two main authors involved here, Khedrup Jé Gelek Palsang and Purbu Chok Jampa Gyatso, whom we mainly rely on for additional explanations, brief biographies of these two eminent Buddhist scholars are given at the close of this introduction. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1, Ahead of Print.

One of the most pressing issues in contemporary semantics is whether propositions are structured entities that should be individuated in terms of their components or, contrarily, they lack structure and should be individuated in terms of their inferential relations. Another one is whether propositions should always contain all the information that is needed to deem them true or false—whether they should always be Fregean propositions. The latter debate might seem to presuppose a certain position in the former. However, it is (...) the first aim of this paper to argue that the two debates are orthogonal. Moreover, we will use Frege’s thoughts as an example of what we would contemporarily call ‘propositions’ that, though trivially Fregean, lack structure. Since it is not uncontroversial that Frege’s thoughts are unstructured, it is the second aim of this paper to show that it follows from Frege’s writings that they are. (shrink)

BackgroundScientific literature on posttraumatic growth after terrorist attacks has primarily focused on persons who had not been directly exposed to terrorist attacks or persons who had been directly exposed to them, but who were assessed few months or years after the attacks.MethodsWe examined long-term PTG in 210 adults directly exposed to terrorist attacks in Spain a mean of 29.6 years after the attacks. The participants had been injured by a terrorist attack or were first-degree relatives of people who had been (...) killed or injured by a terrorist attack. They completed diagnostic measures of emotional disorders and measures of PTSD and depression symptomatology, optimism, and PTG.ResultsMultiple regression analyses revealed gender differences and a positive linear relationship between PTG and cumulative trauma after the terrorist attack. Some PTG dimensions were significantly associated with PTSD symptomatology, these associations being linear, not curvilinear. However, PTG was not associated with depression symptomatology, diagnosis of emotional disorders, age, elapsed time since the attack, or optimism. In comparison with survivors assessed 18 years after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Spanish victims of terrorism showed higher levels of appreciation of life, but lower levels of relating to others and spiritual change.ConclusionThe findings underscore the influence of gender on PTG and provide support to the hypothesis that some emotional distress may be a necessary condition of PTG. Future studies on PTG after terrorist attacks should take into consideration the characteristics of the terrorist attack itself and the contexts of violence and threat in which it occurred. The political, social, and cultural characteristics of the community affected by it and the profile and characteristics of other traumatic events suffered after the attack should also be taken into account in further research. (shrink)

Based on his Inclosure Schema and the Principle of Uniform Solution (PUS), Priest has argued that Curry’s paradox belongs to a different family of paradoxes than the Liar. Pleitz (2015, The Logica Yearbook 2014, pp. 233–248) argued that Curry’s paradox shares the same structure as the other paradoxes and proposed a scheme of which the Inclosure Schema is a particular case and he criticizes Priest’s position by pointing out that applying the PUS implies the use of a paraconsistent logic that (...) does not validate Contraction, but that this can hardly seen as uniform. In this paper, we will develop some further reasons to defend Pleitz’ thesis that Curry’s paradox belongs to the same family as the rest of the self-referential paradoxes & using the idea that conditionals are generalized negations. However, we will not follow Pleitz in considering doubtful that there is a uniform solution for the paradoxes in a paraconsistent spirit. We will argue that the paraconsistent strategies can be seen as special cases of the strategy of restricting Detachment and that the latter uniformly blocks all the connective-involving self-referential paradoxes, including Curry’s. (shrink)

Sandra Harding’s Objectivity and Diversity deals with the epistemic and political limitations of a conception of scientific objectivity that, according to the author, is still in force in our societies. However, in this conception of objectivity, diversity (e.g., of individuals and communities of knowledge, but also, and especially, agendas, models of participation and even styles of reasoning in decision making) still plays a limited and undeserved role.

Quoting Flaubert through time, Mieke Bal and Michelle Williams Gamaker’s Madame B brings Madame Bovary’s reflections on love and emotions to the present day, in a productive anachronism. Their work produces an intertemporal space where the past is relevant for the present, and the present enables us to understand the past. Intimacy and routine are central in their exploration of Flaubert’s contemporaneity. Those issues are precisely one of the keys in Karl Ove Knausgård’s project of literary autobiography, where he expands (...) narration foreclosing the ellipsis and giving visibility to small things and emotions; a project with some resonances with Munch’s crude-obscene uses of intimacy. This essay explores how both proposals, Bal and Williams Gamaker in film, and Knausgård in literature, can serve us to connect present and past sensibilities and, more than that, demonstrate resistances to the hegemonic discourses of temporality. (shrink)

Jeffrey conditioning allows updating in Bayesian style when the evidence is uncertain. A weighted average, essentially, over classically updating on the alternatives. Unlike classical Bayesian conditioning, this allows learning to be unlearned.

According to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. (shrink)

A popular accusation against moral relativism is that it goes too far in its vindication of tolerance. The idea behind accusations like this can be summarized in the slogan, frequently attributed to relativism, that “anything goes”. The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it is an “anything goes” view; from the accusation that it forces us to suspend our judgment in cases in which we do not think we should even be allowed to. (...) In the end, relativism is not an “anything goes” view because it is not a view about what goes, but about the way things go—about what goes on when we say that something is morally right or wrong. There is indeed a view, sometimes called “relativism”, that forces us to suspend our judgment about practices that do not allow for such comfort, but it is not so much moral relativism as moral contextualism. Apparently, though, the most salient alternative to “anything goes” views such as contextualism is not moral relativism. It is moral objectivism, according to which there is a fact of the matter about moral issues. However, I show that moral objectivism too ends up being an “anything goes” view unless the objectivist takes herself to be endowed with “God’s point of view”, which I prove troublesome. (shrink)

In the city of Elche, every year, on the 14th and 15th of August, a sacred musical play about the death, the Assumption and the Coronation of the Virgin Mary is held. This event, known as the “Misterio de Elche”, is unique in the world. Since the middle of the 15th century it has been performed in the Basilica of Santa Maria and in the streets of the ancient city of Elche, located in the Valencian Community. In this work, classified (...) as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, the interior of the temple is transformed into 2 main stages, the scaffold, located in the lower part, and the aerial stage, located in the dome at a height of 27 m. The structure and the traction mechanisms located on the aerial stage allow the aerial devices that take part in the play, “El Araceli”, “La Mangrana” and “La Santísima Trinidad”, to be raised and lowered. It should be noted that between 2 and 5 singing actors are embarked on these devices. This article describes the main characteristics of the aerial stage structure, the 3 apparatus and the mechanical systems used. In addition, the age and modifications of “El Araceli” are analysed, as well as the results of a non-destructive test carried out on this device. (shrink)

« Je t’aime moi non plus », le titre de la fameuse chanson de Gainsbourg reflète de manière exquise ce que la vie a de beau et d’amer à la fois. A défaut de traiter d’amour, cet ouvrage analyse les méandres de l’aide à sens unique. L’altruisme, ce comportement de don sans attente de retour de service, est abordé ici de manière scientifique et philosophique plutôt que poétique et littéraire. Un objectif est d’en traquer les mécanismes sous-jacents, ceux qui échappent (...) à tout romantisme et se traduisent souvent en calculs de coûts et bénéfices. Il s’agit également d’approfondir les diverses manières de comprendre et de pratiquer l’altruisme. Souvent considéré comme une des plus grandes vertus humaines, l’objet de nombreux écrits philosophiques et psychologiques, l’altruisme peut-il se trouver chez les abeilles et les marmottes ? Posez la question à un biologiste de l’évolution et il vous répondra « Mais oui, évidemment ! ». A première vue, une telle réponse est consternante mais nous verrons qu’à y regarder de plus près, les philosophes et les biologistes ne parlent pas exactement de la même chose en utilisant le même terme. L’hétérogénéité des disciplines intéressées à l’altruisme et des contextes théoriques dans lesquels il est utilisé en ont fait une notion extrêmement complexe et difficile à saisir. Au sein des différentes sciences sociales et du vivant, l’altruisme est un élément pivot dans trois débats dont cet ouvrage prend le temps de retracer les contours. Tantôt, l’altruisme se profile en danger (apparent) pour la théorie de l’évolution darwinienne (chap. 1), tantôt, il sert de cheval de bataille dans la croisade contre l’idéal de l’homo economicus si souvent prôné en économie (chap. 2 et 3), tantôt il est une énigme à découvrir dans les méandres de nos motivations intimes (chap. 3). Dans le cadre de ces différents débats, la notion d’altruisme prend des significations sensiblement différentes. Pour en rendre compte, l’ensemble de l’ouvrage s’articule autour d’une triple distinction fondamentale : l’altruisme peut être compris au sens biologique, comportemental ou psychologique. Chacune de ces notions est utilisée dans un contexte spécifique au sein de sciences qui ont leurs propres traditions et leurs propres débats internes. La structure de l’ouvrage est organisée en fonction de cette triple distinction. Le premier chapitre est consacré à l’altruisme biologique, définit en termes de valeur de survie et de reproduction (fitness) : un comportement est altruiste s’il a pour effet d’augmenter la fitness d’autrui aux dépens de sa propre fitness. L’observation de comportements altruistes au sein du monde animal a posé un des plus grands défis à la théorie de l’évolution depuis la publication de l’Origine des espèces. Des générations de biologistes se sont attelés à la tâche d’expliquer comment un comportement qui augmente la fitness biologique d’autres organismes aux dépends de la fitness de l’agent a pu être sélectionnée au fil de l’évolution. Nous verrons que c’est grâce aux travaux de William Hamilton et d’autres que cette difficulté a pu être résolue. Le deuxième chapitre retrace les attaques d’une frange d’économistes (supportés dans leur effort critique par des théoriciens des jeux et anthropologues évolutionnistes), contre le modèle classique de l’homo economicus. Leur objectif est de montrer que des personnes ordinaires ne se comportement souvent pas en maximisateurs rationnels de leurs gains propres, comme le prédirait la théorie économique néo-classique. Dans le cadre de ce débat, c’est du comportement social spécifiquement humain et plus particulièrement de l’altruisme humain dont il est question. Le terme d’altruisme est alors utilisé dans un sens plus lâche que ne le font les biologistes ; ce que l’on appellera l’altruisme comportemental comprend les actions coûteuses pour l’agent et avantageuses pour autrui. La particularité humaine fournira également l’occasion de traiter la délicate question des rapports entre l’évolution génétique et la culture. Nous verrons que l’étude du comportement animal fournit les premiers éléments d’explication de l’altruisme humain, mais ce dernier ne peut être pleinement compris qu’au terme d’une analyse qui tient compte des capacités qui nous sont propres. Cette analyse nous permettra de saisir pourquoi les êtes humains sont à la fois plus sociaux et plus opportunistes (la contradiction n’est qu’apparente) que les autres espèces animales. Malgré leurs différences, les versions biologique et comportementale de l’altruisme sont très proches au sens où elles traitent des conséquences de comportements. Ces notions ne reflètent qu’imparfaitement la conception ordinaire que nous nous faisons de l’altruisme. L’altruisme tel qu’il est utilisé dans le langage courant correspond davantage à l’image que s’en font les philosophes et les psychologues. Pour déceler les actions altruistes, ces derniers se demandent généralement si elles ont été causées par un motif dirigé vers le bien d’autrui. En ce sens, on parle d’altruisme psychologique qui réfère aux causes plutôt qu’aux effets des actions d’aide. Le troisième chapitre est consacré aux débats qui font rage autour de la question de savoir si les êtres humains sont capables d’agir de manière altruiste psychologique, c’est-à-dire en fonction de motifs exclusivement dirigés vers le bien-être d’autrui. Nous verrons à quel point cette tâche est ardue à moins d’accepter de reformuler la question en termes de motivation primaire à l’action. Au terme de l’analyse, il apparaitra que les trois notions d’altruisme se croisent sans se recouper dans un enchevêtrement de liens plus ou moins complexes. Nous verrons par exemple que l’altruisme biologique (voire comportemental) pourrait bien être une condition nécessaire à l’évolution de l’altruisme psychologique ; des liens tangibles peut ainsi être tissés entre ces différentes notions. Les diverses approches du phénomène de l’altruisme retracées dans cet ouvrage fournissent également des clefs de compréhension des méandres du comportement social animal et plus particulièrement humain. De manière générale, sans apporter de solutions toutes faites, cet écrit peut servir de guide sémantique et initie le lecteur à une littérature interdisciplinaire émergeante, foisonnante, passionnante quoique encore souvent parsemée de confusions et de contradictions. (shrink)