In times of erosion and dissolution of social structures and institutions, described by Bauman as the interregnum, there arises both a need and a possibility of developing alternative approaches to the most fundamental organizational practices. Marketing, a simultaneously tremendously successful and much criticized sub-discipline and practice, is a prime candidate for such a redefinition. Potential prefigurations of future processes of organizing and institutionalizing can be found within dissenting organizations, the alternative organizations built at the fringes of, and in opposition to, (...) the mainstream businesses as reported by Parker et al.. In this paper, we present an exploration of the alternative yet already enacted practice we call earnest marketing. Drawing on an ethnographic study of a number of dissenting organizations in the United Kingdom and Poland, we focus on the radical reconstitution of marketing evidenced in their practice, defined by an attitude of earnestness and dedication to the dissemination and demonstration of their self-defined goodness: ideas and values. As organizations engage in earnest marketing, they also become receptive to reciprocal messages from their environments. We conclude by reflecting on the possibilities of a dissenting management model developing the principles of earnest marketing beyond disciplinary confines. (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

The paper tackles two problems. The first one is to grasp the real meaning of Jerzy Kalinowski’s theory of normative sentences. His formal system K 1 is a simple logic formulated in a very limited language . While presenting it Kalinowski formulated a few interesting philosophical remarks on norms and actions. He did not, however, possess the tools to formalise them fully. We propose a formulation of Kalinowski’s ideas with the use of a set-theoretical frame similar to the one (...) presented by Krister Segerberg in his A Deontic Logic of Action. At the same time we enrich the language used by Kalinowski with more operators on actions and present an adequate axiomatisation of the resulting system. That allows us to disclose some unrevealed aspects of Kalinowski’s theory. The most important one is a relation between acts which we call moral indiscernibility. Our second problem is a proper understanding of moral indiscernibility. We show how a repertoire of agent’s actions, defined with the use of simple observable elements of actions, can be filtrated by the relation of moral indiscernibility. That allows us to understand the consequences of Kalinowski’s claim that not doing something good is always bad. (shrink)

The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, (...) To this end, the approaches of Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific research programmes. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Ernst Zermelo’s ideas concerning the possibility of developing a system of infinitary logic that, in his opinion, should be suitable for mathematical inferences. The presentation of Zermelo’s ideas is accompanied with some remarks concerning the development of infinitary logic. I also stress the fact that the second axiomatization of set theory provided by Zermelo in 1930 involved the use of extremal axioms of a very specific sort.1.

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym (...) dorobku naukowym [...]. (shrink)

The contributions in this book deal with the issue of normativity from various academic and scientific perspectives. The reader will learn how phenomena - such as norms, morality, and rule-following - are described and explained in philosophy, biology, psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience. In addition, a discussion of the naturalistic fallacy, from philosophical and ethical perspectives, is included.

Models and Tests : Contributions to the Quantitative Psychology and Its Methodology Jerzy Brzeziński, Tadeusz Marek. Marek Gaul INTERACTIONAL MODELS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH Testing interaction on non-interval level of ...

Contents: PART I. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CREATIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Krystyna ZAMIARA: The psychological approach to creativity. A critical appraisal. Rick L. FRANKLIN: Creativity and depth in understanding. Zdzis??l??awa PIATEK: Creativity of life and F.W. Nietzsche's idea of Superman. Jaromír JANOUSEK: Dialogue and joint activity: A psychological approach. Krystyna ZAMIARA: Some remarks on Piaget's notion of "consciousness" and its importance for the studies of culture. Anna GA??L??DOWA, and Aleksander NELICKI: Attitudes towards values as a factor determining creativity. PART II. THE ROLE (...) OF CREATIVITY IN THE THEORY-BUILDING. Leszek NOWAK: On creativity in theory-building. Izabella NOWAK: Discovery and correspondence. A contribution to the idealizational approach to science. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Research process in psychology in the context of the researcher's methodological consciousness. Andrzej FALKOWSKI: Cognitive similarity in scientific discovery: An ecological approach. PART III: CONSCIOUSNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. Kathleen V. WILKES: Inside insight. Franco DI MARIA, and Gioacchino LAVANCO: History and epistemology of the unconscious. Franco DI MARIA, and Gioacchino LAVANCO: Conscious/unconscious and group-analysis. Banjamin WALLACE, Andrzej KOKOSZKA, and Deanna D. TUROSKY: Historical and contemporary thoughts on consciousness and its altered states. PART IV. BETWEEN EXPRESSION AND PROJECTION. Micha??l?? STASIAKIEWICZ: Creativity and projection: Paradigm opposition and implicit correspondence. Anna BRZEZI??N??SKA: Creative expression versus projection. PART V. THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS IN EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CREATIVITY. Mario BUNGE: Explaining creativity. Piotr WOLSKI: Hemispheric asymmetry and consciousness. Is there any relationship? Andrzej KOKOSZKA: A rationale for psychology of consciousness. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CREATIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Santo DI NUOVO: Consciousness and attention. Tomasz MARUSZEWSKI: Two looks on consciousness. Is there any interface between philosophy of science and psychology? Marek KOWALCZYK: On the question of the functions of consciousness. Dean Keith SIMONTON: From childhood giftedness to creative genius. Magdalena FAFROWICZ, Tadeusz MAREK, and Czes??l??aw NOWOROL: Effectiveness of innovation as a function of creative style of behavior and type of leadership. Mark A. RUNCO, and Joni RADIO GAYNOR: Creativity and optimal development. (shrink)

Contents: Part I. Probability and the Idealizational Theory of Science. Marek GAUL: Statistical dependencies, statements and the idealizational theory of science. Part II. Probability - theoretical concepts in psychology - measurement. Douglas WAHLSTEN: Probability and the understanding of individual differences. Bodo KRAUSE: Modeling cognitive learning steps. Dieter HEYER, and Rainer MAUSFELD: A theoretical and experimental inquiry into the relation of theoretical concepts and probabilistic measurement scales in experimental psychology. Part III. Methods of data analysis. Tadeusz B. IWINSKI: Rough set methods (...) in psychology. Wilma KOUTSTAAL, and Robert ROSENTHAL: Contrast analysi in behavioral research. Part IV. Artifacts in psychological research and diagnostic assessment. David B. STROHMETZ, and Ralph L. ROSNOW: A mediational model of research artifacts. Jerzy BRZEZINSKI: Dimensions of diagnostic space. (shrink)

Contents: INTRODUCTION. Kazimierz TWARDOWSKI: The Majesty of the University. I. Zygmunt ZIEMBI??N??SKI: What Can Be Saved of the Idea of the University? Leszek KO??l??AKOWSKI: What Are Universities for? Leon GUMA??N??SKI: The Ideal University and Reality. Zygmunt BAUMAN: The Present Crisis of the Universities. II. Kazimierz AJDUKIEWICZ: On Freedom of Science. Henryk SAMSONOWICZ: Universities and Democracy. Jerzy TOPOLSKI: The Commonwealth of Scholars and New Conceptions of Truth. Klemens SZANIAWSKI: Plus ratio quam vis. III. Leon KOJ: Science, Teaching and Values. Klemens (...) SZANIAWSKI: The Ethics of Scientific Criticism. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Ethical Problems of Research Work of Psychologists. IV. Janusz GO??L??KOWSKI: Tradition in Science. Jerzy KMITA: Is a "Creative Man of Knowledge" Needed in University Teaching? Leszek NOWAK: The Personality of Researchers and the Necessity of Schools in Science. RECAPITULATION. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Reflections on the University. (shrink)

From the Preface: This book represents the implementation of a decision adopted by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences relating to the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the birth of Nicholas Copernicus. From the outset it was intended that this Copernican volume would describe a number of Copernican-type intellectual revolutions that have taken place in recent centuries. Such revolutions are characterized by the abandonment of widely held concepts and replacement by dramatically new conceptualizations that resulted in deepened (...) understanding of natural processes.It was the original intention of the Academy's Council that the essays would be addressed to the general educated public, including teaching staffs of colleges and high schools and college students. The combination of the intended broad coverage and the contemplated readership presented considerable difficulties and affected the choice of incidents in the history of modern science which could be discussed. As it has turned out, the material presented is quite rich and, while there is an unavoidable variation in the amount of specialized knowledge expected from the reader, we hope that the summaries preceding particular chapters are sufficient to create a broad perspective and make the whole understandable. To the extent that our goals have been approached, the help of numerous scientists is gratefully acknowledged.The introductory chapter describes the circumstances and the essence of the initial intellectual revolution due to Copernicus himself. The subsequent six parts present in turn: several revolutions in astronomy-cosmology, all in the twentieth century and one of them still in progress; a number of deep revolutionary changes in the biological sciences, one of them made twenty years ago by an inspired contribution of a graduate student; several revolutionary changes in the physical sciences; revolutions in the thinking of mathematicians; the emergence of a "pluralistic" point of view in scientific research; and revolutions in technology.The epoch when it was possible for individuals to acquire a reasonably detailed view of practically all of science is now far behind us. It was followed by a prolonged period of compartmentalization of research, with specialists in one domain becoming increasingly ignorant of developments in another. In the present epoch the pendulum appears to be moving in the opposite direction. The many problems faced by modern society depend for their solution on interdisciplinary studies and on participation of individuals with wide horizons. It is hoped that the publication of the present volume will serve not only to commemorate the achievements of Nicholas Copernicus but also to stimulate and accelerate this trend. (shrink)

The article analyses the role of Church’s Thesis in the context of the development of hypercomputation research. The text begins by presenting various views on the essence of computer science and the limitations of its methods. Then CT and its importance in determining the limits of methods used by computer science is presented. Basing on the above explanations, the work goes on to characterize various proposals of hypercomputation showing their relative power in relation to the arithmetic hierarchy. The general theme (...) of the article is the analysis of mutual relations between the content of CT and the theories of hypercomputation. In the main part of the paper the arguments for abolition of CT caused by the introduction of hypercomputable methods in computer science are presented and critique of these views is presented. The role of the efficiency condition contained in the formulation of CT is stressed. The discussion ends with a summary defending the current status of Church’s thesis within the framework of philosophy and computer science as an important point of reference for determining what the notion of effective calculability really is. The considerations included in this article seem to be quite up-to-date relative to the current state of affairs in computer science.1. (shrink)

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

Coreference resolution is the task of finding all expressions that refer to the same entity in a text. It is one of the higher level NLP tasks. It allows, for example, to extract more information about medical products from larger texts. A product such as ‘ambidextrous gloves’ may appear in a text in many different forms. For example, they could be referred to by the pronoun ‘they’, such as in this sentence. The algorithm presented in this paper finds pronouns and (...) for each of them it creates a coreference candidate with entities that appeared earlier in the same sentence or in the previous sentence. Each candidate is described by 48 binary features which represent their grammatical and location properties. In the training set, each pair is marked as a coreference or not, based on which a decision tree classifier is trained. A classifier with a high precision of 0.94 and a decent recall of 0.61 were obtained on the training set, still with a good precision out of a sample of 0.64. (shrink)

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, (...) according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber. (shrink)

The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others comes from Aristotle, as Jan Łukasiewicz states in his studies on Aristotle's syllogistic [1939, 1951], concerning rejection of the false syllogistic form and those on certain calculus of propositions. Short historical remarks on the origin and development of the notion of a rejected sentence, introduced into logic by Jan Łukasiewicz, are contained in the Introduction of this paper. This paper is to a considerable extent a summary of papers (...) which are not easily available, even to the Polish reader: (1) J. Słupecki, Funkcja Łukasiewicza (Łukasiewicz’s function), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Seria B, nr 3 (1959), 33-40; (2) U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131; (3) G. Bryll, Kilka uzupełnień teorii zdań odrzuconych (Some supplements to the theory of rejcted sentences), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Mnografie, Nr 22 (1969), 153-154. The paper also contains a good number of results which have not been published yet. Chapter I contains results presented in the papers (1)-(3). It provides an extension of Alfred Tarski’s theory of deductive systems presented by him in the papers [1930]: Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wssenschaften, I and Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. The enriched theory is marked with T. The most essential new concept in T is the function Cn-1, whose definition was given by Słupecki in (1) on the basis of the so-called Tarski’s general theory of deductive systems. It has the form: y e Cn-1X iff Ex e X (x e Cn {y}), where Cn is Tarski’s consequence operation. In accordance with the definition: A sentence y is rejected on the basis of the sentences of the set X iff at least one of sentences of X is a consequence of y (is deducible from y). The intuitive meaning of the rejection function Cn-1: on the basis of false sentences we can reject false sentences only (while by means of the consequence operation Cn on the basis of true sentences we can deduce true sentences only). The function Cn-1 is a generalization of the notion of rejected sentences which was introduced into logic by Łukasiewicz. The essential property of the rejection function Cn-1 is that it satisfies the axioms of general Tarski’s consequence Cn, so it is a consequence operation, called the rejection consequence. In addition, it is an additive and normal operation. In Chapter I, there are given notions analogous to those of the theory of deductive systems, but they are written down by means of the symbol ‘Cn-1’ and not ‘Cn’. There are established the properties of introduced notions and differences and analogies taking place between them and properties of respective notions of the theory T. There are also given generalizations of the notions of ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ used by Łukasiewicz. The short Chapter II contains axioms of the system T’ which is equivalent to the system T. The only difference between sets of primitive notions of these systems consists in the appearance of the function Cn-1 in the system T’ instead of the function Cn. This chapter reproduces the results given in (2), but they are partially simplified. (shrink)

The paper defends a dynamic view of reality which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. This vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. It is shown that such a conception allows one to explain the fundamental phenomena connected with the flow of time, namely the continuous changing of the present, the endurance of things, and the (...) asymmetry of time. It is also argued that the proposed approach may be of some virtue for the empirical sciences because it explains the ubiquitous interest of scientists in the evolution of dynamic systems of different kinds, and provides us with an arrow of time which is lacking in theories describing fundamental physical interactions. The argument is advanced which aims to show that physics is unable to provide us with a theory of the flow of time and that we should look for such a theory in metaphysics. Thus, an approach to the relation between metaphysics and physics is vindicated that may help to overcome the difficulties blocking our understanding of reality as a dynamic one. (shrink)

Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincare's Philosophy of Science and The Conventionalist Tradition contains essays concerned with Henri Poincare's philosophy of science, physics in particular, and with the conventionalist tradition in philosophy that he revived and reshaped, simultaneously with, but independently of, Pierre Duhem. Separating five essays as chapters, the book discusses the main ideas of the philosophy (Essays 1 and 5), traces at least some of its historical background (Essays 1, 2, and 3), and provides some of its (...) developments (Essays 2 and 4). (shrink)

The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time–reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry of some specific physical (...) process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich’s Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time–asymmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich’s sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them. (shrink)

Certain mathematical objects bear the name “pathological”. They either occur as unexpected and unwilling in mathematical research practice, or are constructed deliberately, for instance in order to delimit the scope of application of a theorem. I discuss examples of mathematical pathologies and the circumstances of their emergence. I focus my attention on the creative role of pathologies in the development of mathematics. Finally, I propose a few reflections concerning the degree of cognitive accessibility of mathematical objects. I believe that the (...) problems discussed in the paper may attract the attention of philosophers interested in concept formation and the development of mathematical ideas. (shrink)

W latach 1931-1934 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz sformułował dwie wersje teorii znaczenia. Tarski wykazał, że druga wersja teorii dopuszcza moż- liwość istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Cecha ta zo- stała uznana przez Tarskiego i Ajdukiewicza za dyskwalifikującą teorię. W artykule dokonuję porównania obu wersji teorii, przede wszystkim ze względu na podstawową definicję wzajemnej wymienialności wyrażeń. Pokazuję, że wbrew rozpowszechnionej opinii zarzut Tarskiego dotyczy także pierwszej wersji teorii. Siła argumentu Tarskiego opiera się na założeniu, że żadna adekwatna teoria znaczenia nie może dopuszczać (...) istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Podejmuję dyskusję z tym stanowiskiem. (shrink)

Contents: I. Philosophical and Methodological Problems of the Process of Cognition. Jenny WADE: Idealizing the Cartesian-Newtonian Paradigm as Reality: The Impact of New-Paradigm Physics on Psychological Theory. Elzbieta HORNOWSKA: Operationalization of Psychological Magnitudes. Assumptions-Structure-Consequences. Thomas BACHMANN: Creating Analogies - on Aspects of the Mapping Process between Knowledge Domains. Harald SCHAUB: Modelling Action Regulation. II. The Structure of Ideal Learning Process. Stellan OHLSON and James J. JEWETT: Ideal Adaptive Agents and the Learning Curve. Bodo KRAUSE: Towards a Theory of Cognitive Learning. (...) Bodo KRAUSE and Ulrich GAUGER: Learning and Use of Invariances: Experiments and Network Simulation. Manuela FRIEDRICH: "Reaction Time" in the Neural Network Module ART 1. III. Control Processes in Memory. Joseph TZELGOV, Vered YEHENE and Moshe NAVEH-BENJAMIN: From Memory to Automaticity and Vice Versa: On the Relations between Memory and Automaticity. H. HAGENDORF, S. FISCHER and B. SÁ: The Function of Working Memory in Coordination of Mental Transformations. IV. Common Sense and Idealization. Leszek NOWAK: On Common-Sense and -Idealization. Izabella NOWAKOWA: On the Problem of Induction. Towards an Idealizational Paraphrase. (shrink)