Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

Contents: INTRODUCTION. Kazimierz TWARDOWSKI: The Majesty of the University. I. Zygmunt ZIEMBI??N??SKI: What Can Be Saved of the Idea of the University? Leszek KO??l??AKOWSKI: What Are Universities for? Leon GUMA??N??SKI: The Ideal University and Reality. Zygmunt BAUMAN: The Present Crisis of the Universities. II. Kazimierz AJDUKIEWICZ: On Freedom of Science. Henryk SAMSONOWICZ: Universities and Democracy. Jerzy TOPOLSKI: The Commonwealth of Scholars and New Conceptions of Truth. Klemens SZANIAWSKI: Plus ratio quam vis. III. Leon KOJ: Science, Teaching and Values. Klemens (...) SZANIAWSKI: The Ethics of Scientific Criticism. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Ethical Problems of Research Work of Psychologists. IV. Janusz GO??L??KOWSKI: Tradition in Science. Jerzy KMITA: Is a "Creative Man of Knowledge" Needed in University Teaching? Leszek NOWAK: The Personality of Researchers and the Necessity of Schools in Science. RECAPITULATION. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Reflections on the University. (shrink)

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection finds application far outside biology, for which it was originally invented. Its consequences for science proved far-going, influencing practically every field from thermodynamics to the humanities. While acting on biological systems, the Darwinian mechanism is a source of progress and the local-scale abandonment of the universe’s general tendency towards chaos. However, observations of changes taking place in selection-exposed organisms show that evolutionary success requires some essential limitations. The application of this (...) reasoning to social evolution may appear thought-provoking: stable evolution requires not only intense selection but also a conservative approach to ideas. (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

One of the streams in the early development of set theory was an attempt to use mereology, a formal theory of parthood, as a foundational tool. The first such attempt is due to a Polish logician, Stanisław Leśniewski . The attempt failed, but there is another, prima facie more promising attempt by Jerzy Słupecki , who employed his generalized mereology to build mereological foundations for type theory. In this paper I situate Leśniewski's attempt in the development of set theory, (...) describe and evaluate Leśniewski's approach, describe Słupecki's strategy without unnecessary technical details, and evaluate it with a rather negative outcome. The issues discussed go beyond merely historical interests due to the current popularity of mereology and because they are related to nominalistic attempts to understand mathematics in general. The introduction describes very briefly the situation in which mereology entered the scene of foundations of mathematics — it can be safely sk.. (shrink)

The origins of testing scientific models with statistical techniques go back to 18th century mathematics. However, the modern theory of statistical testing was primarily developed through the work of Sir R.A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and Egon Pearson in the inter-war period. Some of Fisher's papers on testing were published in economics journals (Fisher, 1923, 1935) and exerted a notable influence on the discipline. The development of econometrics and the rise of quantitative economic models in the mid-20th century made statistical (...) significance testing a commonplace, albeit controversial tool within economics. -/- In the debate about significance testing, methodological controversies intertwine with epistemological issues and sociological developments. Our aim in this chapter is to expound these connections and to show how the use of, and the debate about, significance testing in economics differs from other social sciences, such as psychology. (shrink)

The first important reaction in favor of generic criticism here was that of the Chicago neo-Aristotelians, whose feisty polemics against the "New" critics must have seemed, in the 1940s and 1950s, like voices crying in the wilderness. The popularity of Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism—also ostensibly based upon Aristotle's example—won the concept of genre broader support. And today, if the books covering my desk are anything to go by, genre criticism has emerged in force. The flood has brought forth historical (...) studies of Renaissance genres, analyses of traditional genres like the picaresque or of new ones like "the fantastic," ambivalently generic essays in "thematics," efforts to systemize the genres of narrative fiction, and even attempt, through the philosophic analysis of dozens of generic systems, to go "beyond genre." Indeed, the late sixties spawned a journal entitled Genre entirely devoted to theoretical and practical criticism employing the concept. David H. Richter is the author of a forthcoming book: Fable's End: Completeness and Closure in Rhetorical Fiction, and an article on Jerzy Kosinski. He is assistant professor of English at Queens College of the City University of New York. (shrink)

Zajęcia prowadzone przez Profesora Pelca niewątpliwie wpisywały się w tak szeroko zarysowaną koncepcję logiki ogólnej. Starał się on być nauczycielem myślenia i dobrej roboty – nie tylko w filozofii, lecz w humanistyce i cel ten osiągał, nie tylko poprzez dobór tematów, wysokie wymagania, różnorodne sposoby sprawdzania wiedzy słuchaczy, lecz także – przez przykład. Wielu rzeczy nie przekazywał przez wykład czy lektury, lecz bezpośrednio kierując wysił- kami podopiecznych – zwłaszcza tymi związanymi z przygotowaniem obligatoryjnych prac rocznych. Pouczający był sam proces – (...) konsultowanie kolejnych etapów prac nad esejem – ale także oczekiwania, np. że praca będzie opatrzona abstraktem i słowami kluczowymi w jednym z języków kongresowych. Profesor Pelc dał się poznać i pozostaje w pamięci jako wybitny naukowiec, twórca współczesnej semiotyki polskiej, organizator i dydaktyk. W tym artykule starałem się pokazać, że zwłaszcza ta ostatnia rola stawia go w jednym rzędzie z przedstawicielami SLW, gdyż wspólna im była troska o wykształcenie kultury logicznej słuchaczy, wierność postulatom jasności i krytycyzmu, preferencja dla logiki w szerokim sensie nieograniczającej się jedynie do logiki formalnej, lecz dziedziny prawdziwie interdyscyplinarnej, obejmującej m.in. elementy epistemologii, psychologii, prakseologii – i pełniącej rolę współczesnego trivium. Na koniec chciałbym wyrazić głębokie przekonanie, że koncepcja logiki ogólnej – szkolnej, pedagogicznej, pragmatycznej – zasługuje, by odkryć ją na nowo, zrekonstruować ją i spisać jej historię, a co ważniejsze – by twórczo ją rozwijać. (shrink)

The Theater Is always Dying traces the resilience of live theatrical performance in the face of competing performative forms like cinema, television and contemporary streaming services on personal, hand-held devices and focuses on theater’s ability to continue as a significant cultural, community and intellectual force in the face of such competition. To echo Beckett, we might suggest, then, that theater may be at its best at its dying since its extended demise seems self-regenerating. Whether or not you “go out of (...) the theatre more human than when you went in”, as Ariane Mnouchkin suggests, or whether you’ve had a sense that you’ve been part of, participated in a community ritual, a Dionysia, or whether or not you’ve felt that you’ve been affected by a performative, an embodied intellectual and emotional human experience may determine how you judge the state of contemporary theater. You may not always know the answer to those questions immediately after the theatrical encounter, or ever deliberately or consciously, but something, nonetheless, may have been taking its course. You may emerge “more human than when you went in”. (shrink)

Among the composers with whom Wojciech Młynarski collaborated – a brilliant songwriter and penetrating satirist, librettist and translator, as well as a talented singer – was a completely unique artist, often referred to as the “Polish Gershwin” – Jerzy Wasowski. As a result of their nearly twenty years of cooperation, interrupted by Wasowski’s death in 1984, about thirty songs were created, most often being cabaret-satirical works or in the form of “sung columns”. Among the achievements of the Młynarski-Wasowski company (...) there are many “small masterpieces”, which are examples of masterly connections between words and music. The works they wrote together in the last period of their cooperation have been remembered in a special way by Młynarski. These songs were written at a special moment in the history of the People’s Republic of Poland – during the “Solidarity” carnival and during the martial law period. Moreover, the story of their proprietary company closed. The works they wrote last – in 1982 and 1983 – were described by Młynarski as “interesting songs”. During the martial law period, Młynarski decided to suspend public appearances – joining the artists who, in protest, decided to boycott the state media. He only took care of writing lyrics for new songs. At that time, he addressed the proposal to compose music mainly to Wasowski, who, like him, believed that one should continue to write, but – for now – “in the drawer”. Eight works were written then, six of which – Ballada o szachiście, Jestem piłeczką pingpongową, Po Krakowskim w noc majową, W miejskim teatrzyku lalek, Róbmy swoje, Ballada o dwóch koniach – had a satirical and journalistic character and entered Młynarski’s repertoire when he resumed his performances. Whereas the other two songs – Mam złe lata i dobre dni oraz Gram o wszystko – were lyrical-reflective pieces with female texts, and became their performers a few years later: Hanna Banaszak and Ewa Bem. This article analyzes one of these songs – Ballada o szachiście – aimed at explaining – in an elementary way – why Młynarski used the word “interesting” to refer to the songs written with Wasowski during the martial law period. This term is primarily intended to denote a work whose words and music were written in order to “give food for thought” to the audience. (shrink)

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life, (...) but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. (shrink)

Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...

The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, (...) To this end, the approaches of Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific research programmes. (shrink)

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

The paper defends a dynamic view of reality which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. This vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. It is shown that such a conception allows one to explain the fundamental phenomena connected with the flow of time, namely the continuous changing of the present, the endurance of things, and the (...) asymmetry of time. It is also argued that the proposed approach may be of some virtue for the empirical sciences because it explains the ubiquitous interest of scientists in the evolution of dynamic systems of different kinds, and provides us with an arrow of time which is lacking in theories describing fundamental physical interactions. The argument is advanced which aims to show that physics is unable to provide us with a theory of the flow of time and that we should look for such a theory in metaphysics. Thus, an approach to the relation between metaphysics and physics is vindicated that may help to overcome the difficulties blocking our understanding of reality as a dynamic one. (shrink)

Volume five focuses on the central teaching of non-attachment to our desires. Its premise is the more we crave, the more we suffer. Venerable Master Hsing Yun points out it is not only our attachment to things, but also to our own views, that is the source of suffering.

The old-fashioned concept of state is shown to be inadequate and misleading. Replacing it by a concept of information and taking advantage of the invariance of the mechanical description under time reversal puts the problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in a new light. A more realistic interpretation appears to be possible. Moreover, a new explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is presented, too.

The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time–reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry of some specific physical (...) process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich’s Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time–asymmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich’s sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them. (shrink)

W latach 1931-1934 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz sformułował dwie wersje teorii znaczenia. Tarski wykazał, że druga wersja teorii dopuszcza moż- liwość istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Cecha ta zo- stała uznana przez Tarskiego i Ajdukiewicza za dyskwalifikującą teorię. W artykule dokonuję porównania obu wersji teorii, przede wszystkim ze względu na podstawową definicję wzajemnej wymienialności wyrażeń. Pokazuję, że wbrew rozpowszechnionej opinii zarzut Tarskiego dotyczy także pierwszej wersji teorii. Siła argumentu Tarskiego opiera się na założeniu, że żadna adekwatna teoria znaczenia nie może dopuszczać (...) istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Podejmuję dyskusję z tym stanowiskiem. (shrink)

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym (...) dorobku naukowym [...]. (shrink)

Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincare's Philosophy of Science and The Conventionalist Tradition contains essays concerned with Henri Poincare's philosophy of science, physics in particular, and with the conventionalist tradition in philosophy that he revived and reshaped, simultaneously with, but independently of, Pierre Duhem. Separating five essays as chapters, the book discusses the main ideas of the philosophy (Essays 1 and 5), traces at least some of its historical background (Essays 1, 2, and 3), and provides some of its (...) developments (Essays 2 and 4). (shrink)

The paper tackles two problems. The first one is to grasp the real meaning of Jerzy Kalinowski’s theory of normative sentences. His formal system K 1 is a simple logic formulated in a very limited language . While presenting it Kalinowski formulated a few interesting philosophical remarks on norms and actions. He did not, however, possess the tools to formalise them fully. We propose a formulation of Kalinowski’s ideas with the use of a set-theoretical frame similar to the one (...) presented by Krister Segerberg in his A Deontic Logic of Action. At the same time we enrich the language used by Kalinowski with more operators on actions and present an adequate axiomatisation of the resulting system. That allows us to disclose some unrevealed aspects of Kalinowski’s theory. The most important one is a relation between acts which we call moral indiscernibility. Our second problem is a proper understanding of moral indiscernibility. We show how a repertoire of agent’s actions, defined with the use of simple observable elements of actions, can be filtrated by the relation of moral indiscernibility. That allows us to understand the consequences of Kalinowski’s claim that not doing something good is always bad. (shrink)

The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others comes from Aristotle, as Jan Łukasiewicz states in his studies on Aristotle's syllogistic [1939, 1951], concerning rejection of the false syllogistic form and those on certain calculus of propositions. Short historical remarks on the origin and development of the notion of a rejected sentence, introduced into logic by Jan Łukasiewicz, are contained in the Introduction of this paper. This paper is to a considerable extent a summary of papers (...) which are not easily available, even to the Polish reader: (1) J. Słupecki, Funkcja Łukasiewicza (Łukasiewicz’s function), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Seria B, nr 3 (1959), 33-40; (2) U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131; (3) G. Bryll, Kilka uzupełnień teorii zdań odrzuconych (Some supplements to the theory of rejcted sentences), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Mnografie, Nr 22 (1969), 153-154. The paper also contains a good number of results which have not been published yet. Chapter I contains results presented in the papers (1)-(3). It provides an extension of Alfred Tarski’s theory of deductive systems presented by him in the papers [1930]: Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wssenschaften, I and Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. The enriched theory is marked with T. The most essential new concept in T is the function Cn-1, whose definition was given by Słupecki in (1) on the basis of the so-called Tarski’s general theory of deductive systems. It has the form: y e Cn-1X iff Ex e X (x e Cn {y}), where Cn is Tarski’s consequence operation. In accordance with the definition: A sentence y is rejected on the basis of the sentences of the set X iff at least one of sentences of X is a consequence of y (is deducible from y). The intuitive meaning of the rejection function Cn-1: on the basis of false sentences we can reject false sentences only (while by means of the consequence operation Cn on the basis of true sentences we can deduce true sentences only). The function Cn-1 is a generalization of the notion of rejected sentences which was introduced into logic by Łukasiewicz. The essential property of the rejection function Cn-1 is that it satisfies the axioms of general Tarski’s consequence Cn, so it is a consequence operation, called the rejection consequence. In addition, it is an additive and normal operation. In Chapter I, there are given notions analogous to those of the theory of deductive systems, but they are written down by means of the symbol ‘Cn-1’ and not ‘Cn’. There are established the properties of introduced notions and differences and analogies taking place between them and properties of respective notions of the theory T. There are also given generalizations of the notions of ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ used by Łukasiewicz. The short Chapter II contains axioms of the system T’ which is equivalent to the system T. The only difference between sets of primitive notions of these systems consists in the appearance of the function Cn-1 in the system T’ instead of the function Cn. This chapter reproduces the results given in (2), but they are partially simplified. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo analisa, as recentes versões, da objecção à existência de um fluxo do tempo, com base na pergunta: “Com que velocidade flui o tempo?”. O autor mostra que as soluções existentes para o problema não são plausíveis e, que em vez disso, a resolução deve ser encontrada numa nova concepção de fluxo temporal, que evite tais dificuldades. A teoria metafísica proposta desenvolve as ideias de Broad e Prior sob um novo enquadramento, que invalida a objecção resultante da questão (...) sobre o ritmo da passagem do tempo e das respostas “segundo a segundo”. Neste texto também se procura mostrar, que esta teoria metafísica, aqui proposta, possui outras virtudes que testemunham a seu favor. Palavras-chave : existência dinâmica, fluxo do tempo, presentismo, velocidade de passagem do tempoThe paper analyzes some recent versions of the objection to the existence of the flow of time based on the question: “How fast does time flow?”. It shows that the replies given to the problem are implausible and instead proposes a solution for the issue in the form of a conception of the flow of time which can avoid such a difficulty. The proposed metaphysical theory develops the ideas of Broad and Prior in a radical way and invalidates the objection resulting from the question about the rate of passage and answers “second per second”. The paper also tries to show that this metaphysical theory has other virtues which testify in favor of it. Keywords : flow of time; rate of time’s passage; presentism; dynamic existence. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the (...) detensed or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the same time the dynamism of the presentists' ontology. The paper takes for granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value. (shrink)

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, (...) according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber. (shrink)