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Jerome C. Wakefield [32]Jerome Wakefield [4]Jerome Carl Wakefield [1]
  1. Disorder as harmful dysfunction: A conceptual critique of DSM-III-R's definition of mental disorder.Jerome C. Wakefield - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):232-247.
  2. The Biostatistical Theory Versus the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis, Part 1: Is Part-Dysfunction a Sufficient Condition for Medical Disorder?Jerome Wakefield - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):648-682.
    Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of medical disorder claims that biological part-dysfunction (i.e., failure of an internal mechanism to perform its biological function), a factual criterion, is both necessary and sufficient for disorder. Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder agrees that part-dysfunction is necessary but rejects the sufficiency claim, maintaining that disorder also requires that the part-dysfunction causes harm to the individual, a value criterion. In this paper, I present two considerations against the sufficiency claim. First, I analyze Boorse’s (...)
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  3.  47
    Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor.Jerome C. Wakefield & Jordan A. Conrad - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (3):350-370.
    Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction and a value component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions (...)
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  4.  54
    Does the harm component of the harmful dysfunction analysis need rethinking?: Reply to Powell and Scarffe.Jerome C. Wakefield & Jordan A. Conrad - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):594-596.
    In ‘Rethinking Disease’, Powell and Scarffe1 propose what in effect is a modification of Jerome Wakefield’s2 3 harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder. The HDA maintains that ‘disorder’ is a hybrid factual and value concept requiring that a biological dysfunction, understood as a failure of some feature to perform a naturally selected function, causes harm to the individual as evaluated by social values. Powell and Scarffe accept both the HDA’s evolutionary biological function component and its incorporation of a value component. (...)
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  5. Intentionality and the phenomenology of action.Jerome C. Wakefield & Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1991 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  6.  92
    Addiction and the Concept of Disorder, Part 2: Is every Mental Disorder a Brain Disorder?Jerome C. Wakefield - 2016 - Neuroethics 10 (1):55-67.
    In this two-part analysis, I analyze Marc Lewis’s arguments against the brain-disease view of substance addiction and for a developmental-learning approach that demedicalizes addiction. I focus especially on the question of whether addiction is a medical disorder. In Part 1, I argued that, even if one accepts Lewis’s critique of the brain evidence presented for the brain-disease view, his arguments fail to establish that addiction is not a disorder. Relying on my harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, I defended the view (...)
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  7.  62
    Dysfunction as a value-free concept: A reply to Sadler and Agich.Jerome C. Wakefield - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):233-246.
  8.  55
    ""Aristotle as sociobiologist: The" function of a human being" argument, black box essentialism, and the concept of mental disorder.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (1):17-44.
    In the first part of this article, I argue that Christopher Megone's natural-kind interpretation of Aristotle's argument that "the function of a human being is reason" does not resolve major puzzles about the argument, specifically the puzzles of why a human being has a function and why reason is that function. I attempt to resolve these puzzles by supplementing the natural-kind account with the doctrine that reason is the master regulatory natural function by which individuals enter into social life. In (...)
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  9.  58
    Can the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Explain Why Addiction is a Medical Disorder?: Reply to Marc Lewis.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (2):313-317.
  10.  79
    Spandrels, Vestigial Organs, and Such: Reply to Murphy and Woolfolk's" The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder".Jerome C. Wakefield - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):253-269.
    The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of "disorder" holds that disorders are harmful failures of "designed" (that is, naturally selected) functions. Murphy and Woolfolk (2000) present a series of proposed counterexamples to the HD analysis to support their claim that it fails to provide a necessary condition for disorder. They argue that disorder can exist where there is no failed function, as in failed spandrels and inflamed vestigial organs, and that there can be disorders when everything is working as designed, as (...)
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  11. Social Construction, Biological Design, and Mental Disorder.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (4):349-355.
    Pierre-Henri Castel provides a short but richly argued precis of his recently published two-volume 1,000-page masterwork on the history of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Having not read the as-yet-untranslated books, I write this commentary from Plato’s cave, trying to infer the reality of Castel’s analysis from expository shadows. I am unlikely to be more successful than Plato’s poor troglodytes, so I apologize ahead of time for any misunderstandings. Moreover, I cannot assess Castel’s detailed evidential case for his substantive theses.1 I thus focus (...)
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  12.  30
    Darwin, functional explanation, and the philosophy of psychiatry.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2011 - In Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas De Block (eds.), Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 43--172.
  13.  20
    Freud and Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1: Reconstructing the Argument for Unconscious Mental States.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2018 - Cham: Springer Verlag.
    This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud’s implicit argument for unconscious mental states. The author employs the unique approach of applying contemporary philosophical methods, especially Kripke-Putnam essentialism, in analyzing Freud’s argument. The book elaborates how Freud transformed the intentionality theory of his Cartesian teacher Franz Brentano into what is essentially a sophisticated modern view of the mind. Indeed, Freud redirected Brentano's analysis of consciousness as intentionality into a view of consciousness-independent intentionalism about the mental that in (...)
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  14. What makes a mental disorder mental?Jerome C. Wakefield - 2006 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Makes a Mental Disorder Mental?Jerome C. Wakefield (bio)Keywordsharmful dysfunction, mental disorder, intentionality, mental dysfunction, mental functioning, phenomenality, somatic disorderWhat makes a medical disorder mental rather than (exclusively) somatic or physical? Psychiatry to some extent depends for its existence as a medical specialty on the distinction between mental and somatic disorders, yet the history of this distinction presents a bewildering array of puzzling judgments, radical shifts, and seemingly arbitrary (...)
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  15. Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...)
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  16. Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction Perspective.Jerome C. Wakefield, David Wasserman & Jordan A. Conrad - 2020 - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press. pp. 500-521.
  17. (1 other version)Mental Disorder and Moral Responsibility: Disorders of Personhood as Harmful Dysfunctions, With Special Reference to Alcoholism.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):91-99.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mental Disorder and Moral Responsibility:Disorders of Personhood as Harmful Dysfunctions, With Special Reference to AlcoholismJerome C. Wakefield (bio)Keywordsalcohol dependence, philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorder, harmful dysfunction, psychiatric diagnosis, person, moral responsibilityIn his paper, Ethical Decisions in the Classification of Mental Conditions as Mental Illness, Craig Edwards grapples with a profound problem: why is it that when we classify a mental condition as a mental disorder, that tends to take (...)
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  18. The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue. Part 4: general conclusion.Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley, Peter Zachar & James Phillips - 2012 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7:14-.
    In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...)
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  19.  37
    Fait et valeur dans le concept de trouble mental : le trouble en tant que dysfonction préjudiciable.Jerome Wakefield - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):37-63.
    Les critiques actuelles des diagnostics psychiatriques, qu’elles viennent des antipsychiatres, des béhavioristes, des constructionnistes sociaux, des szasziens et des foucaldiens, rejettent généralement l’idée que le concept de trouble mental est légitime du point de vue médical, ne laissant donc aucun argument solide à partir duquel il soit possible de mener une critique constructive et d’établir un dialogue avec la psychiatrie. Ces positions ne réussissent également pas à expliquer les fortes intuitions populaires qui permettent aux gens de distinguer les troubles psychologiques (...)
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  20. From depth psychology to breadth psychology: a phenomenological approach to psychopathology (1988).Hubert L. Dreyfus & Jerome Wakefield - 2014 - In Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
     
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  21.  67
    Fodor on inscrutability.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):524-537.
    : Jerry Fodor proposes a solution to Quine's inscrutability–of–reference problem for certain naturalized semantic theories, thereby defending such theories from charges that they cannot discriminate meanings finely enough. His proposal, combining elements of informational and inferential–role semantics, is to eliminate non–standard interpretations by testing predicate compatibility relations. I argue that Fodor's proposal, understood as primarily aimed at Mentalese, withstands Ray's and Gates's objections but nonetheless fails because of unwarranted assumptions about ontological homogeneity of target language predicates, and problems with Fodor's (...)
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  22. False positives in psychiatric diagnosis: Implications for human freedom.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):5-17.
    Current symptom-based DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria for mental disorders are prone to yielding false positives because they ignore the context of symptoms. This is often seen as a benign flaw because problems of living and emotional suffering, even if not true disorders, may benefit from support and treatment. However, diagnosis of a disorder in our society has many ramifications not only for treatment choice but for broader social reactions to the diagnosed individual. In particular, mental disorders impose a sick (...)
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  23.  29
    Can One and the Same Instance of Grief Be Both Normal and Disordered?Jerome C. Wakefield - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):341-346.
    Miriam solomon resuscitates a famous proposal of George Engel's to classify normal grief as a medical disorder. She has two main arguments justifying such a reclassification, one based on Engel's "wound analogy" and another a "Humpty Dumpty"-type argument that 'disorder' is a technical term that we can redefine any way we please. I consider them in turn.Solomon says: "I suggest that we allow a concept of "psychological injury" that is analogous to the concept of physical injury." Of course, we already (...)
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  24.  8
    Sadness or Depression?: International Perspectives on the Depression Epidemic and Its Meaning.Steeves Demazeux & Jerome C. Wakefield (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer.
    The World Health Organization states that depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide, and predicts that by 2030 the epidemic of depression raging across the world will be the single biggest contributor to the overall burden of disease of all health conditions. Yet this gloomy picture masks a number of paradoxes concerning the diagnosis and cultural interpretation of depression that appear to challenge the claimed prevalence rates on which it is based. This book's essays by some of the world's (...)
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  25.  49
    High mental disorder rates are based on invalid measures: Questions about the claimed ubiquity of mutation-induced dysfunction.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):424-426.
    Three reservations about Keller & Miller's (K&M's) argument are explored: Serious validity problems afflict epidemiological criteria discriminating disorders from non-disorders, so high rates may be misleading. Normal variation need not be mild disorder, contrary to a possible interpretation of K&M's article. And, rather than mutation-selection balance, true disorders may result from unselected combinations of normal variants over many loci. (Published Online November 9 2006).
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  26.  17
    Patologizzare la normalità: l'incapacità della psichiatria di individuare i falsi positivi nelle diagnosi dei disturbi mentali.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2010 - Psicoterapia E Scienze Umane 44 (3):295-314.
    In psychiatry's transformation from an asylum-based to a community-oriented profession, false positive diagnoses became a major challenge to the validity of the diagnostic system. The shift to descriptive, symptom-based operationalized diagnostic criteria of DSM-III further exacerbated this difficulty because of the contextually based nature of the distinction between normal distress and mental disorder. Through selected examples, the degree of success with which DSM-III and DSM-IV have attended to the challenge of avoiding false positive diagnoses is examined. Conceptual analysis of selected (...)
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  27.  38
    VIastos on the Unity of Virtue.Jerome C. Wakefield - 1991 - Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):47-65.
  28. Why emotions can't be unconscious: An exploration of Freud's essentialism.Jerome C. Wakefield - 1991 - Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 14:29-67.
  29. Why instinctual impulses can't be unconscious: An exploration of Freud's cognitivism.Jerome C. Wakefield - 1990 - Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 13:265-88.
  30.  23
    Why Justice and Holiness are Similar: Pro tago ras 330-331.Jerome Wakefield - 1987 - Phronesis 32 (1):267-276.
  31.  57
    Why specific design is not the mark of the adaptational.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):532-533.
    Andrews et al.'s analysis suffers from a series of conceptual confusions they inherit from Gould's work. Their proposal that adaptations can be distinguished from exaptations essentially by specific design criteria fails because exaptations are often maintained and secondarily adapted by natural selection and therefore, over evolutionary time, can come to have similar levels of design specificity to adaptations.
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  32. The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis. [REVIEW]Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar - 2012 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7:1-29.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  33.  98
    The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 3: issues of utility and alternative approaches in psychiatric diagnosis. [REVIEW]Peter Zachar, Owen Whooley, GScott Waterman, Jerome C. Wakefield, Thomas Szasz, Michael A. Schwartz, Claire Pouncey, Douglas Porter, Harold A. Pincus, Ronald W. Pies, Joseph M. Pierre, Joel Paris, Aaron L. Mishara, Elliott B. Martin, Steven G. LoBello, Warren A. Kinghorn, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Gary Greenberg, Nassir Ghaemi, Michael B. First, Hannah S. Decker, John Chardavoyne, Michael A. Cerullo & Allen Frances - 2012 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):9-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  34. The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis. [REVIEW]Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar - 2012 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7:8-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  35. The chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about the (...)
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