Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...) is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophical Rhetoric of Socrates’ MissionRobert Metcalf"We shall dismiss this business of Chaerephon, as it is nothing but a cheap and sophistical tale [sophistikon kai phortikon diegema]"—Colotes, according to Plutarch's Moralia 14, 1116f-1117a.Socrates' account of his "mission" on behalf of the god at Delphi is one of the most memorable parts of his most famous memorial in Plato's Apology. But it is also controversial as to what it means (...) to Socrates and what it should mean to readers of Plato's text.1 First, there is the curious fact that the story occurs nowhere outside the competing versions of Socrates' defensespeech in Plato and Xenophon, and in the latter version the oracular report differs significantly in content and import: there the Pythia proclaims, not that no one is wiser than Socrates, but that no one is more generous or more just or more "soundminded" (sophron), and Xenophon's Socrates uses this as evidence that he "outshone the rest of mankind" and "deserves congratulations from gods and men alike" (Apology 14-18).2 Furthermore, the sequence of events that make up Socrates' "mission" is itself difficult to discern, from its apparent prompting by the oracular message to Chaerephon, to Socrates' initial effort to refute it, to his ultimate practice of elenchos in order that the oracle (or, at least, his interpretation of the oracle) might remain unrefuted.3 Not surprisingly, it was already a matter of controversy in the third century BC, as we read in the above quotation from Plutarch's Moralia. Whereas Arcesilaus interpreted the story of the Delphic oracle, and the account of elenctic practice occasioned by the oracle, as a model for his own skeptical orientation, Colotes, the Epicurean, charged that he had been duped by Socrates' sophistic oratory.4 To be sure, Colotes' charge of sophistry is meant to be abusive and has value for us only insofar as it counters a piously uncritical reading of Socrates' self-portrayal in Plato's Apology.5 In what follows I shall argue that an appreciation of the irony and mock-humility with which Socrates accounts for his "mission" to philosophize [End Page 143] affords us insight into the philosophical rhetoric that is essential to Socrates' practice of elenchos.But let us begin by examining those strange elements in Socrates' account that have made it "notorious" in the way suggested by the ancient debate.6 Socrates introduces the story of the oracle only after he dismisses, somewhat cursorily, the charges circulated by his "first accusers"—namely, that he investigates the things under the earth and heavenly things, and that he educates people for money (19b-20c). Insisting that he does not dishonor the knowledge involved in these activities (19c, 20b-c), Socrates nonetheless offers little defense apart from simply disowning such knowledge, presumably because these activities are not related to that "matter" (pragma) which has earned him his peculiar reputation (20c-d). It is here, in his explanation of this matter, that Socrates recounts the story of Chaerephon and the Pythia.7 As he begins the story he repeats his vow from the beginning of his defense to tell the jury only the truth (20d), assures them that he is not joking, and then is compelled to plead with them not to make any disturbances—"even," he says, "if I seem to you to be boasting [mega legein] somewhat" (20e). These successive declarations are all necessary, for the story has it that Socrates acquired his reputation through the human wisdom for which Socrates was singled out by the oracle at Delphi (20d-e).Socrates' puzzlement over the oracle and his effort to subject it to elenchos are offered as an explanation for the elenctic practice by which he comes, over time, to acquire his reputation.8 Although he does not say that his practice of elenchos begins with his investigation of the oracle's meaning, he does portray his subsequent practice of elenchos as being "in accordance with the god [kata ton theon]" (22a), an activity for which the god stands as a trustworthy witness (20e), and thus as a "matter of the god [to tou theou]" (21e). Ironically, the account Socrates... (shrink)

The fourth of Herodas is entitled in the papyrus —a title which very well describes the beginning and end of the poem, but disregards the middle, the most important part. The poem divides naturally into sections as follows: 1–20a; 20b–38, 39–563, 56b–78; 79–95. In we hear one of the women of the title carrying out the offering to the god. This section has been examined in detail by R. Wünsch, ‘Ein Dankopfer an Asklepios’, Arch. Rel. Wiss. vii , 95 ff., (...) who shows that it corresponds closely to the form of prayer used in real life, starting with the invocatio of the god, comprising greeting () and mention of his dwelling-places , family (parents, Koronis and Apollo. (shrink)

Mr Shewring, C.Q. XXV. 14, gives statistics of the clausulae favoured in Aristotle's Ethics. I have applied them to test a few conjectural emendations that I happen to have published, with the following encouraging results: Emendations that substitute a good clausula for a bad one: 96a 18 στερον λγομεν for στερον λγομεν κb, στερον λεγον cet. 09b 5 αυτος φλκειν [δεν]. 48a 14 κλαστον τθεμεν [κα γκρατ κα σφρονα]. 63b 13 τν φιλαν [καθπερ ερηται]. 71a 35 ατν <δον εναι . (...) Emendations that substitute one good clausula for another: 97a 9 τ ατ τοτ for τ ατ τοτο γαθν κb, τ ατ or ατ τ γαθν cet. 25a 22 τν γαθν [κα γνοεν αυτν]. I may be pardoned for omitting my one or two alterations that substitute a bad clausula for a good one. My text adopts a MS. variant, or a conjecture of another scholar, similarly supported by Mr. Shewring's test in the following places: 99b 6, 02a 20, 10b 31, 15a 8, 20a 22, 20b 2, 22a 28, 32a 11, 33a 1, 34b 33, 50b 34, 53a 1, 59a 3, 61a 2, 63a 3, 64a 23, 66a 34, 75a 6, 79a 22. (shrink)

Este artículo se dedica al estudio de Afrodita en los poemas del poeta mélico tardo-arcaico Baquílides, específicamente en el Fr.20 B, el Ditirambo 17 y en el Epinicio 5. Se toma como base la representación de la diosa en la mélica griega arcaica, con excepción de Píndaro, a fin de observar semejanzas y diferencias en su diseño en el poeta de Ceos y en el modo en que el erotismo figura en el pequeño corpus considerado, principalmente en el tercer texto (...) indicado. This article turns to the study of Aphrodite in the three melic poems of the late archaic Greek poet Bacchylides, where she is found: Fr. 20B, 17 th Dythiramb and 5 th Epinician ode. The background for the commentary will be the representation of the goddess especially in archaic Greek melic poetry, except for Pindar, and a comparative perspective will be sustained throughout, so that similarities as well as differences may be observed in the Cean poet's drawing of the goddess and in the way eroticism is present in the corpus defined for this paper - mainly in its third song. (shrink)