Recoiling from the power that Athenian democracy placed in the hands of the poor, the founding fathers of the United States took Athens as primarily an anti-model, whereas nineteenth-century defenders of slavery found Athens a very congenial model indeed, seeming as it did to lend a mantle of legitimacy to an unspeakable practice. After a “honeymoon period” in which democracy was idealized as the only legitimate form of government, now at the outset of the twenty-first century the alliance of democracy (...) with a capitalism that often proves heartless to the less fortunate has raised some troubling questions about democracy itself. Despite its small size, classical Athens offers valuable guidance for tempering current difficulties in both the United States and elsewhere by adopting and adapting the selection of some officials by sortition, direct election by popular vote of elected officials, a rigorous system of accountability, and the fostering of civic and community values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political TheoryJennifer RobertsJ. Peter Euben. Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. xvi 1 271 pp. Cloth, $55, £37.50; paper, $18.95, £13.95.Who, Socrates asks Meletus, improves the young men of Athens? The laws, Meletus replies. But which people, Socrates wants to know, which men? These very dicasts here. All of them, Meletus, or just (...) some? Oh, all of them. Goodness; and what about the audience? Them too? Yes, them too. And the members of the Boule? Certainly. And the men in the Assembly? Yes, them too. In other words, Meletus, what you are saying is that absolutely everyone in Athens improves young men except me. Is that right? Yes, that is exactly right, Meletus replies.Socrates has succeeded in making a fool of Meletus precisely because the question of “improving” the young (or anyone else) is so problematic. In this wide-ranging study of political thought in classical Athens, Peter Euben locates Greek explorations of the civic community, and how one educates people for it, in the context of contemporary debates over higher education in the United States. Taking as a springboard (and a title) the accusation of corrupting the youth made against Socrates at his trial, Euben seeks to mediate the claims of “canonists,” who advocate a focus on classical texts on the grounds that they instill Values with a capital V, and “multiculturalists,” who are suspicious of such texts, believing them to embody the narrow and bankrupt values of dead white males—dead white slave-holding males at that. His strategy is to stress what he sees as the polyphonal and multivocal nature of the Athenian corpus, emphasizing the impossibility of these revered but disparate texts’ “teaching” any virtue other than that of constant scrutiny of self and other. The texts he examines, moreover—tragedy, comedy, and dialogue—often deal directly with the question of education for democratic citizenship, a project dear to Euben’s heart.To do this, of course, Euben must demonstrate a pro-democratic agenda in both tragedy and Old Comedy, and here I think he succeeds, although the matter is far from simple; and then there is the question of Socrates/Plato. Readers will probably be persuaded by his arguments in the following order: Sophocles’ Antigone, yes; Aristophanes’ Clouds, maybe; Plato’s Gorgias, very dubious. It is in its discussion of the troubling Gorgias that Euben’s book is most challenging and provocative.Demonstrating multiple voices in Antigone is not a daunting task. The play works as a pro-democratic statement on many levels, beginning with its very surface. Most simply, Haemon and the chorus appear to embody the voice [End Page 621] of reason against Creon’s rigidity and vulgarity, and Haemon explicitly sides with the chorus against his autocratic father. At a deeper level, however, the polyphony of the play represents what Euben sees as the multivocal nature of democratic debate, as the conflicting claims of law and family are both enacted and articulated on the stage. Here, as elsewhere in the book, he finds the process of deliberation and analysis intrinsically democratic and gives it as least as much weight as the conclusions to which it leads, if not more.Creon, who rejects discussion and deliberation and associates yielding with unmanliness, seeks to deny the richness and complexity of human life and the human community. If Creon stands for autocracy, does the equally rigid Antigone then represent democracy? It would seem to me that she does not, since the primacy she gives to religious over civic obligations appears to place her in the camp of the female/religious force that Aeschylus rejected in the Oresteia as pre-democratic, replacing it with the patriarchal state of men and civic laws as the Furies are tamed and the rulings of male juries are constituted as the laws of the community. Euben, however, puts forward an interesting argument to the opposite effect: while Creon, he writes, “may regard Antigone as the amorphous anarchic symbol of womanly power, it is worth recalling that conservatives regarded Athenian democracy the same way” (171). (We might... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular RuleJennifer T. RobertsJosiah Ober. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. xvi + 417 pp. Cloth, $35, £24.95.Making sound political decisions requires hard thinking. Most people do not want to think very hard, and some lack the capacity to do so. Many make decisions on the basis of narrow self-interest, and (...) most lack vision. Given that this is so, it is not surprising that Athenian democracy has come in for a good deal of criticism. What is striking about this criticism, however, is its origins in the writings of Athens' own intellectuals. In this carefully argued and beautifully written book Josiah Ober explores in depth the critiques of democracy in several texts of the fifth and fourth centuries. His theses are several and extend from the centrality of the democracy debate in Athenian intellectual life to the interactive relationship between Greek history and contemporary political writing: the obvious contrast between the bloodthirstiness of the Thirty and the restraint shown by the restored democracy, he contends, mandated that analysis of democracy and its flaws become increasingly sophisticated and in some cases downright labyrinthine. The core of the book, however, is not what Ober sees as sociological analyses of Athenian democracy--the early work of the so-called Old Oligarch and the late work of Aristotle--but rather those critiques that focused, he suggests, on the Athenians' preoccupation with words, and on their efficacy as Austinian "speech acts." It is the middle chapters, tied together by the thread of this preoccupation, that are the most ingenious.Since the logos/ergon relationship is, I would suggest, more nuanced in Thucydides' work than in that of the other authors Ober examines, I leave discussion of it for last and begin with the chapter on Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae. This chapter offers an exciting reading of the play, one in which the potentially trendy Austinian speech-act theory proves an excellent tool of analysis. Like most readers of the play, Ober sees Aristophanes raising the question whether "the attributes essential for the exercise of citizenship" were "unique to Athenian biological males" (135); what is distinctive about his approach is the emphasis on questions that the playwright raises about the relationship of speech to reality. Can words create equality? This is the question, Ober argues, to which Aristophanes is directing his democratic audience's attention. Are there limits to the sociopolitical realities that the Assembly can enact? Does saying make it so? To what extent are notions of male and female fixed by nonverbal physis, and to what degree are they social constructions made by spoken (and [End Page 479] then written) psephismata? Could a decree of the Assembly create female participatory citizens in the way it could create a state of war? (Questions, of course, do not presuppose answers, and in this respect Aristophanes remains maddening to classicists trying to reconstruct the political views of this important thinker on the Athenian scene.)Moving ahead to Plato, Ober explores the word/fact nexus in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and the Republic. Gorgias, of course, is the locus classicus for Plato's attack on democracy and rhetoric, which the philosopher represents as a package deal. It is there that Socrates gets Gorgias to concede that rhetoric works its magic on the ignorant more easily than on those who know, and that on the subject of medicine, for example, the most persuasive orator will be he who has studied not medicine but the art of speaking, and similarly with the other arts: there is no need to know pragmata as long as one has discovered a mechane for persuasion (i.e., appearance can substitute for reality). Socrates thus forces Gorgias into a position which we the readers recognize as untenable but poor Gorgias does not. When Socrates concludes that rhetoric must then consist of the blind leading the blind, Gorgias rejoices in the ease and efficiency of it all: how pleasant to skip all the drudgery of learning one art after another, when all one really needs to know is the art of persuasion! (459A-C, passim... (shrink)