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  1. Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
    The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...)
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    Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
    The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...)
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  3. Moral judgment.Jennifer Ellen Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich - 2009 - In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    Questions regarding the nature of moral judgment loom large in moral philosophy. Perhaps the most basic of these questions asks how, exactly, moral judgments and moral rules are to be defined; what features distinguish them from other sorts of rules and judgments? A related question concerns the extent to which emotion and reason guide moral judgment. Are moral judgments made mainly on the basis of reason, or are they primarily the products of emotion? As an example of the former view, (...)
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  4. Intuition, philosophical theorising, and the threat of scepticism.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
     
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  5. Moderate Intuitionism.Michael Johnson & Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
    Recent empirical work suggests that intuitions may be less reliable than previously assumed. However, given the ubiquity of intuition in philosophical reasoning, it is tempting to give intuitions some evidential weight. This chapter develops an account called ‘moderate intuitionism’, a view whereby intuitions are generally reliable, but nonetheless capable of substantial degrees of error. Believing that the general reliability of intuition emerges from the nature of language, the chapter develops an outline for a disposition-based metasemantic theory which can ground the (...)
     
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    Demythologizing intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):386-402.
    Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of (...)
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    The role of intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 11-44.