Incapacitated adult patients are commonly divided into two groups for purposes of decision making; those with a surrogate and those without. Respectively, these groups are often referred to as represented and unrepresented, and the relative ethics of decision making between them raises two particular issues. The first issue involves the differential application of the best interests standard between groups. Second is the prevailing notion that representedness and unrepresentedness are categorical phenomena, though it is more aptly understood as a multidimensional and (...) continuous variable based on relational moral authority. This paper examines the nature of representedness as it relates to ethical norms of surrogate decision making. (shrink)
With narrow exception, physicians’ treatment of incapacitated patients requires the consent of health surrogates. Although the decision-making authority of surrogates is appropriately broad, their moral authority is not without limits. Discerning these bounds is particularly germane to ethically complex treatments and has important implications for the welfare of patients, for the professional integrity of clinicians, and, in fact, for the welfare of surrogates. Palliative sedation is one such complex treatment; as such, it provides a valuable model for analyzing the scope (...) of surrogates’ moral authority. Guidelines for palliative sedation that present it as a “last-resort” treatment for severe and intractable suffering yet require surrogate consent in order to offer it are ethically untenable, precisely because the moral limits of surrogate authority have not been considered. (shrink)
The ‘best interests’ decision making standard is used in clinical care to make necessary health decisions for non-capacitated individuals for whom neither explicit nor inferred wishes are known. It has been also widely acknowledged as a basis for enrolling some non-capacitated adults into clinical research such as emergency, critical care, and dementia research. However, the best interests standard requires that choices provide the highest net benefit of available options, and clinical research rarely meets this criterion. In the context of modern (...) norms of bioethics, the best interests standard rarely supports surrogate consent for research and should not be accepted as a routine provision. (shrink)
A commentary on “Must We Be Courageous?,” by Ann Hamric, John Arras, and Margaret Mohrmann, and on “Patient-Satisfaction Surveys on a Scale of 0 to 10: Improving Health Care, or Leading It Astray?,” by Alexandra Junewicz and Stuart J. Youngner, bothin the May-June 2015 issue.
(2010). Insult to Injury: Ethical Confusion in American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 68-70.
Background: Previous studies have found lapses in ethical safeguards for subjects of critical-care research. Objective: To assess recently published empiric critical-care research conducted in the United States for the reporting of research protections as they relate to informed consent and surrogate decision-making. Methods: Systematic review of a sample of empiric critical-care research studies published between 2000 and 2004. Results: Of 51 studies reviewed, consent was reported as having been obtained in 44. Assessment of subjects' decision-making capacity was noted in 35% (...) of studies. Assessments of subjects' capacity was less likely to be reported in studies in which researchers accepted consent from either subjects or from third parties, compared to studies with only subjects' consent. Five studies did not report securing Institutional Review Board approval. Conclusion: Lapses in the reporting of critical-care research are prevalent. (shrink)