8 found
Jeffrey Seidman [7]Jeffrey S. Seidman [1]Jeffrey Sarbey Seidman [1]
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Jeffrey Seidman
Vassar College
  1. Valuing and Caring.Jeffrey Seidman - 2009 - Theoria 75 (4):272-303.
    What is it to "value" something, in the semi-technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent-relative reasons for action and for emotion. Understood in this way, an agent's carings have a stronger claim (...)
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  2. Two Sides of 'Silencing'.Jeffrey Seidman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):68 - 77.
    John McDowell argues that for virtuous agents the requirements of virtue do not outweigh competing considerations, but 'silence' them. He explains this claim in two different ways: a virtuous agent (a) will not be tempted to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('motivational silencing'), or (b) will not believe that he has any reason to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('rational silencing'). I identify a small class of cases in which alone McDowell's claims (...)
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  3. Caring and Incapacity.Jeffrey Seidman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):301 - 322.
    This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called “incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a (...)
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  4. The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion.Jeffrey Seidman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2785-2801.
    Caring is a complex attitude. At first look, it appears very complex: it seems to involve a wide range of emotional and other dispositions, all focused on the object cared about. What ties these dispositions together, so that they jointly comprise a single attitude? I offer a theory of caring, the Attentional Theory, that answers this question. According to the Attentional Theory, caring consists of just two, logically distinct dispositions: a disposition to attend to an object and hence to considerations (...)
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    Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation.Jeffrey Seidman - 2008 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (1):1-37.
    When a reasonable agent deliberates about what to do, she entertains only a limited range of possible courses of action. A theory of practical reasoning must therefore include an account of deliberative attention: an account that both explains the patterns of deliberative attention that reasonable agents typically display and allows us to see why these patterns of deliberative attention are reasonable. I offer such an account, built around two, central claims. A reasonable agent who cares about some end is disposed (...)
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  6.  46
    Rationality and Reflection.Jeffrey S. Seidman - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):201-214.
    Christine Korsgaard claims that an agent is less than fully rational if she allows some attitude to inform her deliberation even though she cannot justify doing so. I argue that there is a middle way, which Korsgaard misses, between the claim that our attitudes neither need nor admit of rational assessment, on the one hand, and Korsgaard's claim that the attitudes which inform our deliberation always require justification, on the other: an agent needs reasons to opt out of her concerns (...)
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    Reasons Not to Consider Our Options.Jeffrey Seidman - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (3):353-371.
    I argue that a practical deliberator may have good reasons not to consider some option even though that option is what there is most reason, all things considered, for her to do. The most interesting reasons not to consider an option arise in cases where an agent cannot be compensated in kind for the loss of goods that she values. Where this is the case, an attitude of conservatism is warranted: it is reasonable to begin deliberation by considering only ‘no-regrets’ (...)
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    Jollimore, Troy. Love’s Vision. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. 220. $35.00. [REVIEW]Jeffrey Seidman - 2012 - Ethics 122 (4):815-819.
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