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Jeffrey S. Poland [6]Jeffrey Stephen Poland [1]
  1. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.
  2. Physicalism, the Philosophical Foundations.Jeffrey Stephen Poland - 1994 - Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism is a program for building a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this program. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. He (...)
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  3. Mechanism and Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience.Jeffrey S. Poland & Barbara Von Eckardt - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):972-984.
    The aim of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) mechanism approach to gaining an understanding of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that although the mechanism approach can capture many aspects of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, it cannot capture everything. In particular, it cannot completely capture all aspects of the content and significance of mental representations or the evaluative features constitutive of psychopathology.
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  4. Problems with the DSM Approach to Classifying Psychopathology.Jeffrey S. Poland, Barbara von Eckardt & Will Spaulding - 1994 - In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
     
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  5.  9
    Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal.Jeffrey S. Poland, Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (3):471.
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  6.  24
    Mechanism and Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience.Barbara Eckardvont & Jeffrey S. Poland - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):972-984.
  7.  8
    In Defense of the Standard View.Jeffrey S. Poland & Barbara Von Eckardt - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:312-331.
    In Explaining Attitudes, Lynne Rudder Baker considers two views of what it is to have a propositional attitude, the Standard View and Pragmatic Realism, and attempts to argue for Pragmatic Realism. The Standard View is, roughly, the view that “the attitudes, if there are any, are particular brain states”. In contrast, Pragmatic Realism that a person has a propositional attitude if and only if there are certain counterfactuals true of that person.Baker’s case against the Standard View is a complex one. (...)
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