St. Thomas’s Third Way to prove the existence of God, “Of Possibility and Necessity” (ST 1, q.2, art. 3, response) is one of the most controverted passages in the entire Thomistic corpus. The central point of dispute is that if there were only possible beings, each at some time would cease to exist and, therefore, at some point in time nothing would exist, and because something cannot come from nothing, in such an eventuality, nothing would exist now—a reductio ad absurdum (...) conclusion. Therefore, at least one necessary being must exist. Generations of critics and defenders have contended over St. Thomas’s proof. This article argues that the principle of pros hen analogy is implicit in the Third Way and that once identified explains the ontological dependency of possible beings, as secondary analogates, on the first necessary being, as primary analogate. Thus, without the necessary being as primary analogate, possible beings simply could not exist. The fact that they do exist is evidence for the existence of the necessary being. St. Thomas makes synthesizes the principle of pros hen analogy, as found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, with the Neoplatonic principle of participation. Aristotle develops pros hen analogy in contradistinction to univocal and equivocal predication as well as to genus in Metaphysics 4.2, 11.3, 12.3-5. Since Scotus and re-enforced by modern analytic logic, philosophers have almost universally regarded any kind of analogical predication as a sub-category of equivocal predication and, thus, implicitly occlude the possibility of considering pros hen analogy in their readings of the Third Way. Distinction of per se and per accidens infinite regress and of radical and natural contingency are also central to understanding the Third Way. While resolving apparent problems in the Third Way, the article also seeks to rehabilitate the doctrine of pros hen analogy as a basic principle in Thomistic and, indeed, Aristotelian metaphysics. (shrink)

Contributors consider the limits of our knowledge of a world of unlimited knowability by examining philosophical thought from the Classical Greeks to the present.

Since Kant, modern philosophy has reacted critically and most often dismissively to any theories or inquiries deemed "metaphysical." The Critique of Pure Reason shows that although human beings naturally seek knowledge of things that are beyond the limits of all possible experience (i.e., metaphysical knowledge), the categories by means of which we are capable of knowledge are all restricted in their legitimate application to objects of possible experience. Thus, Kant rules out any human capacity for metaphysical knowledge on epistemological grounds—grounds (...) having to do with the way knowledge-claims are legitimated. It is, therefore, surprising to find Sartre raising at least two questions in the Conclusion of Being and Nothingness that he himself labels metaphysical but nevertheless legitimate. (shrink)

Since Kant, modern philosophy has reacted critically and most often dismissively to any theories or inquiries deemed "metaphysical." The Critique of Pure Reason shows that although human beings naturally seek knowledge of things that are beyond the limits of all possible experience, the categories by means of which we are capable of knowledge are all restricted in their legitimate application to objects of possible experience. Thus, Kant rules out any human capacity for metaphysical knowledge on epistemological grounds—grounds having to do (...) with the way knowledge-claims are legitimated. It is, therefore, surprising to find Sartre raising at least two questions in the Conclusion of Being and Nothingness that he himself labels metaphysical but nevertheless legitimate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Path of No Path: Contemporary Studies in Pure Land Buddhism Honoring Roger CorlessJeff WilsonPath of No Path: Contemporary Studies in Pure Land Buddhism Honoring Roger Corless. Edited by Richard K. Payne. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Buddhist Studies and Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2009. 290 pp.Roger Corless (1938–2007)—Catholic devotee, Tibetan Buddhist meditator, Pure Land interpreter, and renowned professor of religious studies—was a frequent contributor to the (...) dialogue between Christians and Buddhists in the West, including through the auspices of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies. Although he passed away in 2007, his spirit continues to enrich this historic encounter, including through several major posthumous works. Path of No Path is the first of three such works planned for release by the Institute of Buddhist Studies, a seminary and graduate studies institution associated with Jōdo Shinshū, the largest form of Pure Land Buddhism in Japan. Originally intended as a festschrift, the book unfortunately had to become a memorial volume. In addition to some laudatory material reflecting on Corless’s life, it contains articles by ten scholars focusing on the Pure Land tradition of Buddhism, broken into three categories of practice, transmission, and interpretation. Many contributors, such as Ruben Habito and Al Bloom, will be familiar to readers of Buddhist-Christian Studies.Edited anthologies are always a mixed bag, but happily Path of No Path holds together well and offers many interesting essays for scholars interested in this field, although at times the connection to Corless’s own work seems a bit forced. Alternately, we might view those essays with relatively tenuous connections to Corless’s work as representing the sort of playfulness that Corless famously displayed in his writings and speaking appearances. A good example of this is the first essay, by Harvey [End Page 225] Aronson, on Vajrasattva meditation. Vajrasattva, a major figure in Vajrayāna Buddhism, is not traditionally associated with the Pure Land tradition. Yet Aronson begins by putting a Jōdo Shinshū framework around his subsequent article, which deals with meditative visualizations as healing techniques. Like Corless frequently did, Aronson looks for connections between seemingly disparate cultures and religions. In the process, he offers some insightful comments on how Asian and Western practitioners approach healing within a Buddhist context. For example, he finds that the Westerners are far more heavily psychological in their orientation, and tend to react negatively to situations of obligation and responsibility to others that are comfortable to Asian participants.The second essay’s relationship to Corless is much more organic, as it deals with Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, a subject that he published important works on. This essay, by Charles Orzech, analyzes the Rites for Contemplation of and Offerings to Amitāyus Tathāgata (Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui), an esoteric text based in part on the famous Scripture on Contemplation of the Buddha of Limitless Life (Fo shuo guan wuliangshoufo ling). Orzech skillfully demonstrates how the Rites reframed the Scripture on Contemplation in a tantric context, contributing to the ongoing esotericization of Chinese Buddhism in the Tang period (618–907).James Sanford’s contribution also relates to both tantric and Pure Land forms of Buddhism. Sanford offers a translation of and commentary on the Guide to the Eighty Thousand Dharma Principles (Hōri hachiman chō). This is a short apocryphal text purporting to reveal secret teachings passed on from Jōdo Shinshū founder Shinran (1173–1263) to his grandson Nyoshin. These secret Jōdo Shinshū lineages are an important historical phenomenon that have not been given nearly enough attention, in part because they are actively disapproved of by the orthodox, nonesoteric schools of Jōdo Shinshū (and indeed orthodox Shinshū has at times persecuted these minority traditions). Sanford’s introduction, translation, and commentary therefore provide a major service to scholars of Japanese religion.Gordon Bermant’s entry is short but nonetheless contains some pithy observations on the role of “practice” in American Jōdo Shinshū, a subject that Corless himself wrote about numerous times. Traditionally Jōdo Shinshū is often understood not to include any sort of formal practice—religious practices, in fact, are seen as evidence of egoism or lack... (shrink)

Human nature and cooperation -- Tucson knows all about that -- Featuring interviews with Curtis A., Renø M., and Alanna C. -- Democracy and Sproul Plaza -- The people's library -- Featuring interviews with Zachary L. and Jaime T. -- Barcelona to Greensboro -- Student loan debt -- Featuring an interview with professor George Caffentzis -- Solidarity.

Clinical and neuroscientific studies of Buddhist meditation practices are frequent topics in the news media, and have helped certain practices achieve mainstream cultural status. Buddhists have reacted by using these studies in a number of ways. Some deploy the studies to show the compatibility of science and Buddhism, often using the authority of science to lend credence to Buddhism. Other Buddhists use meditation studies to demonstrate the superiority of Buddhism over science. Within inter-Buddhist debates, meditation studies are used to argue (...) for changes in practice or belief, but also sometimes to reinforce certain traditional practices. Benjamin Zeller's threefold categorization of religious groups’ attitudes toward science and José Ignacio Cabezón's three ideal types of relationships between Buddhism and science contribute to analysis of Buddhist uses of scientific studies of meditation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Rhetorical Sense of Philosophy by Donald Phillip VereneJeffrey Dirk WilsonVERENE, Donald Phillip. The Rhetorical Sense of Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2021. xiii + 139 pp. Cloth, $49.95Rhetoric gives philosophy the ability to speak. Philosophy gives rhetoric something to say. They are mutually indispensable, and their rivalry at times descends into enmity. There are also occasions when only the one can rescue the other from catastrophe. (...) Those are the overarching dynamics of Verene's book.There is an introduction, then two parts, "Prolegomena Philosophiae," comprising four chapters, and "Three Rhetorics," comprising three chapters, followed by an epilogue, notes, and an index.Though Verene does not mention Hume in the introduction—and only twice in the book otherwise—it is difficult not to think of him when Verene speaks of philosophy as "a theater of memory," as if correcting Hume's "theater of the mind." It is also corrective to presentism, often attributed to Hume, when Verene claims that a chief task of the philosopher "is to keep us from always living in the present. For this labor to be accomplished the philosopher must go to school with both the poets and the orators." Rhetoric, rightly understood, helps philosophy to remain philosophy and prevents it from becoming sophistry.In chapter 1, "Philosophical Thinking," Verene reminds the reader that mortality is not a choice. The bounded nature of human life leads to the pursuit of happiness and, therefore, also to the pursuit of meaning. The human responds in two ways, by creating both arguments and stories, but arguments as well as stories need words.The "and yet" comes in the second chapter, "Philosophy and the Muses." Verene writes, "The philosopher knows that the real always outstrips language." Philosophy and its kin, poetry, point beyond themselves. Writing is remembering, but what is written, even at its best, can never capture all that is remembered, and memory, even at its best, can never capture all that is.In "Philosophy and Eloquence," Verene maps a way of escaping Kant. Modern philosophy rejects rhetoric and memory in its pursuit of novelty as progress. Verene introduces the concept of ingenium, "a power philosophy shares with rhetoric." It "is the ability to perceive similarity in dissimilars.... the power to produce metaphor" and irony. Metaphor and irony are philosophy's response to the stale univocal predication of critical thinking that Verene sees as the reduction of reality to an analytic concept.In "Philosophical Style," he shows that as soon as a subject is joined to a predicate, the subject ceases to be only what it was. The predicate is an [End Page 369] otherness that is pulled into the subject such that ever after the subject has an inner dialectic. "The ball is red" is generative of a ball that is not merely a ball but also something else, something foreign to its ballness. The ball gives up nothing of what it was but, rather, gains something that it was not, and yet not in the deterministic way of necessity. The ball does not have to be red, but if it is red, then "ball" and "red" constitute an inner dialectic. The ball is red predicatively and not tautologically, but separating out the kinds of predication does not exhaust all the mystery of the inner dialectic; nothing can.The three rhetorics are of "Self-Discourse," "Absolute Thought," and "The Philosophical Frontispiece." These are chapters respectively about speech appertaining to man, God, and the political entity, though each considered slant rather than head-on.Verene juxtaposes Descartes and Vico with respect to self-discourse. Descartes reframes the human being in terms of the first-person singular pronoun, thereby transforming the personal into the categorical. Vico responds by writing not an "autobiography" but, rather, The Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself, thereby transforming the pronoun for the other, "he," into the self-identifier. There follows an essay on the essay and especially on the essays of Montaigne as autobiography. "To think," Verene writes, "is to move ideas in relation to each other and thus to illuminate what comes before the mind in experience." What emerges is a dialectic between the "I" and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Historical Dictionary of Kant and KantianismJeffrey L. WilsonHelmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch. Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism. Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, 60. Lanham, MD-Toronto-Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 374. Cloth, $75.00.The authors are emeritus professor and research associate (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the University of Zurich. Although Holzhey is founding director of the Hermann Cohen Archive, Neokantianism is not disproportionately represented here. (...) The emphasis is on Kant, with supplementary treatment of Kant’s predecessors and successors adequate to grasp Kant’s role in various developments in the history of philosophy. At the same time, a reader interested in the various forms of Kantianism will find ample useful information here; for example, Kant’s influence on ethical socialism is documented from several different directions. Even without these supplements, this would be a formidably comprehensive treatment of the central terms in Kant’s writings from the pre-critical period through the Opus postumum. The authors include references to the Reflexionen (Notes and Fragments) where appropriate. They also helpfully adjudicate certain English translation problems from the perspective of native German speakers.A number of articles stand out as especially noteworthy. “Categories” traces this term from Kant’s 1770 Inaugural Dissertation through to its reception by Peirce and C. I. Lewis. “Copernican Revolution” gives in a brief article a surprisingly comprehensive treatment of Kant’s term and its probable origins that is based on very wide study of the scholarship. “Dimensions of Space” deftly clarifies Kant’s changing attitudes toward non-Euclidean geometries. “Ether” discusses Kant’s uses of the term in the Opus postumum against the background of his pre-critical works. “Hegel” is admirably balanced, summarizing Hegel’s encounter with Kant without trying to defend Kant against Hegel’s critique. “Mathematics” includes a breathtakingly concise overview of the philosophy of mathematics from Descartes through Hilbert. “Noumenon” provides a nuanced explication of this term and “thing in itself” based on the differing roles the two expressions play in Kant’s discourse. “Object” gives the clearest explanation of Kant’s use of this term the reviewer has seen anywhere. “Pre-Critical Philosophy” discusses every philosophically relevant aspect of this period of Kant’s writings and its significance for later developments. “Substance,” among other articles, highlights differences between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. “World” outlines the developments in Kant’s views of the significance of this term for physics, astronomy, epistemology, ethics, and biology.Although one might assume that having only two authors for a reference work might result in a certain narrowness or bias, the presentation here is comprehensive and balanced. The dictionary has the feel of a project that has been ripening over the course of many years. The advantage of the two-author model is a consistency of voice that makes reading the dictionary through cover to cover pleasant and rewarding. The chronology and sketch of Kant’s life provide an excellent overview, and the judiciously selected bibliography is preceded by the best compact orientation to Kant scholarship available. The topical arrangement of the bibliography, while it creates some difficulty in locating a work cited in the text of the dictionary, allows a reader interested in one area of Kant to find the most important relevant secondary sources instantly.The reviewer is at pains to find something here to criticize. There is the occasional linguistic indiscretion, such as the unidiomatic “dignity to be happy.” The authors refer to Kant-Studien as “Kant Studies,” so that a reader might search in vain for a journal of this name. Such infelicities are notable because they are rare in this well-edited volume. Sometimes information might be better placed under another heading; the reviewer often noted defects in one article that were remedied in a related one. (Following up the cross-referenced terms was the solution in every case.) There are also occasional omissions. Distinguished Kant scholarship taking place in Latin America should be recognized. “Antinomy” overlooks the clearest definition of this term: a necessary conflict of reason with itself. “Cognition” neglects Kant’s puzzling references to “practical cognition” (praktische Erkenntnis). Christian August Crusius, mentioned in... (shrink)