This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and ...

Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the 1950s. An issue (...) of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...) is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology. (shrink)

Ce texte est le fruit d’une collaboration entre un astrophysicien, Jean-René Roy, et un philosophe de l’éducation, Normand Baillargeon. Ils ont en commun d’avoir été marqués par la fréquentation des oeuvres de Mario Bunge, auxquelles ils attachent un grand prix, sur un plan personnel, d’abord, mais aussi, et c’est ce qu’ils veulent rappeler dans ces pages : parce qu’ils estiment que les oeuvres de Bunge contribuent de manière extrêmement forte et positive à rendre plus salubre la vie de l’esprit, en (...) enrichissant notre intellect et en luttant contre diverses formes troublantes d’obscurantisme qui y sévissent parfois, notamment dans les domaines familiers aux deux auteurs. (shrink)

Jean-Olivier Roy | : L’étude des nations et du nationalisme autochtones contemporains présente des défis en raison des divergences, chez les penseurs et les acteurs politiques, quant à leur nature et leur interprétation. Nous constatons que le nationalisme autochtone, à la base principalement ethnique ou culturel, accorde de plus en plus d’importance aux revendications politiques, dépassant ainsi les simples protections culturelles. Cet article pose l’hypothèse que les nations et le nationalisme autochtones, malgré les références aux traditions et à leur origine (...) immémoriale, sont des construits en perpétuelle mutation, notamment sous l’influence des nationalismes environnants et de la modernité politique. Pour développer cette hypothèse, nous examinons les propos des acteurs et des penseurs au moyen des différentes théories de la nation. | : The study of indigenous nations and nationalism poses several challenges based on the disagreements that their interpretation poses for the theorists and political actors alike. We note that indigenous nationalism, based on ethnic or cultural grounds, attributes increasing importance to political demands, thereby leaving behind claims for cultural protections. This article argues that despite references to tradition and culture, indigenous nations and nationalisms are in constant flux, subject to the influences of nationalisms around them and the demands of political modernity. To support this claim, we examine the proposals by several theorists and political actors across theories of the nation. (shrink)

RESUMEN La psicopatologia contemporánea sufre de una brecha descriptiva respecto de la experiencia patológica, y la tradición de la psicopatologia contiene un capital descriptivo acumulado que debe ser explotado para la necesaria superación de este déficit. Se argumenta examinando el caso particular de la psicopatologia cognitiva de la esquizofrenia y del contenido de la experiencia del delirio de control, mostrando cómo la teoría de Henri Ey, así como la del automatismo mental del siglo xix en la cual tiene sus raíces, (...) contienen herramientas descriptivas importantes para establecer que la experiencia de un delirio de control es esencialmente diferente de la experiencia de una simple ilusión de control. ABSTRACT This article defends the general view that contemporary psychopathology suffers from a descriptive gap with respect to pathological experience and that the psycho-pathological tradition has accumulated a descriptive capital that should be used in the necessary effort to overcome this gap. This general thesis is argued for by examining the specific case of the cognitive psychopathology of schizophrenia and the experience of the delusion of control, showing how Henri Ey's theory and the 19th century theory of mental automatism in which the former is rooted contain important descriptive tools for establishing that the experience of a delusion of control is fundamentally different from that of a sheer illusion of control. (shrink)

L’article s’attache à poser et définir le problème de la pertinence de la théorie de l’accointance de Russell pour le débat contemporain sur la conscience phénoménale, ainsi qu’à en entreprendre l’examen. Il avance deux hypothèses principales. La première est que, d’un point de vue théorique, ce problème recouvre principalement la question de savoir s’il convient de défendre une conception intentionnaliste de la nature de la conscience phénoménale. La seconde est qu’une partie importante du débat contemporain, correspondant au camp de ceux (...) qui se réclament d’une approche non représentationaliste de la conscience phénoménale et qui est illustré de façon centrale par le travail du philosophe Ned Block, répondent négativement à une telle question et reconnaissent donc du même coup, quoique de manière principalement implicite, que ce qui est en fait pertinent dans la théorie de l’accointance russellienne c’est que son auteur en soit venu à la rejeter en 1919. (shrink)

My first goal is to question a received view about the development of Analytical Philosophy. According to this received view Analytical Philosophy is born out of a Linguistic Turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline; this primacy of language is then overthrown by the return of the study of mind as philosophia prima through a second Cognitive Turn taken in the mid-sixties. My contention is that this picture is a gross oversimplification and that the Cognitive (...) Turn should better be seen as an extension of the Linguistic one. Indeed, if the Cognitive Turn gives explicit logical priority to the study of mind over the study of language, one of its central features is to see the mind as a representational system offering no substantial difference with a linguistic one. However, no justification is offered for the fundamental assimilation of the nature of a mental representation with that of a linguistic symbol supporting this picture of the mind, although the idea that a system of mental representations is identical in structure with a system of linguistic symbols has been argued over and over. I try to demonstrate this point through a close critical examination of Fodor's paradigmatic notion of 'double reduction.' My second claim is that the widespread contemporary assimilation of a mental representation with a symbol of a linguistic kind is no more than a prejudice. Finally I indicate that this prejudice cannot survive a rigorous critical examination. (shrink)

L'idee domine largement encore que, des dernieres annees du XIXe siecle a nos jours, le developpement de la philosophie est parcouru par une opposition a la fois centrale et radicale entre un courant analytique surgi avec Frege et Russell, et un courant phenomenologique initie par Husserl. L'investigation rigoureuse du passe a neanmoins commence de mettre a nu une realite historique bien plus complexe, soulevant par la des interrogations aussi vastes qu'essentielles a la pleine comprehension de notre modernite philosophique. Jusqu'a quel (...) point un schisme analytico-phenomenologique s'est-il effectivement produit au sein de la philosophie? A quel moment au juste et selon quelles modalites precises? Comment ce schisme s'est-il remodele au fil du temps? Quel en est, a travers ses differentes figures, l'objet le plus essentiel? Autant de questions qui, malgre l'interet croissant qu'elles suscitent, demeurent objet de controverse. Rhin et Danube apporte une nouvelle contribution a ce debat, degageant les fondements d'une interpretation originale qu'il confronte de facon prioritaire avec celle proposee par le philosophe Michael Dummett, dont il salue la profondeur souvent meconnue en meme temps qu'il en denonce les erreurs et les insuffisances. (shrink)

On ne peut penser le politique dans sa consistance propre sans dépasser de quelque manière la perspective abstraite de l'individu. Il faut s'élever à la vue d'une totalité qui ordonne en son sein les rapports des individus qui, livrés à leur spontanéité, tendent naturellement à s'approprier le propre d'autrui, à l'assujettir à leurs fins. Mais il y a aussi dans la volonté humaine une profondeur raisonnable qui lui permet de se vouloir dans le tout c'est-à-dire dans le respect de l'égale (...) liberté d'autrui et de vouloir le tout lui-même par-delà la médiation instrumentale qu'il représente par rapport à la simple protection de l'individu. La loi de l'État limite les totalités individuelles, spontanément errantes et violentes, et par là rend possible leur cohabitation dans un monde commun. En effet, la loi qui limite l'usage anarchique de mes forces contraint également autrui et, de ce fait, me protège. Mais, avant Hegel, Rousseau exalte aussi l'intégration différenciée des individus, l'unité substantielle et réfléchie du corps politique. L'égoïsme éclairé de l'individu ne peut suffire à cimenter l'unité politique, il faut faire appel à un mobile éthique plus élevé, l'amour de la patrie qui, seul, peut susciter à la limite le mori pro patria. (shrink)

The following pages contend that, in spite of its intensive development, contemporary cognitive science has recently entered a phase of fairly acute uncertainty and confusion regarding some of its most essential foundations. They emphasize two aspects of this foundational crisis, specifically vindicating the existence of a crisis of naturalism and of a crisis of representationalism. Like any foundational crisis, this situation constitutes a serious threat to the significance of the empirical achievements of cognitive science. A threat calling for renewed efforts (...) to provide it with secure foundations that can only be obtained through acloser collaboration between empirical and foundational investigations, or, more concretely, between cognitive scientists and philosophers. They also outline a general strategy to address this threat, and illustrate itabout one aspect of particular importance of the naturalist crisis, namely the emergentist challenge to the orthodoxy of non reductive functionalism. They argue for the rejection of one version of this emergentist challenge,and they lay out a minimal condition that any other version of emergentism must meet. It is still unclear whether this condition is yet satisfactorily met by some version, and in particular by the sort of emergentism associated with the notion of dynamical system. Clarifyingthis issue should accordingly be seen as a top priority on the agenda of cognitive philosophy. (shrink)

Gallagher provides a suggestive solution to the problem of articulating the neurophenomenological and the enactivist components of Varela’s approach to cognition, although one that perpetuates a problematic understanding of the naturalist dimension of the idea of neurophenomenology.