Review of the paper mentioned in the title.

Let NBG be von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory without the axiom of choice and let NBGA be the modification which allows atoms. In this paper we consider some of the well-known class or global forms of the wellordering theorem, the axiom of choice, and maximal principles which are known to be equivalent in NBG and show they are not equivalent in NBGA.

We show that it is not possible to construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which the axiom of choice for well-ordered families of sets and the axiom of choice for sets are both true, but the axiom of choice is false.

In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice every set has the same cardinal number as some ordinal. Von Rimscha has weakened this condition to “Every set has the same cardinal number as some transitive set”. In set theory without the axiom of choice, we study the deductive strength of this and similar statements introduced by von Rimscha.

Two Fraenkel-Mostowski models are constructed in which the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem is true. In both models, AC for countable sets is true, but AC for sets of cardinality 2math image and the 2m = m principle are both false. The Principle of Dependent Choices is true in the first model, but false in the second.

In this paper we study some statements similar to the Partition Principle and the Trichotomy. We prove some relationships between these statements, the Axiom of Choice, and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. We also prove some independence results. MSC: 03E25, 03E50, 04A25, 04A50.

We investigate the set theoretical strength of some properties of normality, including Urysohn's Lemma, Tietze-Urysohn Extension Theorem, normality of disjoint unions of normal spaces, and normality of Fσ subsets of normal spaces.

We study conditions for a topological space to be metrizable, properties of metrizable spaces, and the role the axiom of choice plays in these matters.

We study statements about countable and well-ordered unions and their relation to each other and to countable and well-ordered forms of the axiom of choice. Using WO as an abbreviation for “well-orderable”, here are two typical results: The assertion that every WO family of countable sets has a WO union does not imply that every countable family of WO sets has a WO union; the axiom of choice for WO families of WO sets does not imply that the countable union (...) of countable sets is WO. (shrink)

We study the relationships between definitions of compactness in topological spaces and the roll the axiom of choice plays in these relationships.

This is a continuation of [2]. We study the Tychonoff Compactness Theorem for various definitions of compactness and for various types of spaces . We also study well ordered Tychonoff products and the effect that the multiple choice axiom has on such products.

We find properties of topological spaces which are not shared by disjoint unions in the absence of some form of the Axiom of Choice.

Résistance(s) réunit un ensemble de contributions scientifiques originales émanant de chercheurs en sciences humaines et sociales et consacré à la ou aux résistance(s). La résistance décrit les capacités de refus, d'évitement et d'adaptation développées par les acteurs lorsqu'ils sont confrontés à une imposition externe ou à une injonction institutionnelle. Elle se présente comme une interprétation des refus, des éventuelles ruses voire des conflits ouverts qui s'expriment dans une telle situation ; cette interprétation diffère cependant de sa simple manifestation dans la (...) mesure où elle recadre la rationalité et le bien-fondé de l'action ou de la réaction. Il n'est plus question d'y voir l'immaturité d'une population ou le sous-développement d'une nation incapable d'offrir une réponse adéquate à une tension du monde ou à une décision dont elles seraient l'objet. Au contraire, cette réponse est analysée comme pertinente dans le cadre précis de cette population ou de cette nation: ramener l'interaction à son cadre, intégrer dans sa perception les logiques endogènes qui ont présidé à son élaboration, affirmer la simple présence de telles logiques, c'est-à-dire d'une telle cohérence, revient à accepter l'idée même de cette résistance qui, intrinsèquement, exprime ainsi l'existence et la reconnaissance d'une réelle diversité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

An obituary of Jean E. Hampton (1954-1996) by the editors of Economics and Philosophy. At the time of her premature death, Jean was serving as a member of the Editorial Board of the journal.

L'Université de Paris, foyer primitif de l'humanisme.--Erasme de Rotterdam, père de l'humanisme.--Voltaire et "le siècle des lumières."--Goethe, événement européen et non pas allemand.--Nietzsche, éducateur et prophète.--Le message de Carl Spitteler à notre temps.--Rilke, "le nouvel Orphée.--La catastrophe mondiale et le bon Européen de l'avenir.

Experiments show that psi differs from known physical processes in a variety of ways, and these differences are described herein. Because of these, psi cannot be accounted for in terms of presently known physical laws. A number of theories, of which we review a sampling, suggest ways in which known physical laws might be expanded in order to account for psi. However, there is no agreement on which of these theories, if any, will ultimately provide a general explanation. A further (...) problem in studying psi is that it is elusive, i.e., methods are not presently known by which it can be reliably produced. However, if psi is real, its study can open the door to a new frontier of knowledge and contribute to our understanding of consciousness. (shrink)

The term action of consciousness is used to refer to an influence, such as psychokinesis or free will, that produces an effect on matter that is correlated to mental intention, but not completely determined by physical conditions. Such an action could not conserve energy. But in that case, one wonders why, when highly accurate measurements are done, occasions of non-conserved energy (generated perhaps by unconscious PK) are not detected. A possible explanation is that actions of consciousness take place within the (...) limits of the uncertainty principle. Two models are reviewed that, using the latter assumption, propose that consciousness can originate an action potential in the brain. One (that of Eccles) uses the latter assumption only, and the other (that of Burns) additionally assumes that consciousness acts, within those limits, by ordering quantum fluctuations. (shrink)

Recent models of consciousness are reviewed which explore the relationship of consciousness to physical laws; many of these also explore the relationship of consciousness to biological findings. Issues investigated by these models are discussed, with the issues framed in a general way in order to provide a comparison between the models. In Part I the issues discussed are: (1) What is the causal relationship between consciousness and the physical world (physicalism, dualism, etc.)? and (2) What physical characteristics are associated with (...) the interface between brain/physical world and consciousness? (shrink)

Even if all of the content of conscious experience is encoded in the brain, there is a considerable difference between the view that consciousness does independent processing and the view that it does not. If all processing is done by the brain, then conscious experience is unnecessary and irrelevant to behavior. If consciousness performs a function, then its association with particular aspects of brain processing reflect its functional use in determining behavior. However, if consciousness does perform a function, it cannot (...) be described entirely by known physical laws. Rather, even if the content of conscious experience follows physical encoding in the brain, consciousness must then be governed in part by a principle which is different from any known physical principle. (shrink)

Two forms of independent action by consciousness have been proposed by various researchers – free will and holistic processing. (Holistic processing contributes to the formation of behavior through the holistic use of brain programs and encoding.) The well-known experiment of Libet et al. (1983) implies that if free will exists, its action must consist of making a selection among alternatives presented by the brain. As discussed herein, this result implies that any physical changes mind can produce in the brain are (...) very small, and this in turn implies that holistic processing would also act to select among brain programs. The latter process would contribute to flexibility of behavior, which would therefore be an indication of the possible presence of consciousness in an animal. Because locomotion requires response to varying and unpredictable conditions, the above conclusions support the idea that simple forms of consciousness appear very early in the evolutionary line of the animal kingdom. (shrink)

The possibility of empirical test is discussed with respect to three issues: (1) What is the ontological relationship between consciousness and the brain/physical world? (2) What physical characteristics are associated with the mind/brain interface? (3) Can consciousness act on the brain independently of any brain process?