This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account of instrumental rationality. The central problem is to (...) explain the grip of instrumental requirements even in cases in which agents do not fully endorse the ends they are pursuing. The solution I propose appeals to coherence constraints on the beliefs that condition the distinctive volitional stance of intention. (shrink)

In this paper, we demonstrate how craft practice in contemporary jewellery opens up conceptions of ‘digital jewellery’ to possibilities beyond merely embedding pre-existing behaviours of digital systems in objects, which follow shallow interpretations of jewellery. We argue that a design approach that understands jewellery only in terms of location on the body is likely to lead to a world of ‘gadgets’, rather than anything that deserves the moniker ‘jewellery’. In contrast, by adopting a craft approach, we demonstrate that the space (...) of digital jewellery can include objects where the digital functionality is integrated as one facet of an object that can be personally meaningful for the holder or wearer. (shrink)