Integrated Information Theory stands out as one of the most promising theories for dealing with the hard problem of consciousness. Founded on five axioms derived from phenomenology, IIT seeks for the physical substrate of consciousness that complies with such axioms according to the criterion of maximally integrated information. Eventually, IIT identifies phenomenal consciousness with maximal Φ or, what is the same thing, with the strongest cause-effect power in the system. Among the scholars critical of this theory, some point to the (...) so-called Intrinsicality Problem, namely that consciousness cannot be an intrinsic property of the system because maximal Φ crucially depends on the possible existence of bigger values of Φ if the initial system is appropriately linked to or embedded in larger systems. Although proposals in the recent literature aim to solve the IP by going beyond reductionism and physicalism, none of them tackle the real issue, i.e., the insufficiency of IIT’s causal-metaphysical structure. This papers endeavors to provide a solution to the IP in IIT within a hylomorphist ontology that includes formal causation. Complementing IIT with formal causation provides the theory with a criterion of individuation that solves the IP and, by relaxing identification between maximal Φ and consciousness, it lends a more robust metaphysical structure. To wit, maximal Φ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) stands out as one of the most promising approaches to scientifically understand the emergence of consciousness. Even if it borrows from the phenomenology of consciousness to derive its axiomatic formulation, IIT does not initially adhere to any particular ontological position. However, its founder leans towards Panpsychism. More recently, Owen has studied the pros and cons of different ontologies as a metaphysical basis for IIT, defending a hylomorphic stance where en-grounding, en-forming relations gain the upper hand in (...) the causal narrative. This paper aims at (1) complementing Owen’s work by invoking additional arguments against physicalist IIT, both reductive and non-reductive; and (2) improving Owen’s characterization of non-physicalist causality through a “nested” version of hylomorphism that avoids the combination problem of Panpsychism. (shrink)

Most interpretations of Quantum Mechanics alternative to Copenhagen interpretation try to avoid the dualistic flavor of the latter. One of the basic goals of the former is to avoid the ad hoc introduction of observers and observations as an inevitable presupposition of physics. Non-Copenhagen interpretations usually trust in decoherence as a necessary mechanism to obtain a well-defined, observer-free transition from a unitary quantum description of the universe to classicality. Even though decoherence does not solve the problem of the definite outcomes, (...) it helps to explain why we do not observe superpositions and, according to Zurek’s existential interpretation, why a specific preferred basis emerges through system–environment interactions. The aim of this paper is to show why such interpretation ends up begging the question and provides little progress in understanding the quantum-to-classical transition; the ultimate reason being that preferred bases always correlate to human observation. Benefitting from the technical discussion, some remarks will be offered in the last section regarding the role of classical observations as a necessary condition to make workable the formalism of Quantum Mechanics and scientific activity itself. (shrink)

In a recent work (Grasso et al., 2021 ), practitioners of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim to have overcome the weaknesses of causal reductionism in producing a coherent account of causation, as causal reductionism would blatantly conflate causation with prediction and could not answer the question of ‘what caused what.’ In this paper, I reject such a dismissal of causal reductionism since IIT anti-reductionists misunderstand the reductionist stance. The reductionists can still invoke a causal account stemming from the causal (...) power of the universe’s basic units and interactions that, eventually, may lead to structures supporting integrated information. Additionally, I claim that the IIT-inspired misunderstanding of causal reductionism originates from the former’s metaphysical deficit, conflating information with causation. However, as a possible way out, if IIT is complemented with a deeper metaphysical ground, such as nested hylomorphism, an improved argument against causal reductionism can be made to work by invoking formal causality as the ultimate cause of integration in natural systems. (shrink)

We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the (...) phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of ‘relational nature’ described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose. (shrink)

Is an epistemological reduction strictly possible? Scientific methodology claims that a boundary separating the system from the “extra-system” can be defi ned. However, no system defi nes its own limits: rather, every system needs extra-systemic presuppositions that are defi ned from outside the system. In this article, we show how various areas of knowledge presuppose the presence of an extra-systemic reality that provides meaning: to know any system, knowledge of the “extra-system” is also necessary.

When must a specific cognitive habit be called upon to solve a problem? In the subject’s learning process, “knowing-to” is connected with a conscious particular judgment of truth or “aha” moment enacting a new behavioral schema. This paper comments on recent experiments supporting the view that a shift from automatic to controlled forms of inhibition, involving conscious attention, is crucial for detecting errors and activating a new strategy in complex cognitive situations. The part that consciousness plays in this process agrees (...) with its philosophical description as “judge of truth”, and can thus be regarded as an essential precursor to the development of higher cognitive habits. In this regard, John Henry Newman’s explanation of human assent to truth, for which our consciousness of self is always prior, proves to be decisive. (shrink)

The Maximum Entropy Production Principle (MEPP) stands out as an overarching principle that rules life phenomena in Nature. However, its explanatory power beyond heuristics remains controversial. On the one hand, the MEPP has been successfully applied principally to non-living systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, the underlying assumptions to lay the MEPP’s theoretical foundations and range of applicability increase the possibilities of conflicting interpretations. More interestingly, from a metaphysical stance, the MEPP’s philosophical status is hotly debated: does (...) the MEPP passively translate physical information into macroscopic predictions or actively select the physical solution in multistable systems, granting the connection between scientific models and reality? This paper deals directly with this dilemma by discussing natural determination from three angles: (1) Heuristics help natural philosophers to build an ontology. (2) The MEPP’s ontological status may stem from its selection of new forms of causation beyond physicalism. (3) The MEPP’s ontology ultimately depends on the much-discussed question of the ontology of probabilities in an information-theoretic approach and the ontology of macrostates according to the Boltzmannian definition of entropy. (shrink)

El compatibilismo afirma que el libre albedrío es compatible con el determinismo. Para el «compatibilismo de las bifurcaciones» pertenece a la esencia de la libertad «poder actuar de otra manera», mientras que para el «compatibilismo de la fontalidad» resulta decisiva la ultimidad del agente como fuente de control. Ahora bien, dadas dos partículas con entrelazamiento EPR, la medición de una variable en una de ellas determina instantáneamente el valor de dicha variable en la otra. Experimentos recientes hacen finalmente insostenibles explicaciones (...) basadas en variables ocultas locales: o la naturaleza está ónticamente indeterminada o bien está determinada de modo global. El primer caso es incompatible con los dos compatibilismos y el segundo es incompatible con el «poder actuar de otra manera». Además, implicaría la existencia de variables ocultas no locales como fuente última de determinación, con longitudes de correlación típicas mayores que las del cuerpo humano: la acción no podría originarse en su interior. El compatibilismo, por tanto, debe ser rechazado. (shrink)

Bruineberg et al. underestimate the ontological weight of Markov blankets as actual boundaries of systems and lean toward an instrumentalist understanding thereof. Yet Markov blankets need not be deemed mere tools. Determining their reality depends on the fundamental problem of distinguishing between system and environment in physics, which, in turn, demands a metaphysical bedrock backed by a realist stance on science.

In his latest book,Roger Penrose deals with three foundational problems of current physics fromhis particularly fresh perspective.He criticizes mainstream string the- ories, standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, and pre-Big Bang cosmolo- gies inasmuch as they aim to solve profound questions while glossing over equally deep issues in our understanding of nature. In this review, I analyze Penrose’s main arguments, emphasizing his presentation of the Second Law conundrum as “the most profound mystery of cosmology”, and discuss his own proposals to overcome (...) the impasse. I especially focus on the capabilities of conformal cyclic cosmology to illuminate the enigma of the extraordinarily low entropy at the Big Bang and review its capacity of success in stipulating a reset for the entropy of the universe. Even though one need not follow Penrose’s tentative answers, which are not immune to serious critiques, much of his view can be shared as a sound starting point in search of “the new physics of the universe.”. (shrink)