The book surveys the key metaphysical contributions of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More (1614–1687).

: The Cartesians have often been read as if they denied spatial presence to incorporeal substances, reserving it for extended things alone. This article explores whether this common interpretation is accurate, examining the cases of both created minds and the divine substance of God Himself. Through scrutiny of the relevant texts of both Descartes himself and his followers, it demonstrates that, in the divine case, this common interpretation is incorrect, and that the Cartesians did believe that God’s own substance really (...) was omnipresent in a literal sense. In the case of created minds, by contrast, the article suggests that the standard reading is probably correct after all, and that these substances were indeed excluded from the spatial world: but it also suggests that, in the hands of at least some of the Cartesians, this position caused certain philosophical tensions and potential inconsistencies within their systems. (shrink)

This paper explores the ontology of Malebranche's notion of "intelligible extension", the archetypal divine idea of matter which he believed to be the immediate object of our own minds in all of our thoughts about corporeal things. Building on this account of its ontology, and through an examination of a form of isomorphism between intelligible extension and the created spatial world, the paper also attempts to explain the manner in which it could fulfill its epistemological role of representing all possible (...) bodies and supplying us with our abstract knowledge of geometry. (shrink)

various arguments for the existence of God have risen and fallen over the centuries, but the one that has perhaps fallen furthest is the argument from the universal consent of mankind. Put simply, the argument went as follows: near enough everyone, in near enough every nation, in near enough every historical era, has believed in God; therefore, God must exist. Or, as it was summarized in the strikingly Lincolnesque terms of Diderot’s Encyclopédie: “You can fool some of the people, or (...) fool all of them in certain places and certain times, but not all people in all places and in all ages.”1 Universal agreement in the truth of a certain proposition was taken by many as a sufficient demonstration of that truth. This.. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine les façons dont le platonicien de Cambridge Henry More, au XVIIe siècle, a tenté de défendre une rigoureuse séparation ontologique entre les substances matérielles et les substances spirituelles tout en maintenant que les unes et les autres étaient étendues. Nous élucidons certaines des théories et certains des concepts propres à More, tels que l’indiscerpabilité, la pénétrabilité, la spissitude essentielle et l’hylopathie, qui fournissaient, croyait-il, une base solide à cette séparation. Mais nous montrons aussi certaines faiblesses inhérentes (...) à ces théories, concluant en fin de compte que More n’est pas arrivé à maintenir la distinction stricte qu’il recherchait. (shrink)

: This paper charts the gradual development of a theory of real space, underlying the created world and constituted by the extension of God Himself, in the writings of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More. It identifies two impediments to More's embracing such a theory in the earlier part of his career, namely his initial commitment to the principles that (a) space was not real and (b) God was not extended, and it shows how he finally came to renounce these principles (...) in order to devise the theory so closely associated with him. (shrink)

This article explores the theory of natural kind essentialism, as developed by Putnam and Kripke. It defends the theory against certain criticisms, but also suggests that it should not be treated as universally true. Rather, it comes down to how different people use language, offering reasons why some people's idiolects might behave in an essentialist way while others behave in the contrary way, but explaining how we can all still communicate perfectly well despite this.

This article compares Hume's metaphysical views with those of his contemporary, the American theologian and philosopher, Jonathan Edwards. It shows how, although the two men developed their theories in isolation from one another, their minds were nevertheless following almost identical paths on several of the most central issues in metaphysics (including the natures of body and mind, personal identity, causation, and free will). Their final conclusions were, however, radically different. In short, wherever Hume came to rest in a skeptical position, (...) Edwards would initially approach the very same position, but would then pull back at the last minute and bring in God to fill the gaps, yielding a Christian system of philosophy with an idiosyncratically Humean flavour. (shrink)

Descartes croyait que le monde étendu ne se terminait pas par une borne, mais pourquoi? Après avoir expliqué la position de Descartes au §1, en suggérant que sa conception de l’étendue indéfinie de l’univers devrait être entendue comme actuelle, mais syncatégorématique, nous nous penchons sur son argument dans le §2 : toute postulation d’une surface extérieure au monde sera autodestructrice, parce que la simple contemplation d’une telle borne nous conduira à reconnaître l’existence d’une étendue allant au-delà. Au §3, nous identifions (...) l’hypothèse fondamentale qui sous-tend cet argument en comparant les conceptions respectives de Descartes et de Malebranche quant au statut ontologique des modes de l’étendue. (shrink)

in the steadily growing body of secondary literature on Anne Conway, it has frequently been claimed that Conway anticipated, and maybe even influenced, Leibniz's theory of monads. This trend got going with a 1979 article by Carolyn Merchant, entitled "The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz's Concept of the Monad."1 It subsequently came to dominate the field; even now, many commentors still just take it for granted that Conway believed in monads. For example, this commitment is considered sufficiently (...) central to her philosophy to earn a mention in the opening paragraph of the preface to Carol Wayne White's book on Conway, listed among just three things that are supposed to mark her out as... (shrink)

This article explores George Berkeley's philosophy of mathematics, in comparison with his philosophy of religion, with particular attention to his book, The Analyst, and other contemporaneous texts. Through this comparison, it sheds light on his real attitude to the calculus, as well as other mathematical impossibilities such as negative or imaginary numbers. In both mathematics and religion, Berkeley rejected "barren speculation," but he found value in both from their practical benefits in life. Viewed in this way, it turns out that (...) he really wasn't an enemy of the calculus at all, as he has often been portrayed. (shrink)

Henry More and Nicolas Malebranche, each in his own way, drew a distinction between two kinds of extension, the one indivisible and the other divisible. Spinoza also drew a comparable distinction, explaining that, insofar as extended substance was conceived intellectually, it would be grasped as indivisible, whereas, when it was instead depicted in the imagination, it would be seen as divisible. But, whereas for Spinoza these were just different views on one and the same extended substance, More and Malebranche's two (...) kinds of extension were supposed to be really distinct from one another. Consequently, neither of them could identify Spinoza's substance with both of his own non-identical kinds; and so they faced a choice over which one they would associate it with. The intriguing thing is that here they diverged. More felt that Spinoza's substance was actually divisible, and consequently material. Malebranche felt that it was actually indivisible, and consequently ideal and divine. In each case, they felt that the other kind of extension—whichever that might be—was simply absent from Spinoza's system. This article explores this divergence between More and Malebranche's interpretations of Spinoza's metaphysics, and it seeks an explanation for it in their own respective epistemologies. (shrink)

Descartes has standardly been read as holding that bodies achieve actual physical individuality through motion. He seems to say as much in Principles of Philosophy II, §25: “By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is transferred at a given time”. I contend, however, that this interpretation is quite wrong. Such a view would lead to an utterly untenable – and un-Cartesian – position whereby nothing could ever move, but nothing could be at rest either. Having noted (...) this, I then examine §25 and related texts in some detail, and I argue that, as a matter of fact, they do not support this interpretation anyway. My conclusion is that physical individuality, for Descartes, has nothing to do with motion. Parts of matter at rest must be just as truly corporeal individuals as those that are moving, for Descartes treats the former as being just as physically efficacious as the latter. I contend that Descartes was happy to regard any conceivable region of extension as an actual body, regardless of whether it should happen to be moving or not. (shrink)

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, four philosophers independently proposed immaterialist theories. Ontologies of this kind had been absent from the philosophical stage for several centuries, and their sudden and widespread revival suggests that there was something about the intellectual milieu at the turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century that made a move to immaterialism a natural step to take. This dissertation examines some of the factors which contributed to its revival. ;In this dissertation, immaterialist theories (...) are placed against the backdrop of a philosophical division between early modern versions of Platonism and Epicureanism, the former accentuating the priority of the infinite over the finite and the latter stressing instead the priority of the finite over the infinite. The twin revivals of these two ancient philosophical systems were instrumental in giving rise to importantly different versions of immaterialism. Part One of the dissertation serves as an introduction to the two subsequent Parts, by laying out some relevant historical and philosophical details regarding Platonism, Epicureanism and immaterialism. In Part Two, it is shown how Berkeley's early theory can be viewed as an Epicurean form of immaterialism. It is suggested that, while coherent as far as it went, the early theory left some crucially important things out---above all, a sound conception of God---and that, for Berkeley to be in a position to incorporate such components into his philosophy, he was compelled to make certain adjustments to it. These adjustments led to his moving quite far, from the Epicureanism of his youth to the Platonism of his old age. ;Part Three culminates with a discussion of the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards' own version of immaterialism, like Berkeley's later theory, had a strongly Platonist flavour. But, unlike Berkeley, Edwards drew on a sequence of seventeenth century theories concerning the relation between incorporeal extension and the divine substance. This enabled him to achieve a clearer conception of the divine ideas---the ones doing all the work in a Platonist immaterialist theory---than Berkeley ever managed. (shrink)

: This paper examines how Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) shifted from a broadly Newtonian conception of divine, absolute space to a more Berkeleian or Leibnizian theory of merely relative, ideal space. Setting Edwards' views within a context of contemporary European thought, it elucidates his early position, as expressed in the opening portion of his essay 'Of Being' (c. 1721), and then proceeds to chart the development of his more mature views, showing in particular how the development of his immaterialism during the (...) early 1720s drove him to change his mind on the issue of space and its relationship with God. (shrink)

This article identifies the author of an anonymous 1751 pamphlet and a group of associated letters to The Gentleman's Magazine as one Thomas Daniel, a customs officer at Sunderland and amateur philosopher. It explores the form of immaterialism Daniel presented, in relation to the views of Malebranche, Newton, Berkeley, Arthur Collier, and Jonathan Edwards.

This paper explores both the striking similarities and also the differences between Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche’s philosophical views on the Holy Trinity and, in particular, the ways in which they both gave important roles to specific Persons of the Trinity in the various different branches of their respective metaphysical systems—ontological, epistemological and ethical. It is shown that Edwards and Malebranche were in very close agreement on ontological questions pertaining to the Trinity, both with respect to the internal, triune nature (...) of the divine substance (characterising the Three Persons as the divine power, as the consubstantial idea of God which was generated as He eternally reflected on Himself, and as the mutual love which proceeded between the Father and this idea), and also with respect to the various roles these Three Persons played in the creation of the world. In epistemology, Malebranche postulated an illuminating union between the mind of man and the divine Word, insisting on an absolutely direct involvement of the Second Person in all human cognition, both intellectual and sensible. On this point Edwards did differ, endorsing instead an empiricist epistemology which left no room for such a direct union with the Word. However, when it came to ethics, Edwards and Malebranche both gave the Third Person an utterly central role, postulating much the same kind of union as Malebranche alone had postulated in the epistemological case, only now between the will of man and the Holy Spirit. (shrink)